Caffey v. Johnson, 1:94-CV-98.

Decision Date29 March 1995
Docket NumberNo. 1:94-CV-98.,1:94-CV-98.
Citation883 F. Supp. 128
PartiesBobby L. CAFFEY v. Jaymi JOHNSON, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bobby L. Caffey, Beaumont, TX, pro se.

April Lavonda Smith, Attorney General's Office, Crim. Law Enforcement, Div. LEDD, Austin, TX, for Jaymi Johnson, TDCJ-ID, Director James A. Collins.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS

COBB, District Judge.

Plaintiff Bobby L. Caffey, proceeding pro se, is a prisoner incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"), Stiles Unit. Plaintiff sues defendants Jaymi Johnson and James Collins, in his official capacity as the Director of TDCJ-ID, under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for deprivation of the right of free exercise of religion.

The court heretofore ordered that this matter be referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court.

The court has received and considered the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge filed pursuant to such order, along with the record, pleadings and all available evidence. Plaintiff filed objections to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. This requires a de novo review of the objections in relation to the pleadings and the applicable law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b).

I. Background and the Magistrate Judge's Report

Plaintiff claims that on September 19, 1993, defendant Johnson wrongfully seized and either destroyed or lost his Holy Koran, handkerchief with Islamic prayer on it, and Islamic papers.

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).1

Defendant Collins, a state official plaintiff sued solely in his official capacity, claims he is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Defendant Johnson seeks the protection of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and also claims qualified immunity for any action he may have taken. Johnson claims plaintiff has not designated himself a member of a religious group as required by prison regulations. Therefore, assuming he disposed of plaintiff's property, disposal was proper because they constituted contraband.

The magistrate judge found no allegations of any individual knowledge or actions on the part of Collins. Consequently, he recommended dismissal of defendant Collins on the basis of sovereign immunity.

The magistrate judge also recommended the assertion of qualified immunity be granted, because the TDCJ-ID rule which authorized Johnson's actions was a legitimately adopted prison regulation designed for security purposes. In the event plaintiff's right to practice his religion had in any way been circumscribed, the regulation made such limitation reasonable and legitimate.

II. Objections

Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of Collins because he claims suing Collins is akin to suing TDCJ-ID.

Plaintiff also objects to the grant of qualified immunity because the prison rule requiring designation as a member of a religious group was not enacted until four years after plaintiff was incarcerated. Before this rule was enacted, plaintiff claims, inmates were allowed to change religions without designation.2

III. Discussion

The Eleventh Amendment provides that the State of Texas, as well as its agencies, are immune from liability. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). In Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court held that neither the state nor a state official is a "person" for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, the claim against defendant Collins should be dismissed.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects against individual liability for civil damages to officials "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Immunity in this sense means immunity from suit, not merely from liability. Jackson v. City of Beaumont, 958 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.1992).

In essence, qualified immunity "reconciles two competing interests. One interest is the compensation of persons whose federally protected rights have been violated. Opposing this is the fear that personal liability will inhibit public officials in the discharge of their duties." Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir.1994).

An official's conduct is not protected by qualified immunity if, in light of preexisting law, it was apparent that the conduct, when undertaken, constituted a violation of the right at issue. This is true even if every action in question had not then been held to be a constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

If the court assumes Johnson discarded plaintiff's religious articles, he was acting in accordance with a prison regulation that has not been challenged by plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiffs only complaint is that the rule was adopted four years after he became an inmate. He does not allege he has designated himself a Muslim, nor does he claim the regulation is onerous, unfair, or illegitimate — he merely claims he should be exempt from a regulation adopted after he arrived at the prison. This argument is unavailing. If plaintiff did not designate himself a Muslim in accordance with prison regulations, then the Koran, prayer shawl, and other items, were contraband. Consequently, it was not unreasonable to discard them and Johnson is entitled to the shield of qualified immunity.

Accordingly, plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct and the report of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. A final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the magistrate judge's recommendations. The order referring this case to the magistrate judge is VACATED.

FINAL JUDGMENT

This action came on before the Court, Honorable Howell Cobb, District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly considered and a decision having been duly rendered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that defendant James Collins' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that defendant Jaymi Johnson's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.

All motions not previously ruled upon in this case are DENIED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HINES, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending is defendants' "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)."

Plaintiff Bobby L. Caffey, proceeding pro se, is a prisoner incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"), Stiles Unit. Plaintiff brings suit against Officer Jaymi Johnson and James Collins, in his official capacity as the Director of TDCJ-ID,1 pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the deprivation of the right of free exercise of religion.2

This action was referred to a United States magistrate judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Amended Order for the Adoption of Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to the United States Magistrate, dated July 3, 1980, for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for disposition of the case.

I. Nature of the Claim

Plaintiff alleges Officer Johnson deprived him of religious materials necessary to practice his Islamic faith. Specifically, plaintiff contends that on September 19, 1993, defendant Johnson seized and destroyed or lost plaintiff's Holy Koran (also spelled Quran), handkerchief with Islamic prayer on it, and Islamic papers.

II. The Motions to Dismiss

Both defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which permits dismissal of in forma pauperis complaints deemed frivolous. Defendant Collins argues he is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine. Further, he argues plaintiff has failed to assert any personal knowledge or activity on his behalf. This failure, according to defendant, does not overcome the doctrine of respondeat superior, a theory of liability not cognizable under § 1983.

Plaintiff does not contest his suit against Collins is premised on the doctrine of respondeat superior. He admits "defendant Collins was not directly involved and plaintiff relyed sic upon the theory of respondeat superior."

Defendant Johnson, who also alleges he is protected by sovereign immunity, further claims qualified immunity for any action he may have taken. Assuming arguendo he disposed of plaintiff's religious articles, Johnson claims plaintiff has not designated himself a member of a religious group as required by prison regulations. Therefore, disposal of the articles was proper because they were unauthorized. Plaintiff does not dispute this contention.

III. Discussion

A procedural confusion continues to manifest itself in the motion practice related to in forma pauperis complaints. Generally, there are three pre-trial dispositive motions in these cases: a motion to dismiss as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a claim, FED. R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); and a motion for summary judgment. FED.R.CIV.P. 56. Each has a different standard of review and stands in a different procedural posture. For example, a motion to dismiss may occur on the basis of pleadings only. Once a party introduces evidence or allegations contained outside the pleadings, or files a dispositive motion post-answer, it is construed as one for summary judgment. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).

Frivolousness dismissals occur when an in forma pauperis plaintiff presents a claim that has no "arguable basis in...

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