Cahoon v. Seger

Citation168 P. 441,31 Idaho 101
PartiesANNIE CAHOON and WILLIAM CAHOON, as Administrator of the Estate of H. R. CAHOON, Deceased, Appellants, v. A. J. SEGER, Respondent
Decision Date08 December 1917
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL - ASSESSMENT-ERRONEOUS DESCRIPTION IN TAX SALE CERTIFICATE-TAX DEED-VOID ASSESSMENT FOR LACK OF CORRECT DESCRIPTION.

1. In order to apply the principle of equitable estoppel it is essential that the party claiming to have been influenced by the conduct or declarations of another to his injury was himself ignorant of the facts in question, and also without any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge. Where the facts are known to both parties or both have the same facilities for ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel.

2. Where the true description of a tract of land sold for taxes is as follows: "beginning 1/4 of one mile west and 1/4 of one mile north of the southeast corner of said Section 22 Township 15 South of Range 24 East of Boise Meridian; thence running west 73 rods; thence north 75 rods; thence a little south of east 96 rods to the center of the county road thence south along said road 35 rods to the place of beginning; said latter piece containing 28 acres and 140 square rods, more or less," but the tax sale certificate describes the tract as the W. 1/2 of the NE. 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of sec. 22, such certificate does not comply with the requirement of sec. 1759, Rev. Codes, that it shall contain among other things, "a description of the land sold," and cannot operate as a conveyance of any part of the tract purported to be sold for taxes.

3. Sec. 1763, Rev. Codes, required the assessor or ex-officio tax collector, in the event property sold for taxes was not redeemed within three years from the date of sale, to make a deed therefor to the purchaser, "reciting in the deed substantially the matters contained in the certificate," and where the tax sale certificate contains an erroneous description of the land, it cannot be cured by inserting the correct description in the deed.

4. Secs. 1685 and 1718, Rev. Codes, required each tract of land to be separately assessed and described by sectional division or fractional subdivision when this could be done, and if not, then by metes and bounds or other description sufficient to identify it, giving an estimate of the number of acres and locality, and non- compliance with this requirement renders the assessment to that extent void.

5. Where one valuation is fixed by the assessor for the entire assessment of a taxpayer's land consisting of different parcels or subdivisions, and a portion of the land is correctly, and another portion erroneously, described, the owner is without data from which to determine what portion of the assessment was intended to apply to the land correctly described and what portion to the land erroneously described. He is therefore not in a position to effectively present the matter to the board of equalization for correction, or to pay the taxes on the land described correctly, and cannot be deemed to have had such notice as would enable him to ascertain what amount of taxes he should pay upon any portion of his land in order to prevent a delinquency, and it must be held that under such circumstances the taxpayer is deprived of the protection which the law is designed to secure him, and the entire assessment is void.

[As to recitals in tax deeds as evidence, see note in 31 Am.St. 233]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, for Cassia County. Hon. Chas. O. Stockslager, Judge.

Action to quiet title against holder of tax deed. Judgment for defendant reversed.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Costs awarded to appellants.

T. Bailey Lee, for Appellants.

Cahoon had promised to pay; he had rightly understood that his proffered payment would be accepted by the defendant, and when he endeavored to pay, he was confronted with a tax deed to his property. This is a case of equitable estoppel, pure and simple. (McConnell v. Ory, 46 La. Ann. 564, 15 So. 424.)

Certificate of sale and tax deed were void for total failure of description. (1 Cooley on Taxation, p. 74, and notes.)

"Land must be so described as to enable the owner to know what land is charged with the tax, and also to enable a possible purchaser to know what land is offered for sale." (Wilson v. Jarron, 23 Idaho 563, 131 P. 12; Miller v. Williams, 135 Cal. 183, 67 P. 788.)

"An assessment which does not identify the lands assessed and does not show an owner whether other lands than his own are included therein is invalid." (Evans v. Newell, 18 R. I. 38, 25 A. 347; Sutton v. Calhoun, 14 La. Ann. 209.)

The land must be definitely described. (37 Cyc. 1052, 1445; People v. Flint, 39 Cal. 670; Palomares Land Co. v. Los Angeles County, 146 Cal. 530, 80 P. 931; Grand Forks County v. Frederick, 16 N.D. 118, 125 Am. St. 621, 112 N.W. 839.)

Matters in the certificate of sale must be recited in the tax deed. (White Pine Mfg. Co. v. Morey, 19 Idaho 49, 50, 112 P. 674; Wilson v. Jarron, supra.)

This provision of the statute must be complied with. (Black on Tax Titles, par. 162; Defrieze v. Quint, 94 Cal. 653, 28 Am. St. 151, 30 P. 1; Bank of Lemoore v. Fulgham, 151 Cal. 234, 90 P. 936; Grimm v. O'Connell, 54 Cal. 522; Hubbell v. Campbell, 56 Cal. 527, 37 Cyc. 1371.)

If there is a material variance between the certificate of sale and the tax deed, the purchaser takes no title. (Matthews v. Nefsy, 13 Wyo. 458, 110 Am. St. 1020, 81 P. 305; Flint v. Webb, 25 Minn. 93; Levy v. Ladd, 35 Fla. 391, 17 So. 635; Hewitt v. Storch, 31 Kan. 488, 2 P. 556.)

Nor can the deed be cured by a reference to the certificate or record aliunde. (Preston v. Hirsch, 5 Cal.App. 485, 90 P. 965; Wilson v. Jarron, supra.)

S. T. Lowe, for Respondent.

Where the facts are known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel. (Sheffield Car Co. v. Constantine Hydraulic Co., 171 Mich. 423, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 984, 137 N.W. 305; Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees v. Stensland, 206 Ill. 124, 99 Am. St. 137, 68 N.E. 1098.)

The essentials of estoppel are not present in this case. (Bigelow on Estoppel, 3d ed., 484.)

If property is subject to taxation, it cannot escape through some technical failure of the officer to perform his duty, unless it has actually misled the party to his injury. (Co-operative Savings & Loan Assn. v. Green, 5 Idaho 660, 51 P. 770; Bacon v. Rice, 14 Idaho 107, 93 P. 511.)

The description, however, is sufficient if by it the land can be identified, with the aid of extrinsic evidence. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., 219.)

An assessment is void only when it wholly fails to lead to identification. (Glass v. Gilbert, 58 Pa. 266.)

A description in an assessment-roll may be sufficient although it is necessary to introduce parol evidence for the purpose of applying a description to certain land. (Judd v. Anderson, 51 Iowa 345, 1 N.W. 677; Jenkins v. Sharpf, 27 Wis. 472.)

The designation of the land will be sufficient if it affords a means of identification, and does not positively mislead the owner, or be calculated to mislead him. (Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., p. 745; Woodside v. Wilson, 32 Pa. 52; Best v. Wohlford, 144 Cal. 733, 78 P. 293; Cheney v. Minidoka County, 26 Idaho 471, 144 P. 343; Bothwell v. Bingham County, 24 Idaho 125, 132 P. 972.)

BUDGE, C. J. Morgan and Rice, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, C. J.

This action was begun by Annie Cahoon and H. R. Cahoon, but the latter dying before the case came on for trial, Wm. D. Cahoon, as administrator of the estate of H. R. Cahoon, deceased, was substituted as a party plaintiff. The action was brought to quiet title to the SE. 1/4 NW. 1/4 and the NE. 1/4 SW. 1/4 of section 22, Tp. 15 S. of R. 24 E. of Boise meridian and a further piece of land beginning 1/4 of one mile west and 1/4 of one mile north of the southeast corner of said section 22; thence running west 73 rods; thence north 75 rods; thence a little south of east 96 rods to the center of the county road; thence south along said road 35 rods to the place of beginning; said latter piece containing 28 acres and 140 square rods, more or less.

The complaint alleges in substance that this property was attempted to be sold by Cassia county for the delinquent taxes of 1907 but that the proceedings and steps taken in the original assessment and sale are void as to part of the land, for a total failure of description and void as to another portion of the land by reason of the fact that the same had been assessed to and the taxes paid by respondent, and further, that appellants had been induced by respondent to delay redemption until the time within which they might redeem had expired, and that thereafter respondent had taken a tax deed to the property which, it was contended, should be set aside on the ground of the alleged fraud which had been practiced by respondent upon appellants.

The answer put in issue the material allegations of the complaint; a cross-complaint was also filed setting up the various steps taken in the acquisition of respondent's tax deed to the property, and claiming title absolutely in respondent by reason of such tax deed. However, the invalidity of the entire assessment by reason of misdescription is set out in the cross-complaint, which shows that all the land was assessed and all valued together, and is as follows: "That during the fiscal year of 1907 the county assessor of the county of Cassia duly assessed the property of the plaintiff, H. R. Cahoon, which property was by said assessor entered in his official assessment book and described as follows, to wit: 'SE. 1/4 of the NW. 1/4 and the NE. 1/4 of the SW. 1/4 and the W. 1/2 of the NW. 1...

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  • Marshall-Wells Co. v. Kramlich
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    • May 29, 1928
    ... ... the persons to whom the representations were made and would ... prevent an estoppel. ( Cahoon v. Seger, 31 Idaho 101, ... 168 P. 441; Bryan v. Ramirez, [46 Idaho 359] 8 Cal ... 461; Flege v. Garvey, 47 Cal. 371; Tonge v. Item ... Pub ... ...
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    ...where the facts are known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel. Cahoon v. Seger, 31 Idaho 101, 168 P. 441; Charpentier v. Welch, 74 Idaho 242, 259 P.2d 814; Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 264 P. 233. In the case of Little v. Berg......
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    ...the estoppel, and where, as in the case at bar, all parties are equally aware of the true facts there can be no estoppel. (Cahoon v. Seger, 31 Idaho 101, 168 P. 441; Johansen v. Looney, 31 Idaho 754, 176 P. Page v. Savage, 42 Idaho 458, 475, 246 P. 304; In re Davis' Estate, (Cal.) 101 P.2d ......
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