Cain v. Southern Massachusetts Tel. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 December 1914 |
| Parties | CAIN v. SOUTHERN MASSACHUSETTS TELEPHONE CO. (two cases). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Geo R. Farnum and Hannigan & Fox, all of Boston, for plaintiffs.
Powers & Hall, of Boston, for defendant.
The first action is brought against the defendant to recover compensation for alleged electrical shocks received by the plaintiff on the allegation that they were caused by the defective condition of the defendant's telephone apparatus. The second action is by the husband of the plaintiff in the first action expenses incurred by him in connection with his wife's injuries the subject of the first action. The second action depends upon the same facts and rules as the first.
We proceed to the consideration of the first. There were two counts in the first action, one bases on an alleged electrical shock on January 6, 1909, the other one on May 13 1910.
The plaintiff testified in substance that on January 6, 1909, she went to her telephone, turned the crank, lifted the receiver to her ear as she always has done, and as she did it she received a stunning blow, her hands flew up and stiffened right out, she had severe darting pains and queer feelings all over her, she got dazed and had a faint recollection of trying to get help. This was at half past 9 o'clock in the morning. The next she knew she was in the sitting room and her family physician, Dr. Noyes, was there. She was told it was about noon. At that time she felt very sick, was suffering very severe pain, could not move her left leg at all, nor her left arm, and the fourth finger of her right hand stood out straight. Her pains were all over her body her head ached terribly, and she was put to bed and stayed there for eight weeks at least, and was attended by Dr. Noyes daily for five or six weeks.
On these facts the plaintiff has invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The defendant contends that the plaintiff cannot invoke that doctrine because on the evidence the jury were not warranted in finding that the physical condition into which she was thrown on the 6th of January was caused by an electrical shock. But we are of opinion that the testimony of Dr. Noyes made out a case for the jury on that point. Dr. Noyes testified (in substance) to the condition of the plaintiff on January 6th, which she testified to and which is stated above. On direct examination Dr. Noyes testified that:
'The condition the be found upon his arrival on the morning of January 6, 1909, in his opinion was consistent with an electrical shock sustained by Mrs. Cain that morning, and from his personal knowledge of the case and his examination and his previous knowledge of Mrs. Cain's history he did not discover any other cause.' 'Neither the occurrence in January, 1909, nor the occurrence in May, 1910, did he diagnose as electrical shock.'
On redirect examination be was asked what he meant when he testified that he did not diagnose 'it' as electrical shock, and his answer was:
'I never stated to the family that I thought her condition was due entirely to the effect of an electrical shock;' that he stated it was 'consistent with an electrical shock'; that he did not discover any other cause for 'it.'
On recross-examination he was asked this question:
'If you had been told that she had suddenly learned of the death of her husband under tragic conditions, or something of that kind, you would have said it would have been entirely adequate to produce her condition, wouldn't you?' (meaning her condition on January 6, 1909), to which he answered: 'No, I don't think so.'
He was then asked this question:
'Well, if you were told that she received some sudden fright or some mental--' to which Dr. Noyes answered: 'No, there was something more than a hysterical attack in that attack of January, 1909.'
It is impossible to contend that on this testimony the jury were not warranted in finding that the plaintiff's condition on January 6, 1909, was caused by an electrical shock. If the jury could find that what happened to the plaintiff on January 6, 1909, was caused by an electrical shock she had a right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See for example Cahill v. N.E. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 193 Mass. 415, 79 N.E. 821; Beattie v. Boston Elev. Ry., 201 Mass. 3, 86 N.E. 920; Steverman v. Boston Elev. Ry., 205 Mass. 508, 91 N.E. 919. The ruling of the judge directing a verdict for the defendant on the first count was wrong and the exception taken to that direction must be sustained.
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