Cain v. State
| Decision Date | 01 January 1857 |
| Citation | 18 Tex. 387 |
| Parties | JAMES CAIN v. THE STATE. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
However little apparent reason there may be for still adhering to the technical language of the common law in framing indictments, or applying its strict rules of construction to criminal proceedings, the courts have not felt at liberty to depart from or disregard them, without legislative sanction.
The word feloniously is essential to all indictments for felony, whether at common law or statutory.
Every offense which is punishable by death or by confinement to hard labor in the penitentiary, either absolutely or as an alternative, is a felony (Laws 5th Legis. p. 67, sec. 48) and must therefore be charged to have been committed feloniously.
To constitute the offense of enticing away a negro from his master, there must be the felonious intent wholly to deprive the owner of his property; and this intent must be averred in the indictment.
Before confessions can be received in evidence in a criminal case, it must be shown that they were voluntary, without the influence of hope or fear applied by a third person; the evidence upon this point, being in its nature preliminary, is addressed to the judge, who admits the proof of the confession, to the jury, or rejects it, as he may or may not find it to have been drawn from the prisoner by the application of those motives.
If, after evidence of a confession has been admitted, it appears that it was not voluntarily made, it is the duty of the court to withdraw the evidence from the jury, and of the jury wholly to disregard it.
Evidence of verbal confessions of guilt is to be received with great caution.
Where threats of personal violence in presence and hearing of the prisoner are proved, it is for the state to show that they were not made at a time and under circumstances to induce the confession.
Appeal from Fayette. Tried below before the Hon. Thomas H. DuVal.
Indictment as follows: That James Cain, late of Fayette county aforesaid, yeoman, with force and arms, in the county aforesaid, on the thirteenth day of January, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, did then and there entice away from the possession of his master, William Scallon, a certain negro man slave, of the value of five hundred dollars, named Dick, of the property of said William Scallon, without the consent or knowledge of the said Scallon; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.
Defendant was convicted. There was ample evidence to sustain the verdict; but all confessions of the defendant, which all the witnesses stated very positively, were made voluntarily, without any threats made or inducements offered. The first witness testified to confessions which were made when the defendant was brought to the house of Scallon; the other witnesses did not state whether the confessions they spoke of were made at the same time or not, nor where they were made. There was a bill of exceptions as follows:
The prisoner interrogated Sherman Reynolds, who states that he was at the house of Scallon when prisoner was brought there, but did not hear him make any confessions. The question was then asked by prisoner, “if he heard any threats made in the hearing of the prisoner,” which the court would not permit the witness to answer, for the reason that such threats, if any such were made, could not be connected by the witness, in point of time, to any period prior to the admissions. The court refused to let the witness be further examined; to all of which the defendant excepted, etc.
J. T. Harcourt, for appellant, cited 11 Tex. 22. The case of Alexander v. The State, 12 Tex. 540, is not in point. As to confessions, 1 How. (Miss.) 256.
Attorney General, for appellee, cited Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 37-38; Alexander v. The State, 12 Tex. 542.
The judgment is erroneous and must be reversed on two grounds; 1st. Insufficiency in the indictment; 2d. The improper rejection of evidence.
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...acted on by the jury with great caution. (Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo., 432; Gay v. State, 2 Tex. App., 127; Walker v. State, id., 326; Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387; Comm. Sanborn, 116 Mass. 61; People v. McArron, 79 N. W., 944; Marion v. State (Neb.), 20 N. W., 294; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384......
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...on, this Court noted that "it devolves on the prosecution to satisfy to the court" that a confession was voluntarily made. Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387, 391 (1857). Later, Griffin v. State, cited by the majority, acknowledged that this Court had yet to decide whether the constitutionally mini......
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Ramirez v. State
...applied by a third person to the prisoner's mind.'" Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (quoting Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387, 390 (Tex.1857)). The ultimate question is whether appellant's will was overborne. Id. (citing Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 693 Regarding ......