La Caisse Populaire Credit Union v. Cross

• Decision Date: 18 January 1936
• Citation: 293 Mass. 190,199 N.E. 548
• Parties: LA CAISSE POPULAIRE CREDIT UNION v. CROSS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

293 Mass. 190

199 N.E. 548

LA CAISSE POPULAIRE CREDIT UNION

v.CROSS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Jan. 18, 1936.

Action of contract by La Caisse Populaire Credit Union against George J. Cross and Ovelina Aubin. Defendant Ovelina Aubin was defaulted, and the case went to trial against defendant Cross alone. From an order of the Appellate Division for the Western District dismissing a report which found for defendant Cross and for plaintiff against defendant Ovelina Aubin, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Appellate Division of District Court, Western District; Wall, Judge.

E. A. Brodeur, of Worcester, for appellant.

L. J. Croteau, of Worcester, for appellee.

DONAHUE, Justice.

The plaintiff is the payee and holder of the following promissory note:

‘ $1,000.00Worcester (Mass.)

March 6, 1924

‘For value received, we Wilfred Aubin and Ovelina Aubin and _____ jointly and severally promise to pay to the La Caisse Populaire Credit Union de Worcester or order the sum of- One Thousand Dollars, in monthly instalments of Seventy-five dollars each, with interest at the rate of Ten-10% per cent per annum.

‘Ovelina Aubin

‘Wilfred Aubin

‘George J. Cross.’

The note was made on a printed form, the words appearing above in italics being in typewriting. By agreement of counsel, the original note was submitted to us for examination. After the name ‘Wilfred Aubin’ in the body of the note the printed words ‘as principal’ were stricken out as were the words ‘as sureties' after the blank space indicated above. Following the death of Wilfred Aubin, the plaintiff brought this action on the note against Ovelina Aubin and George J. Cross as makers. The defendant Ovelina Aubin was defaulted and the case went to trial in the Central District Court of Worcester against the defendant Cross alone.

The trial judge found ‘upon all the evidence’ that the defendant Cross was an indorser and not a maker of the note, that the makers were Wilfred Aubin and Ovelina Aubin, that no notice of default or nonpayment was given according to law and found for the defendant Cross. The Appellate Division ordered the report dismissed. The defendant contends that the case is not properly before the court. At the trial the plaintiff made no objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence (G.L.[Ter.Ed.] c. 231, § 108) and filed no request for rulings of law (Rule 27 of the District Courts [1932]). After the judge filed his finding the plaintiff filed a report which, however, did not ‘contain a clear and concise statement of the rulings upon which a re-hearing is requested sufficiently full and accurate for indentification’ as required by the rule. The plaintiff was not entitled as of right to a report. Almeida v. Alsdorf (Mass.) 196 N.E. 185. We think, however, that the report is to be considered as one filed by the judge of his own volition [(G.L. [Ter.Ed.] c. 231, § 108]; East Hampton Bank & Trust Co. v. Collins, 287 Mass. 218, 191 N.E. 379) and as presenting the question whether the judge was justified in finding for the defendant Cross.

The Negotiable Instruments Act contains a section which prescribes the construction which must be given ‘where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are omissions therein,’ if certain specified ambiguities and omissions appear. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 107, § 39. That section does not authorize the receipt of extrinsic evidence to clarify such ambiguities or to supply such omissions. What it does is to require a prescribed construction, that is, that a definite legal effect must be given upon the appearance of each of the specified ambiguities or omissions in an instrument whose language is ambiguous. Omitting portions of section 39 which are not here relevant, the statute reads: ‘Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: * * * 6. Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign he is to be deemed an endorser.’

In the interpretation of a section of an act which declares rules for the construction of ambiguous negotiable instruments regard must be had for the purposes sought to be accomplished by the act as a whole. Among those purposes were uniformity and certainty. Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679, Ann.Cas. 1913C, 525. Included in the design was a codification of the law for practical use by men whose business transactions involved instruments which were negotiable. As has been said, the act ‘ought to be interpreted so as to be a help and not a hindrance to the easy ascertainment of the rights and liabilities of the several parties to commercial paper.’ Fourth National Bank of Boston v. Mead, 216 Mass. 521, 524, 104 N.E. 377, 378,52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 225. The act in other sections than section 39 manifests the general purpose that a party to negotiable paper whose status is not clear is to be treated as an indorser. See sections 19, [293 Mass. 193]54, 86, 87, 90; Fourth National Bank of Boston v. Mead, supra.

The portion of the statute above quoted was intended, when applicable, to provide a construction to make certain what negotiable instrument itself had left uncertain, that is, the status of a party whose signature appeared thereon. The first prerequisite to the application of the statute is that ‘the language of the instrument is ambiguous.’ Unless it is, this section of the statute by its terms provides no rule of construction. Read as a whole, including the signature on the note as well as its text, the language of the instrument here sued upon is manifestly ambiguous. The body of the note states the only promise expressed to...