Cal. Corr. Peace Officers' Ass'n v. State

• Decision Date: 18 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. A125679.,A125679.
• Parties: CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

188 Cal.App.4th 646

115 Cal.Rptr.3d 361

16 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1218

10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12,164

2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,654

CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. A125679.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Aug. 18, 2010.

**362 David A. Sanders, Daniel M. Lindsay, West Sacramento, David W. Burnett, Fresno, for Appellants.

Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard, David W. Tyra, Kristianne T. Seargeant, Sacramento, Department of Personnel Administration, K. William Curtis, Warren C. Stracener, Linda A. Mayhew, Sacramento, Christopher E. Thomas, Jake M. Hurley for Respondents.

RUVOLO, P.J.

*649 The California Correctional Peace Officers' Association (CCPOA) contends that the State of California (the State), through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),¹ has violated various Labor Code provisions, as well as wage orders promulgated by the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC), by failing to provide correctional officers with meal periods and by failing to pay for the missed wage periods. According to CCPOA, the Legislature intended that the State provide its correctional officers with meal periods as required by Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Order No. 17, and that the State must pay for missed meal periods as *650 required by Labor Code section 226.7.² we disagree, and affirm the trial courT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE subject wage and hour statutes do not apply to public employees.

BACKGROUND

CCPOA is the recognized employee organization for State employees in State Bargaining Unit 6 (BU 6). CDCR is the agency charged with administering the State's prison system.

By an amended complaint filed in July 2008, CCPOA filed a class action against respondents, alleging, among other things, violations of sections 226.7 and 512, and IWC Wage Order No. 17. According to the amended complaint, CDCR's failure to provide meal breaks or a safe, hygienic place to eat forces officers to "choose between working a full shift without eating, or 'eating on the run,' while working in one of California's most dangerous jobs in one of the State's least hygienic environments."

This appeal arises from the trial court's order after hearing on a motion to determine legal issues, in which it ruled that sections 226.7 and 512 do not apply to public employers like the State, and that IWC Wage Order No. 4, not IWC Wage Order No. 17, applies to BU 6 employees.³

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"At issue in this appeal is the construction of the relevant statutes and wage orders. The facts are not in dispute. Therefore, this court is faced with questions of law requiring independent review. [Citation.] [¶] In construing a statute, the court's fundamental task is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator. Therefore, the first step is to scrutinize the statute's words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. **363 ( Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 141 P.3d 225].)" ( Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water Storage Dist. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 729, 734-735, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53 ( Johnson ).) In this regard, the nature and purpose of the statute must be considered. ( Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 324, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 106 P.3d 976.) Sentences are not viewed in isolation but *651 in light of the statutory scheme. ( Ibid.) Finally, "if the language allows more than one reasonable construction, the court looks to such aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction. [Citation.]" ( Johnson, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 735, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53.)

B. Sections 512 and 226.7 Do Not Apply

Before addressing the merits of CCPOA's claim that the Labor Code sections pertaining to meal breaks apply to public employees, we begin with a brief review of the applicable statutory framework.

"The IWC, established by the Legislature in 1913, was the state agency authorized to formulate the regulations, or wage orders, that govern employment in California. ( Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 700 [166 Cal.Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579].) In fulfilling its broad statutory mandate to regulate wages, hours, and working conditions of California employees, the IWC acted in a quasi-legislative capacity. ( Id. at p. 702 [166 Cal.Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579].) Although the IWC was defunded effective July 1, 2004, its wage orders remain in effect. ( Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 429, 434, fn. 2 .)" ( Johnson, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 735, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53.)

"In 1999, in response to the IWC's elimination of daily overtime rules in certain industries, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed Assembly Bill No. 60 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), the Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 134, § 14 (the Act).) Among other things, this legislation restored the eight-hour workday (§ 510) and mandated that the IWC conduct public hearings and adopt consistent wage orders (§ 517, subd. (a)), including orders pertaining to meal and rest periods (§ 516). [Citations.] The Act established a new statutory scheme governing hours of labor and overtime compensation for all industries and occupations." [Citation.]

"The Legislature enacted two provisions relating to meal periods. The first, section 512, was enacted in 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 134 [Assem. Bill No. 60].) In pertinent part, it provides: '(a) An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes.... An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.' "

"Later in the 1999-2000 Regular Session, additional legislation was introduced to strengthen the enforcement of existing wage and hour standards *652 contained in current statutes and wage orders. (Assem. Com. on Labor and Employment, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2509 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 24, 2000, p. 7.) Section 226.7 was enacted as part of that legislation (effective on Jan. 1, 2001). It states: '(a) No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period .... [¶] (b) If an employer fails to **364 provide an employee a meal period or rest period ..., the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.' " ( Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 434, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 482.) Section 226.7 provides a " premium wage intended to compensate employees" for the failure to provide meal and rest periods. ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1114, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 155 P.3d 284.)

Recently, in Johnson, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 729, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53, the court considered and rejected claims very similar to those advanced in this case. In Johnson, a water district employee filed a class action complaint against his employer, the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (District), alleging that he, and a putative class of current and former District employees, had been, among other things, denied meal breaks in accordance with the Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders. ( Id. at p. 733, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53.) The trial court sustained the District's demurrer on the ground that, as a public entity, it was exempt from the challenged wage and hour laws. ( Ibid.) The plaintiff argued that, "contrary to the trial court's ruling, public employers are subject to the California wage and hour provisions at issue unless they are expressly made exempt." ( Ibid.) Similar to CCPOA here, the plaintiff in Johnson argued, "under statutory construction rules, it [was] evident that the Legislature intended that water storage districts provide their employees with overtime and meal periods as required by Labor Code sections 510 and 512, and IWC Wage Order No. 17. [Plaintiff] further assert[ed] that these Labor Code requirements [would] not infringe on the execution of the District's sovereign powers." ( Ibid., fn. omitted.)

Rejecting these claims, the Johnson court held: "[U]nless Labor Code provisions are specifically made applicable to public employers, they only apply to employers in the private sector. Since section[ ] ... 512 do[es] not expressly apply to public entities, [it is] not applicable here. Further, applying section[ ] ... 512 to the District would infringe on its sovereign power to regulate its workforce." ( Johnson, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 733, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53.)

CCPOA asserts Johnson was incorrectly decided because there is evidence the Legislature intended to include public entities. It refers to section 512, which specifically exempts certain employees (subd. (c) [wholesale baking industry] & subd. (d) [motion picture industry] ), yet is silent as to public *653 employees. The implication, CCPOA asserts, is that the failure to exclude public employees as well indicates Legislative intent to include them in the statute's coverage.

This argument runs contrary to well-established principles of statutory construction. Our Supreme Court has noted: "A traditional rule of statutory construction is that, absent express words to the contrary, governmental agencies are not included within the general words of a statute. [Citations.]" ( Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, supra, 39 Cal.4th...