Calabresa v. Lynch
| Decision Date | 26 March 1930 |
| Citation | 170 N.E. 812,271 Mass. 58 |
| Parties | CALABRESA v. LYNCH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Hammond, Judge.
Action by Lola Calabresa, p. p. a., against Anna M. Lynch. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions.
Exceptions sustained, and judgment for defendant.
G. I. Cohen, of Boston, for plaintiff.
J. J. Curran, of Boston, for defendant.
In this action of tort for personal injuries, alleged to have resulted from a defect in the iron frame of a ‘Hyatt Light’ forming part of the sidewalk in front of a store occupied by the defendant, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied, there was a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant excepted.
A verdict for the defendant should have been directed since a finding that she was responsible for the alleged defect was not warranted by the evidence.
There was evidence that the defendant was the lessee under a written lease and the occupier of the ‘store’ numbered 171 Hanover Street in the city of Boston which was one of three on that street in a five-story building leased to the defendant's lessor, and that she was required by her lease to make inside and outside repairs and agreed therein that the lessor should not be liable ‘for any claim or damage arising from neglect in not removing snow and ice from the roof of the building or from the sidewalks bordering upon the premises.’ There was evidence that the ‘Hyatt Light’ space was a part of the sidewalk and extended in front of the entire building for the width of from two and one half to three feet over a part of the cellar; that one step led from the sidewalk into the store and there was no other entrance thereto; that ‘no other tenant had any access to the store * * * which is occupied exclusively by the defendant’; that there was no entrance to the cellar from the defendant's store, and that the cellar, except for a small portion in the rear, partitioned off and used by another tenant, was ‘a great big open space’ where ‘different tenants kept different things.’ There was testimony that the defendant ‘had the use of the cellar’ and that boxes, marked with her name, were seen in the cellar, but no testimony as to how they got there or that the defendant or her employees ever were seen there. There was testimony also that at different times she swept the sidewalk in front of her store and cleaned it of snow and ice. It was agreed by the parties at the trial that the defendant was covered by liability insurance against loss arising from claims, among others, by ‘persons not employed by the assured while within or upon the premises * * * or upon the sidewalk, ways or premises adjacent thereto,’ with exceptions not here material.
The defendant was not responsible to the plaintiff for the defect unless she had control of the iron frame and consequently, as to the public, was under the duty of keeping it in repair. Cunningham v. Cambridge Savings Bank, 138 Mass. 480, 481;Grasselli Dyestuff Corp. v. John Campbell & Co., 259 Mass. 103, 108, 156 N. E. 17;Kelley v. Rubin, 259 Mass. 379, 156 N. E. 714. It could not have been found that she had such control. Her lease, unlike that in Boston v. Gray, 144 Mass. 53, 10 N. E. 509, and that in Kelley v. Rubin, supra...
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Beauvais v. Springfield Inst. for Sav.
...however, did not obligate him to repair the burner or to maintain it in proper mechanical and electrical condition. Calabresa v. Lynch, 271 Mass. 58, 170 N.E. 812. The jury could find that the defendant had contracted with the testator and with the other tenants to furnish heat to the store......
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Cowan v. Eastern Racing Ass'n
...insurance would not constitute an admission on the part of the defendants that they had retained control of the steps.' Calabresa v. Lynch, 271 Mass. 58, 61, 170 N.E. 812. Salsman v. Frisch, 276 Mass. 228, 230, 177 N.E. 7. Hannon v. Schwartz, 304 Mass. 468, 470, 23 N.E.2d 1022. Perkins v. R......
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Salsman v. Frisch
...not take the case out from that decision. Such a blanket policy does not support an inference of an admission of liability. Calabresa v. Lynch (Mass.) 170 N. E. 812.Enman v. Trustees of Boston University (Mass.) 170 N. E. 43. It differs essentially from the policy of elevator insurance held......
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Minkkinen v. Nyman
...such insurance would not constitute an admission on the part of the defendants that they had retained control of the steps. Calabresa v. Lynch, 271 Mass. 58 , 61. Salsman v. Frisch, 276 Mass. 228 , 230. v. Schwartz, 304 Mass. 468 , 470. The case of Perkins v. Rice, 187 Mass. 28 , relied on ......