Calcutt v. McGeachy
Decision Date | 02 February 1938 |
Docket Number | 673. |
Citation | 195 S.E. 49,213 N.C. 1 |
Parties | CALCUTT v. McGEACHY, Sheriff of Cumberland County, et al. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Cumberland County; N. A. Sinclair Judge.
Action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act by Joseph Calcutt trading as the Vending Machine Company, against N.H McGeachy, Sheriff of Cumberland County, and others, to determine the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the manufacture, sale, possession, and use of gambling devices. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Action under Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act of North Carolina chapter 102, P.L.1931, Code 1935, §§ 628 (a) to 628 (o), to determine constitutionality of chapter 196, Laws 1937, prohibiting "manufacture, sale, possession and use of slot machines, gambling apparatus and devices," for declaration of rights, status, and other legal relations thereunder, and for injunction.
Plaintiff alleges: That he is "engaged in the business of managing and selling to parties both in the State of North Carolina and in other states certain vending and amusement machines and devices * * * and has made and * * * is making, storing, keeping, possessing, selling, transporting (both within the state and from this state into other states) said machines and devices, and * * * is under contractual obligation to make and is prepared * * * to make such machines and devices"; that he has in his possession a number of machines and devices of twelve types "operated by slot, the sole function of which is to collect (in lieu of personal collection) the uniform and unvarying use charge, namely, charge made for use of the machine"; that, as to the first eleven types, "in their playing the operator or player may make varying scores or tallies; that the twelfth type involves no element of either skill or chance since the return in merchandise is invariably predictable and known in advance to the operator; and there is no chance to make varying scores or tallies"; that, claiming to act under the authority of chapter 196, P.L. of 1937, declaring the maintenance or keeping of all or any machines therein described to be a public nuisance, defendant McGeachy, sheriff, and McBryde, chief of police, have threatened to seize all such machines which may on or after July 1, 1937, be, remain, or come into the possession of plaintiff, to institute proceeding against plaintiff under C.S. §§ 3181 to 3187 for injunction, abatement, and other penalties therein set out, and to prosecute against plaintiff "both such civil and such criminal actions for and on account of the possession, maintenance, sale, transportation and the making of contracts and agreements with reference to the same as may be authorized by said" Laws of 1937. Defendants, sheriff and chief of police, admit that, acting in accordance with their oaths of office and with said laws, they are preparing to enforce the same as to such machines.
The court below found the following facts:
The court concluded as a matter of law as follows:
From adverse judgment thereon, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, and assigned error.
Malcolm McQueen, of Fayetteville, and Ehringhaus, Royall, Gosney & Smith, of Raleigh, for appellant.
A. A. F. Seawell, Atty. Gen., and Harry McMullan and T. W. Bruton, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.
While on this appeal the question of jurisdiction of the court under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub.Laws 1931, c. 102, Code 1935, § 628 (a) et seq., is not presented by the parties, it is proper to state that the action is maintainable only in so far as the legislative act, chapter 196 P.L.1937, affects the civil "rights, status and other relations" in the present actual controversy between parties. We consider it only in that aspect.
The court below has found as a fact without objection that the first eleven types of slot machines and devices described in the complaint are within the letter of the definition of "slot machines and devices" which are condemned by the act under consideration as public nuisances. In the playing of each of these types the operator may make varying scores and tallies upon the outcome of which wagers might be made. The defendants, sheriff and chief of police, admit their intention and preparation to seize such machines and devices. Therefore, the correctness of the ruling below, as to the rights, status, and other relations thereto is unchallenged, provided, of course, the act be constitutional.
The record then presents the determinative question: Is chapter 196, P.L.1937, entitled "An Act to Prohibit the Manufacture, Sale, Possession and Use of Slot Machines, Gambling Apparatus and Devices," constitutional? We agree with the affirmative holding below.
The title of the act manifests the intention and purpose of the Legislature to suppress and prohibit gambling. After prescribing the prohibitive provisions, the definition of slot machines and devices covered by the act is clearly set forth as follows: ...
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