Caldwell v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1981
• Citation: 619 S.W.2d 534
• Parties: Earl CALDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR CO., and Allen Russell Ford, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 534

619 S.W.2d 534

Earl CALDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR CO., and Allen Russell Ford, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section.

April 30, 1981.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court Aug. 3, 1981.

Louis C. Woolf, Hugh B. Bright, Jr. of Baker, Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry & Woolf, Knoxville, for Ford Motor Co.

David T. Black, Maryville, for plaintiff-appellee; Martha S. L. Black, Knoxville, of counsel.

OPINION

FRANKS, Judge.

In this products liability case, Ford Motor Company appeals a verdict of damages for personal injuries for $150,000.00 awarded by a jury to plaintiff on the theory of strict liability against Ford Motor Co., the manufacturer of a pickup truck.

Plaintiff Caldwell is a home builder and was in the process of transporting a load of building materials to a job site when his truck suddenly caught fire. Plaintiff was injured while hurriedly unloading the building materials from the bed of his newly-purchased Ford pickup truck, after the fire had broken out in the engine area of the truck. The injury occurred as plaintiff was pulling a 57 pound piece of siding from the truck and he experienced a severe pain in his back which brought him to his knees. He suffered a ruptured intervertebral disc with resulting permanent partial disability.

At the outset we observe, as to evidentiary issues in jury cases, we are limited to determining whether there is material evidence to support the verdict. It is our responsibility on review to take the strongest legitimate view of all the evidence in favor of the verdict and to assume the truth of all that tends to support it, allowing all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict and to discard all to the contrary. Pullins v. Fentress Cty. Gen. Hospital, Etc., 594 S.W.2d 663 (Tenn.1979); Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Construction, Inc., 575 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn.1978); Valentine v. Conchemco, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn.App.1979).

The first issue raised is the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of proximate causation between the fire and the injury. Ford states the issue thusly in its argument:

The fire did not burn or otherwise injure the plaintiff. The sole issue is whether or not the fire caused the plaintiff to unload the building materials or caused the plaintiff to unload the materials in such a manner as to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

And pointedly asserts it was the strain of pulling the siding off of the truck, that plaintiff would have done regardless of the fire, which alone caused his back injury and not the fire in the front of the vehicle. This argument fragments the issue of causation and a proper analysis of this issue must, of necessity, embody the scope of proximate causation.

The issue of proximate cause is for the jury's determination unless the facts and inferences establish beyond dispute that all reasonable men would agree on the outcome. Frady v. Smith, 519 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn.1974); Kroger Co. v. Giem, 215 Tenn. 459, 387 S.W.2d 620 (1964); Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn.App.1977). Essentially, for the purposes of this appeal, Ford admits a practically brand-new pickup truck which suddenly and inexplicably catches fire is a defective and unreasonably dangerous product, see T. C. A., § 29-28-101, et seq.; however, Ford argues it should not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries because there was no factual causation between Ford's defect and plaintiff's injuries.

Ford correctly asserts that causation in fact is the first requirement of proximate causation, and argues because plaintiff experienced his injury as he pulled a 57-pound piece of siding from the truck, a motion he would have used in removing material whether he had been doing so hurriedly or not, it cannot be said that "but for" the defect and the resultant fire, plaintiff would have been injured. The testimony of Dr. Leon Willien, an orthopedic surgeon who treated the plaintiff, is offered in support of this view. Dr. Willien testified:

Q. Is it more probable than not that a person who was either off-balance or in a hurry would rupture his disc than if he were doing it in a slower, more established manner, or if he had some assistance in removing that type of siding or sheeting?

A. Well, I would think that his disc could rupture whether he was in a hurry or not.

While Dr. Willien indicates the plaintiff's injury could have occurred whether he had been in a hurry or not, it, in fact, occurred as he hurriedly removed the materials from the burning truck. Plaintiff's testimony was:

Q. When you got to the site, when you would have gotten to the site, whenever you would have done it had there not been a fire, you would have had to pull a sheet of siding that weighed fifty-seven pounds; right?

A. Right.

Q. And you'd have to pull it and get it down onto the ground and then start pulling the rest of them one at a time to stack it one on top of the other?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now on the afternoon of this incident, you got out of the truck and you went to the rear of the car; right?

A. The truck, yes, sir.

Q. And you began to pull off the siding one sheet at a time?

A. No, sir, I wasn't pulling it off. I was yanking it off and slinging it up into the garage away from the truck.

Q. Do you remember in your deposition, and you remember what I told the jury this morning, I asked you on page 13, "How did you take it off?" Your answer was: "Well, I was on one side of the siding, pulling it up and pulling it out and getting it back into the carport, and one of the grandkids, both of them then, were back in the carport helping to line it up as I pulled it off the truck." Then I said: "You were pulling one sheet at a time off?" And you answered, "Yes, sir." Now is that an accurate statement?

A. So far as it goes. It does not go ahead and say, of course, that I was pulling them off and slinging them back into the garage. I should have said at the time that I was slinging them back in the garage.

Q. Then later on, on the next page, you said, "As I told you, I personally pulled the sheets off of the truck and the grandchildren were in the carport helping to line the sheets up." You meant to add that you were slinging the sheets?

A. That's the only way I could get them from the truck into the garage.

Q. What would you have done otherwise? How would you have done it had there not been the fire; that's what I asked you, and your answer was "I would have taken my time."

A. Well, I would have taken my time and would have pulled off the sheets and stacked them up just like I said, which is what I normally do. This was not something that was new to me. It's something I have done hundreds of times. I know how I do them. What I do, I back the truck up to where I'm going to unload it, pick up the sheet, back up and let it drop onto the ground, and then I walk back on top of that sheet and pull the next one out and let it drop onto it, and that's the way I normally do it, taking my time, no getting myself into a bind I shouldn't be getting into.

Q. Mr. Caldwell, in order to begin to move the sheet that weighed fifty-seven pounds, you had to give it a tug?

A. First I picked up the edge of it.

Q. And then you have to give it a pull?

A. Well, actually

Q. You've got to move it?

A. That's right, and with my weight, if I'm doing it like I normally do it, without having to sling it away from where I'm unloading it, where my truck is parked, then I'm letting my weight do most of the job. I'm not using my back and my muscles too much.

The record establishes that plaintiff unloaded the material in a significantly different manner than normal. He hurriedly removed the building materials and would sling the heavy materials away from the truck to avoid a spreading of the fire. Both Dr. Willien and Dr. Steve Natelson, a neurosurgeon who also treated plaintiff, testified that the medical cause of the ruptured disc was the activity plaintiff was pursuing when he first experienced the severe back pain. Dr. Natelson testified that the medical cause was the removal of the building material from the truck "in the specific circumstances described", i. e., in a hurry. Both doctors testified that the strain placed on the back by this particular activity was clearly sufficient to cause a ruptured disc. It would be "absurd to say that the only reasonable conclusion is that the accident would have occurred even had no defect existed". See Winnebago Industries, Inc., supra. The evidence that a strain sufficient to rupture plaintiff's disc could have been required in the normal unloading of building material does not, as a matter of law, relieve defendant from liability if his conduct has caused plaintiff's injury. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Northington, 91 Tenn. 56, 17 S.W. 880 (1891); Ison v. McFall, 55 Tenn.App. 326, 400 S.W. 243 (1964); Methodist Hospital v. Ball, 50 Tenn.App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961).

A case conceptually similar to the case sub judice is Finks v. Gillum, 38 Tenn.App. 304, 273 S.W.2d 722 (1954). In that case, the plaintiff alleged her miscarriage was caused by the defendant's negligence in operating his automobile into the rear of the automobile occupied by plaintiff. The defense argued that since miscarriages can occur spontaneously, any attempt to causally relate plaintiff's miscarriage to the accident would be mere conjecture. The court held where there was material evidence of causation and "... if the minds of reasonable men might differ from the proved facts as to whether the conflicting probabilities or inconsistent theories, are equally supported by the evidence, the case must go to the jury." At p. 311. Accord: Elrod v. Town of Franklin, 140 Tenn. 228, 204 S.W. 298 (1917); Silcox v. Smith County, 487 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn.App.1972); Meeks v. Yancey, 43...