Caldwell v. Halifax Convalescent Center, 89-2383
| Decision Date | 09 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-2383,89-2383 |
| Citation | 566 So.2d 311 |
| Parties | 15 Fla. L. Weekly D2081 Elizabeth CALDWELL, Appellant, v. HALIFAX CONVALESCENT CENTER and United Self Insured Services, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael B. Wingo of Simmermon, Morgan & Wingo, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Dwight Chamberlin of Monaco, Smith, Hood & Perkins, Daytona Beach, for appellees.
Elizabeth Caldwell has appealed an order of the judge of compensation claims denying her claim for temporary total disability benefits, and orthopedic and psychiatric care. We reverse.
Caldwell suffered a compensable injury to her neck and back in April 1987 while working for the employer as a nurse's aide. In August 1987, she saw an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Seltzer, whose examination revealed no abnormalities; the results of various objective tests were also normal. Seltzer last saw Caldwell in October 1987, at which time he opined that she had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) "from an orthopedic standpoint with no evidence of impairment." Caldwell saw a second orthopedist, Dr. Stose, on one occasion in January 1988. He concurred that she had reached MMI with "no permanent anatomical impairment," and added that "no psychiatric treatment was necessary from an orthopedic point of view."
Based on Caldwell's continued complaints of headache pain, Dr. Seltzer referred her to Dr. Rotstein, a neurologist/psychiatrist. She saw Rotstein on November 13, 1987, at which time he diagnosed a "profound depression." Rotstein opined within a reasonable medical probability that "this lady's in bad need of psychiatric care." While testifying that such care had been indicated prior to the industrial injury (Caldwell's parental rights to two of her five children had been severed some years prior to the accident), Rotstein opined that the industrial accident had aggravated her prior emotional problems.
The employer/carrier ceased all payment of benefits in January 1988. Caldwell thereafter sought temporary total disability benefits from November 1987 to the date of the hearing and the authorization of further orthopedic and psychiatric care. At the subsequent hearing, along with the testimony of Drs. Seltzer, Stose and Rotstein, the judge considered the deposition of Dr. Silverman, a psychiatrist whom Caldwell saw once in January 1989.
Based on her review of Caldwell's medical records and an hour-long examination Silverman diagnosed a "major depressive disorder." She related the depression to the industrial accident within a reasonable degree of medical probability, stating that "I think that she got depressed from the accident and not being able to work." Silverman also noted that, despite suffering emotional problems prior to the accident, Caldwell's ability to work was not impaired prior thereto. When asked if Caldwell was disabled from working at the time she saw her in January 1989, Silverman answered in the affirmative, attributing the disability to "a combination of her physical disability and depression."
The judge thereafter entered an order denying Caldwell's claim in its entirety. With regard to the claim for TTD benefits and further orthopedic care, the judge cited the opinions of Drs. Seltzer and Stose that Caldwell had reached MMI in October 1987 without permanent impairment or restriction. As to the claim for psychiatric care, the judge found that there was no need for such treatment as a result of the accident. She noted that Caldwell had suffered from a turbulent personal life prior to the accident, and found that Dr. Rotstein did not relate her depression to that accident. The judge apparently rejected Dr. Silverman's opinion, noting the brevity of her January 1989 examination.
Caldwell alleges first that the judge erred in finding no evidence that her psychiatric condition was related to the industrial accident. We agree. While the record is clear...
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