Caldwell v. Klemz
| Decision Date | 12 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-455 |
| Parties | CHASE CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. JESSE KLEMZ, WILLIAM KNAPP, JAMIE EROW, and TIMOTHY BELL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on "Defendants Jesse Klemz, William Knapp, Jamie Erow, and Timothy Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed by the defendants on April 1, 2016. (DE #164.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
The plaintiff, Chase Caldwell ("Plaintiff"), filed his pro se complaint in this matter on December 12, 2014, after an incident with officers from the Porter County Sheriff's Department (collectively, "Defendants"). (DE #1.) In it, Plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted and Tased by Jamie Erow ("Officer Erow") and was tackled and pushed by William Knapp ("Corporal Knapp"). According to Plaintiff, when he fled from those officers he was confronted by Timothy Bell ("Officer Bell") and Jesse Klemz ("Sergeant Klemz"), who eventually broke his right wrist. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff purported to bring those claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 241. (Id. at 2.) At the preliminary pretrial conference, it was determined that any motion for leave to amend the pleadings was to be filed by April 30, 2015, by Plaintiff and by May 15, 2015, by Defendants. (See DE #19.) The discovery deadline was set for December 1, 2015. (Id.)
On April 15, 2015, Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint in order to increase the amount of damages requested. (DE #23.) The motion was denied without prejudice by Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry for a variety or procedural defects. (DE #24.) Judge Cherry extended the deadline for filing a motion to amend the pleadings to May 9, 2015, for Planitiff and to May 22, 2015, for Defendants. Plaintiff refiled his motion to amend on April 27, 2015, and that motion was granted by Judge Cherry on June 5, 2015. (DE #26 & DE #35.) The amended complaint was docketed on June 10, 2015. (DE #40.) In it, Plaintiff requested additional monetary damages based on multiple injuries he suffered when Defendants allegedly punched him in the face, Tased him several times, and broke his right scaphoid. (Id. at 1.) Discovery commenced and was closed on December 1, 2015, without any requests to extendthat deadline. However, on November 30, 2015, one day prior to the close of discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the amended complaint, followed by a flurry of additional motions to amend. (DEs #127, #130, #131, #132, #133, #135, #136, #140.) On January 11, 2016, Judge Cherry granted the original motion to amend while denying the rest. (DE #145.)
The second amended complaint describes the alleged conduct of Defendants on February 18, 2014, and references 18 U.S.C. sections 241, 242, 245, and 249, as well as 42 U.S.C. section 14141, Article I, Section I of the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana Code 35-42-2-1(a)(C). (DE #147.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that:
I was grabbed by Officer William Knapp after complying with police order to supply Identification. After fleeing from officers both William Knapp and Jamie Erow, followed me in their police marked vehicles to the entrance of property of The Courts of Northwest Indiana were I was assaulted by all four officers at 127 E US-6 Frontage Rd Valparaiso IN 46383 . . . . As stated in my original complaint all four officers used their electronic stun guns (taser) on my body which includes permanent scarring. Officers Timothy Bell and Jamie Erow grabbed me in rude insolent manner. I recall Officer William Knapp using his electronic stun gun (taser) on my genitals and stomach. I recall Officer Jesse Klemz punching me in the face several times and breaking my right wrist.1
(Id. at 1, 5.)
On February 2, 2016, this Court set the dispositive motion deadline for April 1, 2016. (DE #155.) The following day, Plaintiff filed what he entitled an "Interrogatory to Plaintiff Chase Richard Caldwell." (DE #156.) On February 16, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to strike that interrogatory. (DE #160.) On March 25 and 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed two documents entitled "Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion," in which he requested that the Court strike the police report attached to Defendants' initial disclosures. (DE #161 & DE #162.) On April 1, 2016, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (DE #164.) That same day, Defendants also served Plaintiff with a Notice of Summary Judgment. (DE #163.) On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to that motion. (DE #166.) On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his pleadings before trial. (DE #167.) Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment on April 18, 2016, and a response in opposition to the motion to amend on April 21, 2016. (DE #168 & DE #169.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an additional motion for leave to amend his pleading, a memorandum in support of that motion, a reply and a corrected reply to Defendants' response in opposition to his motions to amend, and two additional memorandumsin support of his motions to amend. (DEs #170, #171, #172, #173, #174, #175.) On May 11, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to strike docket entries number 170 through 175. (DE #176.) Plaintiff filed a response to that motion two days later. (DE #177.) Defendants filed a reply on May 19, 2016. (DE #178.) Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on May 23, 2016. (DE #179.) In an order dated September 2, 2016, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike (DE #160) and struck the document entitled "Interrogatory to Plaintiff Chase Richard Caldwell" (DE #156), denied the "dispositive motions" filed by Plaintiff (DE #161 & #162), denied the motions for leave to amend filed by Plaintiff (DE #167 & #170), and denied Defendants' motion to strike. (DE #176.) The only motion remaining before the Court at this stage is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (DE #164.)
Summary judgment must be granted when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Notevery dispute between the parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the deciding court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). "However, our favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture." Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012)). A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely on allegations or denials in her own pleading, but rather must "marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case." Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element on which he or she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
While it is undisputed that pro se filings must be construed liberally, even pro se litigants must follow the rules of civil procedure. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006)(citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)). Non-compliance with local summary judgment rules may warrant a penalty -- the court is within its discretion to ignore facts a litigant has proposed that are not submitted in compliance with those rules. Id. (citing Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005)). In this district, Local Rule 56-1 mandates that the moving party must include a "Statement of Material Facts" in its supporting brief and that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must file a response brief (or appendix) that includes "a section labeled 'Statement of Genuine Disputes' that identifies the material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed so as to make a trial necessary." N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a),(b). Local Rule 56-1 also imposes a duty upon a party seeking summary judgment against an unrepresented litigant to serve that party with a Notice of Summary-Judgment Motion ("Notice"). N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f) (citing to Appendix C). The Notice explains what a summary judgment motion is and what the responding party's obligations are with regard to the motion. Id. The Notice includes copies of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56-1 itself, which, together, provide that factual positions must be supported with citations to the record and that the court is not required to consider materials that are not cited. Id. The Notice provides a warning that a failure to follow therules may result in an adverse ruling by the court. Id. The Seventh Circuit has also made it clear that:
[a] district court is not required to wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact. And a mere disagreement with the movant's asserted facts is inadequate if made without reference to specific supporting material. In short, judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.
Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Thus, when a non-movant fails to controvert a moving party's Statement of Material Facts with a properly supported...
To continue reading
Request your trial