Caldwell v. Little

Decision Date23 May 1881
Docket NumberCASE No. 1039.
PartiesCALDWELL v. LITTLE.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

1. A, B and C were executors of an estate X, which was alleged to be indebted to an estate Y, of which A and B became administrators. Action was brought in the Court of Probate by a distributee of the estate Y against A and B, as administrators, calling upon them to account for their administration of that estate. There being no allegation or proof that A and B, as executors, had received any portion of the estate X, and they having denied any receipts of the estate Y- Held, that constructive payment by operation of law had not been established.

2. The executor, C, could be no proper party to a proceeding instituted by a distributee of the estate Y, except upon allegations which would make a case not covered by the terms “matters testamentary and of administration,” and, therefore, a case beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Probate.

Before KERSHAW, J., Laurens, September, 1880.

Hon. T. B. Fraser, judge of the Third Circuit, sat in this court on the hearing of this cause, in the place of Chief Justice Simpson, who had been of counsel in the court below.

Action by Nancy A. Caldwell against John W. Little and L. R. Brooks, as administrators of David Williams, deceased. For a full understanding of the points decided by this court, the case is clearly stated in the opinion. The plaintiff appealed.

Mr. John W. Ferguson, for appellant.

Mr. B. W. Ball, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

T. B. FRASER, A. A. J.

This action was commenced in the Court of Probate for Laurens county, January 15th, 1879, was carried by appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, and comes to this court by appeal from the judgment rendered in that court.

About the year 1825 John Williams died intestate, and administration on his estate was granted to two of his sons, Charles Williams and Lemuel G. Williams. David Williams, Letty Williams and Clarissa Williams were also children of John Williams, deceased.

In May, 1826, Charles and Lemuel G., the administrators, filed their first return in the office of the Ordinary, in which, among other things, they charged themselves with the sum of $802.05, with interest from April 13th, 1825, as the share of David Williams, and on April 13th, 1827, the return filed by them on that day showed that the sum due David Williams was $845.50, with interest from April 13th, 1825. These returns showed also the amounts due Letty and Clarissa, and the latter showed certain payments made for Letty and Clarissa, but none for David.

Similar returns were made annually until April 14th, 1839, when a memorandum was made on the return that “the different amounts charged to administrators is the whole of the capital, although it is charged on every return.” After this the administrators returned only money paid out, and continued to make returns until April 14th, 1863, but no return shows any money paid out for David Williams. It appears that Charles Williams is dead, but the date of his death does not appear.

In 1876 David Williams died intestate, and Lemuel G. Williams administered on his estate, giving bond in the penal sum of $1700, and, so far as is known, doing no other act as administrator of David Williams. He died in a few weeks after this, leaving a will, which was admitted to probate. The defendants, John W. Little and L. R. Brooks, were appointed executors of the will of Lemuel G. Williams, and qualified. George F. Moseley was also appointed executor, and qualified as such.

After the death of Lemuel G. Williams, the defendants, John W. Little and L. R. Brooks, were appointed administrators de bonis non of David Williams.

The plaintiff in this case is an heir and distributee of David Williams. L. R. Brooks, one of the defendants, speaks of David as his uncle, and, besides this, there is nothing in the case to show how many other distributees there are, Letty and Clarissa Williams, if alive, being the only other two who are mentioned in the testimony.

There is nothing in the case before the court to show that David Williams had any estate except what appears to have been due to him as shown by the returns above referred to, or what estate, if any, Lemuel G. Williams left at his death, and there is no admission of assets by the defendants of either estate.

This action is brought by the plaintiff, Nancy A. Caldwell, one of the heirs and distributees of David Williams, against the defendants as administrators of David Williams, and the defendants are called on to show cause why that estate should not be settled up.

The petition charged that there was a small personal estate of David Williams, besides a considerable estate in the hands of Lemuel G. Williams, deceased. L. R. Brooks, one of the defendants, denies that they received any estate of David Williams, and denies that David Williams had any estate in his lifetime in the hands of Lemuel G. Williams; and John W. Little only denies that he has received assets of David Williams, and says nothing of Lemuel G.

The testimony shows that David Williams lived during his whole lifetime with Lemuel G. Williams, his brother, who was unmarried; that David was of weak mind, but that he was able to do many things which were of service, and that, in fact, he did do many kinds of service which were valuable. The testimony is conflicting as to the value of his services, and as to the proper compensation for the care and support of one in his condition. It seems that Letty and Clarissa, who are in a similar condition, are now supported at an annual expense of $125 each.

The judge of probate held “that this action is affected neither by the statute of limitations nor by the presumption of payment arising from lapse of time, and that the administrators have in their hands...

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5 cases
  • Howard, Matter of
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 19, 1993
    ...of subject matter jurisdiction in the probate court, we reverse the ruling on LeRoy Howard's claim of title to the gun. See Caldwell v. Little, 15 S.C. 236 (1881); Poole v. Brown, 12 S.C. 556 (1879); In re Estate of Krueger, 235 Neb. 518, 455 N.W.2d 809 (1990) (appellate court cannot acquir......
  • Mack v. Stanley
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1939
    ... ... The Probate Court has ... jurisdiction, which is purely statutory, in matters ... testamentary and of administration. Caldwell v ... Little, 15 S.C. 236; Bradford v. Richardson, ... 111 S.C. 205, 97 S.E. 58; Beatty v. National Surety ... Company, 132 S.C. 45, 128 S.E. 40 ... ...
  • Mack v. Stanley
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1939
    ...The Probate Court has jurisdiction, which is purely statutory, in matters testamentary and of administration. Caldwell v. Little, 15 S.C. 236; Bradford v. Richardson, 111 S.C. 205, 97 S.E. 58; Beatty v. National Surety Company, 132 S.C. 45, 128 S.E. 40. But "a distinct ground of equitable r......
  • Shelley v. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • September 24, 1984
    ...estate. Mack v. Stanley, 190 S.C. 300, 308, 2 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1939); Beckwith v. McAlister, 165 S.C. 1, 162 S.E. 623 (1932); Caldwell v. Little, 15 S.C. 236 (1880); cf. Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317 (1877) (Probate court has no jurisdiction in action against administrator for partitio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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