Caldwell v. Parker Univ.
Decision Date | 27 November 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 3:18-cv-1617-BN,3:18-cv-1617-BN |
Parties | DANIEL CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. PARKER UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
After being expelled from Defendant Parker University ("Parker"), Plaintiff Daniel Caldwell brought this pro se action against Parker alleging that the university violated his constitutionally-protected right to due process, several federal statutes, and state law. See Dkt. No. 3.
On the consent of the parties, this action is before the undersigned United States magistrate judge for all purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Dkt. No. 21.
Parker moves to dismiss Caldwell's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 18. Despite the Court's grating Caldwell's request to extend the response deadline, he failed to file a response, and the extended deadline to do so has passed. See Dkt. Nos. 20, 22, & 23.
The Court GRANTS Parker's motion to dismiss but will allow Caldwell leave to file, by December 19, 2018, an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies noted below.
Caldwell alleges that, on June 20, 2014, Parker "fraudulently expelled [him] from the Doctor of Chiropractor Program without notice" and (at least initially) without a hearing. Dkt. No. 3 at 4. At a subsequent hearing, held later that day, Caldwell claims that he "was not informed of the allegations against him (sexual harassment and vandalism)" and further claims that, "[w]ithout due process of fair notice of the allegations against [him] nor reasonable opportunity to respond, [a committee at the university] immediately and permanently dismissed [him] from Parker." Id. This decision was upheld by a vice-president at the university and Parker's provost. See id.
Caldwell was informed that he would have to pay $6,444 to obtain his transcript from Parker. See id. And Caldwell alleges that he unsuccessfully sought relief from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and the U.S. Department of Education. See id.
Caldwell asserts that these facts support claims (1) for violation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and (2) under the United States Higher Education Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See id. at 3. And he further states that, "[i]n addition to the claims of violation of federal regulations which resulted in Parker's dismissal of [him] and refusal to release [his] transcripts, state law grounds for awarding damages include breach of contract, fraud, or quantum meruit and refusal to mitigate damages." Id. at 5.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must "accept all well-pleaded factsas true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. But, "to survive a motion to dismiss" under Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, anddirectly events" that the plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); accord N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) .
The United States Supreme Court "has made clear that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion turns on the sufficiency of the 'factual allegations' in the complaint." Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App'x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted," Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 346.
That rationale has even more force in this case, as the Court "must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally," Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006), "to prevent the loss of rights due to inartful expression," Marshall v. Eadison, 704CV123HL, 2005 WL 3132352, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 2005) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)); see United States v. Ayika, 554 F. App'x 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ( ); but see Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) ().
A court cannot look beyond the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the complaint. Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205. Documents "attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D. Tex. 2011). "However, if a document referenced in the plaintiff's complaint is merely evidence of an element of the plaintiff's claim, then the court may not incorporate it into the complaint." Id.
In addition, "it is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record." Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5thCir. 2007); accord Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2008).
Taking first his alleged constitutional violation, presumably made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Caldwell has not alleged facts to support that violation, considering - most importantly - that Parker should not be assumed to be acting under color of state law.
For example, in Blouin v. Loyola University, 506 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing First and Fourteenth Amendment claims made against Loyola for its refusing to renew the plaintiff's teaching contract, reasoning that "[t]he licensing of an otherwise private entity by the government does not, of itself, require a finding of action action," id. at 21-22 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)); see also Jordan v. ATI Career Training Ctr., No. 3:13-cv-4176-G-BN, 2014 WL 351651, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014) ( ; accord Brown v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 4:15-cv-613-A, 2016 WL 3398395 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2016).
Moody v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2017).
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