Caldwell v. State
| Decision Date | 14 December 1926 |
| Docket Number | 19943 |
| Citation | 154 N.E. 792,115 Ohio St. 458 |
| Parties | Caldwell, Et Al., D. B. A. Caldwell & Taylor, v. The State Of Ohio. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Taxation - Motor vehicle fuels - Gasoline tax - Section 5526 et seq General Code (111 O. L., 294) - Tax limited to petroleum products and derivatives, except kerosene - Benzol not taxable.
By virtue of Section 1 of the act of March 18, 1925 (111 Ohio Laws, 294), imposing a tax upon "motor vehicle fuels," the term as defined in that section includes only products derived from petroleum other than kerosene, and the petroleum ingredient in compounds of petroleum with other volatile and inflammable substances, used in internal combustion motors.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr Charles M. Leslie and Mr. Clarence M. Smith, for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. C C. Crabbe, attorney general, and Mr. Wilbur E. Benoy, for defendant in error.
Messrs Waters, Andress, Southworth, Wise & Mason, amici curiae.
This cause originated in the court of common pleas of Franklin county, Ohio, as an action by the state of Ohio to recover of Caldwell & Taylor the tax upon the benzol ingredient of benzol gas, under the so-called "gaso- line tax act." Caldwell & Taylor are dealers as defined by that act, and have paid the tax upon the gasoline ingredient in the benzol gas sold by them, but they refuse to pay the tax upon the benzol ingredient, claiming that it is not subject to tax under the provisions of that act. The controversy involves no question except the interpretation of the gasoline tax act (111 Ohio Laws, p. 294) and a determination whether the benzol ingredient is taxable under the definition of "motor vehicle fuel," as defined in Section I of the act (Section 5526, General Code). That definition is as follows:
Concisely stated, it is the contention of the dealer that the definition should be construed as though it read "`Motor vehicle fuels' shall mean gasoline used for the purpose of generating power by means of internal combustion motors," all other words of the statute, as well as the exception relating to kerosene oil, to have no significance whatever.
The contention of the state, concisely stated, is that the statute should be construed as if it read:
"`Motor vehicle fuels' shall mean any fuel, except kerosene oil, used for the purpose of generat- ing power by means of internal combustion motors."
It is contended by the dealer in argument that no ambiguity is found in the statutory definition, and it is contended with equal earnestness by the state that there is an ambiguity which must be solved, like any other language of doubtful import, and that, if necessary, resort may be had to evidence. `The earnestness of argument of this cause indicates that minds differ as to the meaning of the definition of "motor vehicle fuels," and, inasmuch as the lower courts have reached different conclusions, and have therefore rendered different judgments, that fact strongly indicates the existence of ambiguity. An ambiguity is defined as doubtfulness or uncertainty; language which is open to various interpretations or having a double meaning; language which is obscure or equivocal. Measured by this definition, and weighed in the light of the present controversy and the arguments which have grown out of it, we have no difficulty in determining that ambiguity exists. The real difficulty is in arriving at the true meaning of the language employed. The true interpretation of the ambiguous language in this statute may be found by resort to the context, to the purpose for which the statute was enacted, as expressed in its preamble, and, if necessary, to scientific facts having a bearing upon the subject-matter, and even to any pertinent extrinsic facts which will aid in arriving at the legislative intent. The ambiguous language must be construed according to certain well-known rules of interpretation, and, the statute being one levying an excise tax, a strict rule of construction must be followed. This court has several times declared the rule of interpretation of statutes levying taxes; the most recent declaration being found in Cassidy v. Ellerhorst, 110 Ohio St. 535, at page 539 (144 N. E., 252, 42 A.L.R. 372) of the opinion. The rule which has been often declared, and which was followed in that case, is that, where there is ambiguity or doubt as to legislative intent, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the person upon whom the burden of taxation is sought to be imposed, and that language employed in a taxation statute should not be extended by implication beyond its clear import, or to enlarge its operation so as to embrace subjects of taxation not specifically named. This rule is so well settled as not to be longer debatable. It is supported both by authority and reason. In the interpretation of a contract the document is construed strictly against the person who prepared it, and favorably to the person who had no voice in the selection of the language. In a statute relating to the rights of citizens, as between themselves, a reasonable rule of interpretation is followed without favor to any of the parties affected by it. But in statutes where the state is involved, on the one part, and the citizen, on the other, by analogy to the same rule of interpretation governing contracts, the Legislature having chosen the language, that language will not be extended by implication beyond its clear import. Thus it is that in a penal statute, or a statute levying a tax, a rule of strictness will be followed as against the sovereign and a rule of favor as toward the citizen. This does not, of course, mean that by a simple showing of ambiguity, or of doubtful language, a taxation statute must fail entirely. The language employed should receive a fair interpretation, but its operation will never be extended by implication to embrace subjects not specifically named. By reference to Section I of this act (Section 5526, General Code), it will be found that the definition of motor vehicle fuels includes "gasoline and all other volatile and inflammable liquids derived from petroleum."
Those words are followed by a limitation as follows:
"Which are produced, refined, prepared, distilled, compounded and used for the purpose of generating power by means of internal combustion motors...
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