Caldwell v. State
| Decision Date | 13 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 57, 2000.,57, 2000. |
| Citation | 780 A.2d 1037 |
| Parties | Fred T. CALDWELL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Thomas A. Pedersen, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General of the Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for the State.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. VEASEY, Chief Justice.
In this appeal, we address the constitutional limitations on searches and seizures conducted during the course of a traffic stop. It has long been clear that the duration and execution of a traffic stop, like any investigative stop, must be reasonably related to the initial purpose of the stop. Thus, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, any detention of a vehicle or its occupants beyond that required to complete the purpose of the traffic stop must be supported by independent facts sufficient to justify the additional intrusion. Because the defendant in this case was detained without sufficient justification for purposes unrelated to the traffic stop, we conclude that the Superior Court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered as the product of the illegal detention. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
On the evening of July 10, 1998, Officer Nicolas Berna observed Fred Caldwell and a passenger, later identified as Isaac Wiley, parked in front of a yellow curb at the corner of Division and South New Streets in Dover, Delaware.1 The yellow curb signifies a fire lane in which parking is prohibited under 21 Del. C. § 7001. The officer recognized Caldwell as a person suspected of involvement in drug dealing and decided to stop Caldwell for the parking violation. The officer acknowledges that this decision was based, in part, on Caldwell's criminal history and unspecified "intelligence that [the officer] had gathered" in connection with an ongoing drug investigation.2 When Caldwell saw the officer drive by, he pulled away from the curb, traveling in the same direction as Officer Berna's car. Officer Berna pulled over to allow Caldwell to pass him and he then proceeded to follow Caldwell's car.
After following the car for a short time, the officer activated his emergency lights. The officer testified that, as Caldwell pulled over, the officer noticed Caldwell "look at me in his rear view mirror and I could see him doing something on the side" with his hand. The officer immediately called for back-up. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that Caldwell appeared "extremely nervous," was perspiring and his hands were shaking.3 The officer asked Caldwell for his credentials, and Caldwell produced his license and registration. The officer then asked Caldwell to exit the vehicle because he "didn't like the way he was acting, kind of looking around, still nervous."
The officer then inquired about the identity of the passenger in Caldwell's car, asking where Caldwell had picked him up and where they were going. Caldwell responded that he did not know the name of his passenger, but that he had picked the passenger up on South Queen Street and they were going to Capitol Park. The officer immediately frisked and handcuffed both Caldwell and the passenger, Isaac Wiley, and waited until the requested back-up unit arrived on the scene.
When another officer arrived, he and Officer Berna questioned Wiley about how he met Caldwell and where they were going. Wiley responded that he had been with Caldwell all day and that they were going to Bay Court Plaza. Officer Berna then asked Caldwell what he was doing with his right hand as he was pulling over. According to the officer, Caldwell answered that he was putting a razor blade in the center console of the car and invited the officer to look for himself.4
When he was unable to find the razor blade in the console, the officer proceeded to use a drug-detecting dog to identify any contraband that may have been in Caldwell's car. The dog alerted to the center console of the car, and a further search by the officer revealed a scale, a razor blade, and plastic bags containing crack and powder cocaine concealed underneath the outer shell of the center console. The officers then arrested both Caldwell and Wiley and took them to the police station.
During an interview at the station house, Wiley told the police that the cocaine in the car belonged to Caldwell and that Caldwell kept more cocaine in a house-trailer located just south of Dover. Based on this information, the State Police obtained a nighttime search warrant for the trailer and executed the warrant at about 2:10 a.m. on July 11, 1998. Upon entering the trailer, the police found Patrick Caldwell, the Defendant's uncle, in the process of flushing a large amount of cocaine down a toilet. Catherine Caldwell, the Defendant's mother, was also in the trailer at the time. The ensuing search turned up over $15,000 in cash and 723 grams of crack cocaine.
The police arrested Patrick and Catherine and transported them to the police station. During interviews with the police, both indicated that the cocaine found in the trailer belonged to Caldwell. They also told the police that Caldwell occupied the room in the trailer in which the cocaine was stored and that Caldwell supplied them with cocaine for resale.5
The State charged Caldwell with trafficking in cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and various other offenses.6 Before trial, Caldwell filed a motion to sever the charges relating to the cocaine found in his car from the charges relating to the cocaine found in the trailer. Caldwell also filed several motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his car and the nighttime search of the trailer. The Superior Court denied Caldwell's motion to sever.7 After conducting a suppression hearing, the Court denied Caldwell's motions to suppress.8 On December 12, 1999, a jury convicted Caldwell on all charges except one count of maintaining a dwelling for keeping controlled substances. The trial court sentenced Caldwell to twenty-eight years in prison followed by probation.
On appeal, Caldwell challenges the judgment of the Superior Court on six grounds. First, he argues that the initial traffic stop was unreasonable, and thus violated article I, section 6 of the Delaware Constitution9 because the officer used Caldwell's traffic violation as a pretext to initiate a baseless drug investigation. Second, Caldwell contends that, even if the initial stop was valid, the officer's conduct during the stop was not reasonably related to the justification for the traffic stop and therefore violated his constitutional rights.10 Third, he argues that the application for the nighttime warrant to search the trailer did not satisfy the requirements of 11 Del. C. § 2308. Fourth, he maintains that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever the charges stemming from the cocaine found in his car from the charges stemming from the cocaine found in the trailer. Fifth, he contends that the trial court's failure to record seven sidebar conferences prejudiced his ability to prosecute his appeal. Finally, Caldwell challenges the Superior Court's decision to deny his motion for a mistrial when it was discovered that one of the jurors was a close friend of the wife of a lawyer in the Attorney General's office.
Caldwell argues that the officer's conduct during the traffic stop was not justified under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution. In particular, Caldwell argues that the officer frisked and handcuffed him without sufficient justification and thus exceeded the permissible scope of a traffic stop. The State responds that the officer's decision to handcuff and frisk Caldwell was supported by the officer's observations of Caldwell and the officer's safety concerns.
The Superior Court held that the officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Caldwell's car,11 including the use of the drug-detecting dog, based on: (1) conflicting statements by Caldwell and the passenger, (2) Caldwell's assertion that he did not know the name of his passenger, (3) the officer's inability to locate the razor blade that Caldwell allegedly placed in the center console, and (4) Caldwell's nervous behavior.12
In reaching this conclusion, the Superior Court addressed only the search that uncovered the cocaine hidden in the center console and failed to consider the prior question whether the officer had a sufficient justification to pat-down and handcuff Caldwell during the detention leading to that search.13 We review de novo claims that the trial court erred in formulating the law or in applying the applicable legal standard to undisputed facts in deciding a motion to suppress evidence.14
Under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop is a seizure of a vehicle and its occupants by the State. A stop is subject to constitutional limitations.15 Specifically, the State must demonstrate that the stop and any subsequent police investigation were reasonable in the circumstances. First, the stop must be justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity as defined in Terry v. Ohio.16 Second, "the stop and inquiry must be `reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.'"17 The question we address here is whether the officer's conduct during the traffic stop was sufficiently related to the parking violation.18
The duration and execution of a traffic stop is necessarily limited by the initial purpose of the stop.19 As the Maryland...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cooke v. State
...Cooke's Opening Br. at A152. 214.Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176, 177 (Del.2005) (citing Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Del.1997)). 215.Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1058 (Del.2001) (quoting Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Del.1988)); see also Lovett v. State, 516 A.2d 4......
-
State v. Askerooth, No. C6-02-318.
...of burglary from that of a petty offense in determining the reasonableness of the duration of a squad car detention); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1049 (Del.2001) (holding that, during a stop for a parking violation, an officer's frisking and handcuffing of the driver and a passenger w......
-
State v. Morlock
...during a routine traffic stop a law enforcement officer may ask a detained driver about his or her travel plans. See Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1049 (Del.2001) (relying on statute that allowed officers to question detained motorists on destination); Woodard v. State, 289 Ga.App. 643,......
-
Lopez-Vazquez v. State
...(Del.Supr.); Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757, 762 (Del.2003); McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Del. 2002); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1053 (Del.2001); Hubbard v. State, 2001 WL 1089664, at *3 (Del.Supr); Elam v. State, 2001 WL 46379, at *1 (Del.Supr.); Virdin v. State, 78......
-
“lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment
...marginally applicable traffic laws as a device to circumvent constitutional search and seizure requirements.” (quoting Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1048 (Del. 2001))); State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 153 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“We believe that our constitutional requirement that searches ......