Caldwell v. Ulsh

• Decision Date: 16 May 1916
• Docket Number: 23,096
• Citation: 112 N.E. 518,184 Ind. 725
• Parties: Caldwell, Executor v. Ulsh
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

112 N.E. 518

184 Ind. 725

Caldwell, Executor v. Ulsh

No. 23,096

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 16, 1916

From Kosciusko Circuit Court: Francis E. Bowser, Judge.

Action by Eliza M. Ulsh on a claim against the estate of Isaac Caldwell, deceased. From a judgment for plaintiff, William Caldwell, executor of the last will of decedent, appeals. (Transferred from the Appellate Court under § 1394 Burns 1914, Acts 1901 p. 565.)

Affirmed.

John D Widaman, Allan S. Widaman and L. W. Royse, for appellant.

John H Aiken and Andrew G. Wood, for appellee.

Erwin J. Morris, C. J., dissents; Lairy, J., not participating. Cox, J.

OPINION

Erwin, J.

This action arose upon a claim filed by appellee against the estate of Isaac Caldwell, deceased. Upon trial by jury appellee was awarded the sum of $ 888.11 with an order to pay the same out of the assets of the estate. There is no question presented here as to the validity of the claim, but it is contended by appellant that the statute of limitations bars appellee's right to a recovery and in that regard that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial based on the grounds that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. Some questions as to the right of appellant to be heard on the merits of the cause are attempted to be raised by appellee but as they are extremely technical no reference will be made to the same in this opinion. The question for decision is whether under the facts shown by the evidence introduced in this cause, appellee's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The facts are substantially as follows: Isaac Caldwell, appellant's decedent was a resident of Kosciusko County, as was appellee; that Caldwell died testate in said county on July 28, 1910; that appellee was the widow of Joshua Caldwell, a son of appellant's decedent; that Joshua died a short time prior to March 13, 1886, leaving as his only heirs at law, appellee and a daughter, Ulla Caldwell, who has since intermarried with one Minear; that at the death of Joshua, one John Collins who then resided in Hayes County, Nebraska was indebted to said Joshua in the sum of more than $ 700; that in the settlement of the estate of Joshua, this claim was divided between appellee, widow, and her daughter, Ulla; that Collins executed and delivered to appellee and her daughter, Ulla, separate notes in the sum of $ 358.40 due two years after date; that Isaac Caldwell was duly appointed the guardian of the daughter, Ulla, and as such guardian, collected the debt due his ward from Collins; that in June, 1893, John Collins, died, in the state of Nebraska and his widow was granted letters of administration and proceeded to settle the estate; that in September, 1893, Isaac Caldwell, made a trip to the state of Nebraska where he filed a claim for appellee against the estate of John Collins, based on the note executed by him to appellee on March 13, 1886, which claim was disallowed on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations of the state of Nebraksa; that after the disallowance of the claim, Rosa Collins, widow of John Collins, having lands in her own right and expressing a desire to pay the debt evidenced by the note of her deceased husband, executed a deed of conveyance to Isaac Caldwell for one hundred sixty acres of land located in that state, in payment of the debt evidenced by the note of $ 358.40 of the date of March 13, 1886, that the deed of conveyance was taken by Isaac Caldwell in his own name, without the knowledge, consent or acquiescence of appellee; that Isaac Caldwell held the title to the real estate until his death in 1910, when by the terms of his will, it was given to a granddaughter; that at the time the deed of conveyance was made, Isaac Caldwell agreed with Rosa Collins that he would secure the note from appellee and send it to Mrs. Collins; that afterwards he falsely informed said Rosa Collins that he could not send her the note for the reason that the mice had eaten it. There is no evidence that Caldwell ever notified appellee that he had secured the title to the real estate in payment of appellee's claim against the Collins' estate or that he had settled the claim. The evidence further shows that some two or three months after the death of Caldwell, appellee and her daughter made a trip to Nebraska and visited Mrs. Collins; that immediately after her return from Nebraska, she filed the claim in question against the estate of Isaac Caldwell asking the payment of the amount of her note which Caldwell received in settlement of the claim against the Collins estate with interest from the date of the note.

It is contended by appellant that the cause of action accrued at the time the deed of conveyance to Caldwell was executed and that therefore the same was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Appellee contends that appellant's decedent concealed the cause of action and therefore the cause of action did not accrue until the same was discovered.

It is a well-settled rule of equity, in the absence of statutory provision otherwise, that where property is paid for with the money or assets of one person, and the title thereto is taken in the name of another person, in the absence of circumstances showing a different intention or understanding a constructive trust in the property arises in favor of the person whose money or assets are so used. 39 Cyc 118 and cases cited. When, therefore, Isaac Caldwell took the deed of conveyance for the one hundred sixty acres of land in Nebraska, the consideration therefor being the money due on the note of John Collins and which belonged to appellee, a constructive trust was created in favor of appellee, of which appellant's decedent involuntarily became the trustee. 39 Cyc 26 and cases cited. "For the purpose of working out justice, constructive trusts are raised by equity, when in fact there was no intention by the party charged as trustee to create such relation, and usually, indeed, when his intention was otherwise. The gist of every constructive trust is fraud, which may be founded upon misrepresentation and concealment, or arise from the use by one party of some influential or confidential relation which he sustained toward the owner of a legal title, thereby obtaining such title himself upon more advantageous terms than he could otherwise have done. And, therefore, one who obtains the legal title to property by arts or acts, or through circumvention or imposition, or by virtue of a confidential relation and influence arising from it, under such circumstances that he ought not, in good conscience, to hold and enjoy the beneficial interest therein, is converted into a trustee, and ordered so to execute the trust as to protect or indemnify the party defrauded, and at the same time promote fair dealing and common honesty in the interest of society and the state. 1 Perry, Trusts (5th ed.) § 166; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3d. ed.) § 155; 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3d ed.) § 1044; Hughes v. Willson (1891), 128 Ind. 491 ; Jackson v. Landers (1893), 134 Ind. 529 ; Cox v. Arnsmann (1881), 76 Ind. 210; Wright v. Moody (1888), 116 Ind. 175, 179 ." Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind.App. 643, 645, 73 N.E. 1096, 1097. A trust once being established the statute of limitation would not begin to run until such time as the trustee disavows the trust by some act indicating that he was claiming the real estate as his own. Scott v. Dilley (1913), 53 Ind.App. 100, 101 N.E. 313; 39 Cyc 472; Dyer v. Waters (1890), 46 N.J. Eq. 484, 19 A. 129. The only act of disavowance on the part of Caldwell was, when, by the terms of his will he undertook to devise the real estate to his granddaughter, which will was probated in 1910, from which date the statute of limitations began to run. This was less than six years before...