Calef v. Budden

Citation361 F.Supp.2d 493
Decision Date18 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 3:03-3762-10.,3:03-3762-10.
PartiesMaria CALEF, Plaintiff, v. Jean C. BUDDEN, Traci L. Batchelder, and Richland School District Two, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

William Gary White, III, William White Law Firm, Columbia, SC, for Plaintiff.

Kathryn Long Mahoney, Kenneth Lendrem Childs, Thomas Kennedy Barlow, Childs and Halligan, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

ORDER

PERRY, District Judge.

In this action, Plaintiff, Maria Calef ("Calef") alleges that Defendants, Jean C. Budden, Traci L. Batchelder, and Richland School District Two ("the School District") denied her the opportunity to substitute teach at Dent Middle School ("Dent") in the School District in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech by speaking out against U.S. military involvement in Iraq and President Bush. This matter came before the Court for hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on December 29, 2004. Based on the memoranda, supporting materials, and the arguments of the parties, the undersigned finds that Defendants' motion should be granted, in its entirety.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff, Maria Calef ("Calef") is a 59-year old female of Panamanian descent. She has been a United States citizen since 1985.

Calef began working for the School District on September 25, 2000 as a substitute teacher. In the School District, substitute teachers serve as employees at will. Over the course of Calef's employment with the School District, the District's Human Resources Office received numerous complaints about her performance, and in particular, her inability to properly interact with students and control her classes. From January 2001 to March 2003, the School District received six separate requests from school administrators to exclude Calef from substitute teaching at their schools. Despite these numerous concerns with her ability to relate to and control students, the School District permitted Calef to continue substitute teaching at schools that had not requested her removal from substitute lists.

The events that transpired on March 25, 2003 eventually resulted in Calef's suspension from substitute teaching for approximately a month and ban from substitute teaching at Dent Middle School ("Dent").1 On that date, Calef was substitute teaching at Dent for a math teacher. At the end of the school day, the Dent principal, Randall Gary, received a complaint from a parent of a student, Colonel Brent Johnson. Col. Johnson advised Gary that Calef had worn a button during class bearing the slogan "War is Not the Answer" and had referred to President George W. Bush as "stupid" or an "idiot" and made other negative statements regarding American military policy in Panama and Iraq. Because Dent Middle School has a large percentage of students with parents in the military, Gary considered Calef's discussion, as reported, inappropriate and forwarded an Evaluation of Substitute Form to the School District's Human Resource office recommending her removal from further substitute duties at Dent.

Gary also called Dr. Daniel Cobb, who was then the Chief Human Resources Officer for the School District, and advised him of the inappropriate behavior that had been reported. Dr. Cobb directed Tiniece Javis, one of the School District's Human Resources Directors, to conduct an investigation of the allegations and determine what course of action the School District should take regarding Calef's employment. Javis and Jean Budden, the substitute supervisor for the School District, first decided to suspend Calef from any future substitute teaching assignments until the investigation had been completed. Calef received notice of this decision by letter from Budden dated March 26, 2003. Javis then asked Gary to interview the students in the class and obtain statements from them. The statements Gary received were consistent with the allegations that Col. Johnson had reported.

Meanwhile, in response to the allegations, Calef submitted a letter to Budden denying the reported conduct and taking a very aggressive tone. She accused Budden of discrimination, denying her "equal protection of the law," and of not being "straight and honest" with Calef. Although Calef admitted wearing the political button in class, she denied making the statements attributed to her about the war, the president, and U.S. foreign policy. However, after reviewing Calef's personnel file and prior problems, and considering Calef's expression of similar beliefs in their meetings with her, Javis and Budden decided that, more likely than not, Calef had engaged in the expression that the students reported.

Javis determined that Calef's classroom expression had violated several policies contained in the School District's Substitute Handbook. In particular, Javis concluded that, by wearing her political button and making derogatory comments about the president and military action in Iraq, Calef had violated handbook policies regarding Professional Behavior (pages 36-37), Discretion and Confidentiality (pages 37-38), and Dos and Don'ts for Substitute Teachers (page 50). At deposition, Calef conceded that it would be inappropriate and a violation of School District policies to use abusive or derogatory language or use sarcastic or disrespectful phrases, and that it is a substitute's job to conduct a lesson chosen by the regular classroom teacher.

Rather than permanently removing Calef from substitute teaching duties at the remainder of the schools in which she was still eligible to teach, Javis and Budden decided to remove Calef only from substitute teaching responsibilities at Dent Middle School. Calef was reinstated to substitute at six other schools in the School District at which she had previously expressed interest in teaching and had not previously been barred by request of those schools' administrations. Javis informed Calef of this decision by letter dated April 30, 2003. The record before the Court also establishes that the School District has disciplined other employees for engaging in similar conduct

Between April 30 and the end May 2003, Calef declined to substitute teach anywhere in the School District despite being asked to teach on multiple occasions. Defendants took steps to ensure that Calef was not confused regarding her employment status and ability to teach at six schools in the District. Also, per Calef's request, Defendant Traci Batchelder provided her with a neutral letter of reference to aid her in seeking other employment if she chose.

Calef responded with an angry letter accusing the School District and Batchelder of acting outrageously and defaming her by addressing the incidents that had occurred at other schools prior to March 2003, of which Calef claimed she had previously not been made aware. Batchelder offered Calef the opportunity to meet with Dr. Cobb, the School District's Chief Human Resources Officer, if she chose to pursue the matter further or was dissatisfied with Batchelder's review of her status. Calef chose not to meet with Dr. Cobb or pursue the matter any further with the School District.

Between June 2003 and December 17, 2003, Calef was offered substitute teaching opportunities on 131 occasions. Calef declined every opportunity to substitute teach during that time. She admits that she was not interested or available to substitute teach during this period because she was taking courses at the University of South Carolina and Midlands Technical College.

II. ANALYSIS
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after considering the full evidentiary record, there are no genuine issues of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court is not to weigh the evidence, but determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When the party moving for summary judgment does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the burden of summary judgment may be discharged by "pointing out to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, a "mere scintilla" of evidence will not preclude summary judgment. The court's inquiry is "not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any [evidence] upon which a jury could properly ... find a verdict for the party" resisting summary judgment. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Defendants argue that the School District and the individual defendants, to the extent that they have been sued in their official capacities, are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Smith v. School District of Greenville County, 324 F.Supp.2d 786 (D.S.C.2004)(South Carolina school districts are "arms of the state" immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment). Plaintiff conceded in her written response to summary judgment and at oral argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars her suit for damages against the District and against the individual defendants in their official capacities. However, she argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for injunctive or other equitable relief against the individual defendants, presumably pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

However, a review of Plaintiff's Complaint reveals no claim or prayer for injunctive relief. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff is pursuing individual capacity claims against Defendants Budden and Batchelder and has not alleged any official capacity claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claim against the School District itself is barred by the Eleventh...

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    ...Amendment does not extend." Id. There are conflicting opinions on this issue from the District of South Carolina. In Calef v. Budden, 361 F.Supp.2d 493, 497 (D.S.C.2005), Smith v. School District of Greenville County, 324 F.Supp.2d 786, 796 (D.S.C.2004), and Stewart v. Laurens County School......
  • Grady v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. Seven, C/A No.: 7:13-cv-02020-GRA
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    ...basis. ECF No. 25 at 13-14 (Compare Eldeco, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 521 (D.S.C. 2006), Calef v. Budden, 361 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D.S.C. 2005), Smith v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty.,324 F. Supp. 2d 786 (D.S.C. 2004), and Stewart v. Laurens Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 55, 1992......

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