Smith v. School Dist. of Greenville County
| Citation | 324 F.Supp.2d 786 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.2:03-2027-26.,No. CIV.A.2:03-3692-26.,No. CIV.A.9:03-2016-26.,No. CIV.A.3:03-2031-26.,No. CIV.A.2:03-2020-26.,No. CIV.A.2:03-2018-26.,No. CIV.A.4:03-3693-26.,No. CIV.A.4:03-2033-26.,No. CIV.A.0:03-2032-26.,No. CIV.A.3:03-3690-26.,No. CIV.A.4:03-2029-26.,No. CIV.A.0:03-2019-26.,No. CIV.A.4:03-2023-26.,No. CIV.A.3:03-2024-26.,No. CIV.A.8:03-2017-26.,No. CIV.A.3:03-2028-26.,No. CIV.A.6:03-2015-26.,No. CIV.A.5:03-3695-26.,No. CIV.A.4:03-2021-26.,No. CIV.A.7:03-3689-26.,No. CIV.A.1:03-3691-03.,No. CIV.A.4:03-2022-26.,No. CIV.A.8:03-3694-26.,No. CIV.A.4:03-2025-26.,No. CIV.A.3:03-2026-26.,CIV.A.6:03-2015-26.,CIV.A.9:03-2016-26.,CIV.A.8:03-2017-26.,CIV.A.2:03-2018-26.,CIV.A.0:03-2019-26.,CIV.A.2:03-2020-26.,CIV.A.4:03-2021-26.,CIV.A.4:03-2022-26.,CIV.A.4:03-2023-26.,CIV.A.3:03-2024-26.,CIV.A.4:03-2025-26.,CIV.A.3:03-2026-26.,CIV.A.2:03-2027-26.,CIV.A.3:03-2028-26.,CIV.A.4:03-2029-26.,CIV.A.3:03-2031-26.,CIV.A.0:03-2032-26.,CIV.A.4:03-2033-26.,CIV.A.7:03-3689-26.,CIV.A.3:03-3690-26.,CIV.A.1:03-3691-03.,CIV.A.2:03-3692-26.,CIV.A.4:03-3693-26.,CIV.A.8:03-3694-26.,CIV.A.5:03-3695-26. |
| Parties | Martha Jane SMITH, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GREENVILLE COUNTY, Defendant. Susie Coaxum and Geraldine Archer Major, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Beaufort County School District, Defendant. Butler Gray, Jr., Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Abbeville County School District, Defendant. Trudy Brown, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Charleston County School District, Defendant. David Rice, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Chester County School District, Defendant. Leona Fields and Pearl Holmes, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Colleton School District, Defendant. Alberta Kelly, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Dillon School District One, Defendant. Melinda Robinson and Jessie Wright, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Florence School District One, Defendant. Lasonya McFadden, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Florence School District Three, Greenville County, Defendant. Emma Bradley, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Lee County School District, Defendant. Sallie Walls, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Horry County Schools, Defendant. Evelyn Thompson, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. School District Five of Lexington and Richland Counties, Defendant. Maggie Linen, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Georgetown County School District, Defendant. David Higgins, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Richland County School District One, Defendant. Patricia Reid, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Marlboro County Schools, Defendant. Dorianne Carter, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Sumter School District 17, Defendant. Ruby Greene, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. The School District of Fairfield County, Defendant. Kevin Brown, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Williamsburg County School District, Defendant. Dorethea Black, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County School District No. 7, Defendant. Alteal Branch-Richardson, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Richland School District Two, Defendant. Bonita Smith, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Aiken County Public Schools, Defendant. Mary Dickerson and Melonese, Washington, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Berkeley County School District, Defendant. John Sanders, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Marion School District One, Defendant. Marvin McLean, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. The School District of Oconee County, Defendant. Terry Guess, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Orangeburg Consolidated School District Four, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Eugene Clark Covington, Jr., Covington Patrick Hagins Stern and Lewis, Greenville, SC, Louis H. Watson, Jr., Watson and Heidelberg, Jackson, MS, for Martha Jane Smith, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, plaintiff.
Thomas Allen Bright, Greenville, SC, for School District of Greenville County, defendant.
These cases involve twenty-five putative class action suits alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Plaintiffs are, or at one time were, employees of the named Defendant school districts. Pending before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss, filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having carefully considered the motions, the responses, the replies, the arguments of counsel, the record and the applicable regulations and law, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' motions shall be granted.1
Plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion if subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). Williams v. United States of America, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.1995); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 181-82, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936)( that the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving that jurisdiction). The Court must determine if Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1216 (4th Cir.1982).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings. Williams, 50 F.3d at 304. Indeed, "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. (citation omitted). The Court's consideration of materials outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, depositions, or live testimony, does not convert the Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a motion for summary judgment. Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.
On appeal, a district court's dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Tillman v. Resolution Trust Corp., 37 F.3d 1032, 1034 (4th Cir.1994).
Defendants contend that its' motions to dismiss should be granted on the grounds that sovereign immunity, as reflected in the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, bars Plaintiffs from pursuing their actions. According to Defendants, the school districts are an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiffs maintain that, to be entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity, Defendants must establish that they are each an arm of the state and not merely a "political subdivision" or a "body politic." Plaintiffs argue that the decisional law, as well as South Carolina statutory provisions, clearly distinguish county school districts from state agencies.
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. Amend XI. On its face, the plain language of the Amendment would seem to limit only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says as for the presupposition that it affirms. Id. (citation omitted). The presupposition is that a state is immune from suits brought in federal courts by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), unless 1) the state consents to the suit in unequivocal terms or 2) unless Congress, operating pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally declares its intention to revoke the immunity. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985).
There is no dispute that Congress failed to abrogate the state's immunity in the FLSA. Moreover, Defendants in these cases have not consented to a private suit under the FLSA. In fact, the parties agree that the dispositive question is whether school districts in South Carolina are arms of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, if the Court answers in the affirmative, then dismissal is appropriate; but, if the Court answers in the negative, then the cases shall go forward.
At least two courts in this district have considered this question before today. Unfortunately, however, the courts reached opposite conclusions, and thus provide little guidance to this Court.
In Green v. Clarendon School District Three, 923 F.Supp. 829 (D.S.C.1996), when the court considered whether the defendant school district was an arm of the state, it focused almost exclusively on how maintenance of the suit would not affect the state treasury. As to any other relevant factors, such as whether the suit would jeopardize the integrity of the state's sovereignty or whether the state exerts such control over the defendant school district that it should be considered an arm of the...
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