Calhoun v. City of Providence, 77-111-A

• Decision Date: 07 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-111-A,77-111-A
• Citation: 120 R.I. 619,390 A.2d 350
• Parties: Willie Lee CALHOUN v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 350

390 A.2d 350

120 R.I. 619

Willie Lee CALHOUN v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.

No. 77-111-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 7, 1978.

[120 R.I. 634] Pucci & Goldin, Inc., Samuel A. Olevson, Providence, for plaintiff.

Julius C. Michaelson, Atty. Gen., William Granfield Brody, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is a civil action, in which the plaintiff is now before us on his appeal from the grant by a Superior Court justice of the state's motion for a directed verdict. The trial justice had reserved decision on the motion, and its grant came subsequent to a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,200.

On Sunday, November 19, 1972, at approximately 6 p. m., plaintiff, in the company of two female friends, was driving along Cranston Street in Providence. His itinerary for the evening included dropping off one of his companions at her aunt's home, visiting a local pharmacy, and reporting to work at 7:30. However, as plaintiff leisurely directed his 1965 Chevrolet down Cranston Street and turned onto Potters Avenue, he was unaware that at that moment the Fates were conspiring against him to make November 19 a day that would be forever inscribed in his memory.

As plaintiff proceeded on his appointed rounds, he noticed the flashing lights of a Providence police cruiser reflected in his rear-view mirror. He pulled his vehicle to the side of Potters Avenue to allow the cruiser to pass, but much to his surprise, the cruiser, instead of passing him, came to a stop behind the Chevrolet. Soon a second cruiser arrived on the scene and pulled in front of his automobile. The officers who confronted him asked him for his license and registration. The plaintiff produced the documents for the officers who, after inspecting them, informed him that he was driving a stolen car. The plaintiff told the officers that they must be mistaken because he had recently purchased the car from his employer. When one of the officers insisted that the car was "hot," plaintiff once again asserted that the car was rightfully his and that the officers were wrong.

The police then told plaintiff that they also had a warrant for his arrest that had been issued by the Warwick police. At this point plaintiff was not only dumbfounded, he was handcuffed. However, plaintiff, a firm believer that hope springs eternal, told his captors that once they arrived at the police station, they would learn that they had arrested an innocent man. He was then placed in a police van and taken to police headquarters. The supposedly stolen car was towed from the arrest site.

At headquarters plaintiff strenuously maintained that the officers had the wrong man. Nevertheless, he was placed in a cell, where he waited for several hours until the Warwick police arrived to bring him to that municipality. Once in the Warwick Police Station, plaintiff was again questioned and then put into a cell, where, needless to say, he spent a sleepless Sunday night.

On Monday morning plaintiff was brought before a justice of the Third District Court. When plaintiff was asked how he would plead to the pending charges of driving without a license and registration, he told the court that before he could plead, he wished to make an explanation.

The plaintiff then proceeded to relate that he had been in the Warwick court 8 months earlier, in March 1972, for the very same offenses, and at that time he had paid fines totalling $30 and costs. He thought that, with this payment, the matter was ended. The justice informed plaintiff that he couldn't have paid the fines because the clerk's office had no record of payment. Not so, replied plaintiff. He was sure of his position, he said, because the license and registration charges arose out of a two-car collision. The plaintiff told the court that the other party's insurer would not pay until the charges had been resolved, and he assured the court that the insurer had paid him. At this point the District Court justice made a phone call, and at the end of his conversation he told plaintiff that he was free to leave the premises.

The plaintiff's brother came to Warwick and transported the innocent man to Providence police headquarters to retrieve his car. When plaintiff presented the release slip for the car, he was told that the vehicle was in the possession of the common carrier who had towed the Chevrolet away from Potters Avenue. When he asked who was going to pay for the towing charges, the police informed him that payment was not their responsibility. Insult was added to injury because regaining possession of his car cost plaintiff $15.

In March 1973 plaintiff, after deciding that maybe one can fight city hall and even take on the state house, commenced a civil action in the Superior Court in which he sought damages from the State of Rhode Island and the cities of Warwick and Providence. Subsequently, he discontinued his action against the two municipalities. ¹

The plaintiff's action against the state was predicated on negligence. The record reveals that in March 1972 there was a capias ² outstanding on plaintiff issued because of the alleged unresolved motor vehicle charges. Actually, plaintiff did appear in the Third District Court in March and paid the fines imposed because of these violations. However, the capias that had been issued was never recalled by the state. The plaintiff's claim against the state is based upon its failure to recall the capias.

At trial the state offered no evidence. In ordering the directed verdict, the trial justice ruled that the cancellation of the capias involved the performance of a judicial act that could only be performed by a judge having the requisite jurisdiction. Thus, the trial justice reasoned that although the judge who failed to recall the capias may have been negligent, he was immune from personal liability by reason of the doctrine of judicial immunity. The trial justice went on to rule that since the basis for the state's liability rested on the principle of Respondeat superior, it followed that, if the allegedly negligent servant was immune from liability, the state must also be immune. He also observed that this result was called for even though G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-1 renders the state liable in tort for damages up to the amount of $50,000.

While plaintiff's appeal is based on several contentions, the decisive issues are (1) whether the enactment of § 9-31-1 has abolished all vestiges of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and (2) if the doctrine retains some viability, does it provide a sufficient basis for the grant of the directed verdict.

The plaintiff, in challenging the trial justice's grant of the directed verdict, claims that the trial justice completely confused the doctrines of sovereign and judicial immunity. According to plaintiff, even if one assumes that cancellation of the capias was a judicial act and the negligent state employee would be personally immune from suit because of judicial immunity, it does not inexorably follow that the state is thereby relieved from financial responsibility. He points out that the doctrine of judicial immunity only arises when the state agent is Personally made a party to the action and not when the state is the defendant. When the action is against the state, plaintiff maintains that recovery should be allowed under § 9-31-1 regardless of whether the offending employee is personally immune for his conduct.

In its pertinent part § 9-31-1 reads as follows:

"The state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including all cities and towns, shall * * * hereby be liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation * * *."

There can be no questioning the fact that the General Assembly, in enacting § 9-31-1, has sharply reduced the broad notion of sovereign immunity ³ that had prevailed in this jurisdiction. However, we do not believe that the Legislature ever intended the statute to operate so as to impose liability upon the state for any and all acts or omissions of its employees and officers which might cause injury to persons.

Section 9-31-1 can only be fully understood in light of the historical development and demise of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Legal scholars are in general agreement that governmental immunity had its genesis in the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng.Rep. 359 (1788). See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1 (1924). In Russell the court upheld a claim of immunity against a political subdivision upon the fear that "an infinity of actions" would arise and that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." 2 T.R. at 671, 673, 100 Eng.Rep. at 362. Underlying these expressions was presumably the English notion, based upon centuries of monarchial rule, that the King could do no wrong. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). From this concept evolved doctrines exempting governmental units from vicarious tort liability because the ruling authority of the commonwealth could not as principal be held to account, either personally or under the concept of Respondeat superior, for the negligent acts of his servants. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 209 (1963).

The doctrine of governmental tort immunity was imported to the United States in the early part of the 19th century with Russell being relied upon to deny tort recovery against state and municipal governments. See Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). Rhode Island recognized the doctrine as it applied to municipal corporations in Wixon v. City of Newport, 13 R.I. 454 (1881). There the court held that a municipality was immune for either the nonperformance or the negligent performance of the duties of its employees and officers...