Ford v. Kenosha County
| Citation | 160 Wis.2d 485,466 N.W.2d 646 |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1046,89-1046 |
| Parties | Darryl E. FORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENOSHA COUNTY, Its Officials, Agents and Employees, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Walter W. Stern (argued) and Stern, Caviale & Stern, Kenosha, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bernard R. Vash (argued), Kenosha County Corp. Counsel, for defendants-respondents.
This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to section 809.61, Stats.1987-88. Darryl E. Ford appeals from a judgment entered by the circuit court of Kenosha County, the Honorable Michael S. Fisher, presiding, dismissing Ford's complaint against Kenosha County, its officials, agents, officers, and employees.
The issue certified on appeals is: "does the doctrine of judicial immunity extend to representatives of the clerk of court's office and the district attorney's office and thereby shield them from liability for an arrest resulting from an erroneously issued bench warrant?" The circuit court found that since the bench warrant was issued at the direction of the judge, the clerical personnel and assistant district attorney are not subject to liability. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
We conclude that the assistant district attorney, in submitting the bench warrant to the judge as alleged in the complaint, 1 was acting as an advocate, and is therefore absolutely immune from liability. Clerical personnel, in preparing the bench warrant, which was accepted and signed by the judge, were performing a quasi-judicial act and are absolutely immune from liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing Ford's complaint.
In examining the complaint, we must accept as true the facts pleaded and all inferences therefrom. Production Credit Ass'n. v. Croft, 143 Wis.2d 746, 751, 423 N.W.2d 544 (Ct.App.1988). The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows: On December 3, 1985, Ford wrote a check for insufficient funds. He was later criminally charged with issuing a worthless check. Pursuant to an "authorization to appear," On February 1, 1988, Ford filed a complaint alleging that the assistant district attorney and clerical personnel were negligent in preparing and submitting the bench warrant for Ford's arrest. As a result, the "arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff was [sic] negligent" and were in violation of Ford's "rights protected by state and federal law."
Ford's attorney appeared on his behalf before the circuit court of Kenosha County and entered a plea of "either no contest or guilty to an amended ordinance violation." On July 7, 1986, Ford paid a fine for the ordinance violation. 2 Nowhere in the complaint is it alleged that the misdemeanor charges were dismissed. On July 11, 1986, an assistant district attorney for Kenosha County submitted a bench warrant to Judge Breitenbach for Ford's arrest. 3 The complaint alleged that clerical personnel for [160 Wis.2d 491] the offices of the Kenosha County clerk of court, district attorney and joint services 4 were responsible for preparing the bench warrant and submitting it to the assistant district attorney. Judge Breitenbach signed the bench warrant. On or about January 30, 1987, Ford was "pulled over" by a City of Wauwatosa police officer for operating a vehicle with a defective taillight. The police officer informed Ford that the Kenosha Police Department had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Unable to post the $500 bond, Ford was held in custody for five hours
We reach our conclusions based on the "facts" Ford alleged in the complaint. However, Ford furnished the circuit court (Judge Fisher) with a more complete statement of what occurred in the document entitled "Response to Motion for Summary Judgment by Ray Gramm and Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss by Kenosha County." It recites that on May 22, 1986, attorney Chandler appeared on behalf of Ford in the initial appearance on the criminal complaint "alleging the writing of a worthless check."
[T]he Court Commissioner set a pretrial before the Honorable Jerold W. Breitenbach ... on July 7, 1986 at 1:00 P.M. On July 7, 1986, [no hour mentioned] in fact John Chandler appeared on behalf of [Ford] before [Judge Breitenbach,] and Christopher Coakley represented the State. A plea bargain was arrived at, and the worthless check misdemeanor ordinance [sic] was reduced to a county ordinance violation ... [a] bench warrant request made by Susan Remkus, then Assistant District Attorney.... apparently was granted by Judge Breitenbach prior to the Coakley appearance ... (Emphasis added). 5
Bench warrants are usually issued for failure to appear in court. 6 However, the record does not show nor does the complaint state why Ms. Remkus made such a request which was granted by Judge Breitenbach.
Kenosha County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The County argued that "[it] does not matter who drafted ... a bench warrant, because [it] is totally ineffective until the judicial officer approves ... by subscribing his name thereto, thus making it the court's ... warrant." Therefore, the County concluded that "each named defendant is immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity." Moreover, Kenosha County claimed that the assistant district attorney is absolutely immune from liability while performing acts which are an integral part of the judicial process; and, as an attorney, the assistant district attorney is immune from liability against suit by a third party, absent fraud or malice.
The court granted Kenosha County's motion to dismiss the complaint. The court found that the judge is "in control and responsible." Since the judge issued the bench warrant, the assistant district attorney and clerical personnel, as "supporting actors," are not subject to liability.
Ford appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to this court. We accepted the certification.
In reviewing the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint, we are faced with a question of law. Dean v. Ehrhart, 147 Wis.2d 174, 176, 432 N.W.2d 658 (Ct.App.1988). Therefore, we owe no deference to the circuit court's decision. Id. Since fair notice of a claim is all that is required of a pleading, the test we apply to the complaint is whether the defendants have been given notice of the general nature of the plaintiff's claim. CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First Fed. Savings & Loan, 88 Wis.2d 631, 636, 277 N.W.2d 766 (1979); Hertlein v. Huchthausen, 133 Wis.2d 67, 72, 393 N.W.2d 299 (Ct.App.1986). We are not concerned with whether the allegations, if proven, entitle the plaintiff to recover. CEW, 88 Wis.2d at 636, 277 N.W.2d 766.
The complaint alleges that clerical personnel for the Kenosha County clerk of court's office and district attorney's office negligently prepared the bench warrant for Ford's arrest and negligently submitted it to the assistant district attorney. The complaint also alleges that on July 11, 1986, the assistant district attorney negligently submitted the bench warrant to Judge Breitenbach. As to the clerical personnel, we find that the complaint gives the defendants sufficient notice of the claim of negligence against them. We also find that the complaint gives the assistant district attorney sufficient notice of the claim of negligence against her.
Even though a liberal construction of the complaint meets the requirement of notice pleadings, if "it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover," we will affirm the dismissal of the complaint because it is based on a legally insufficient claim. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis.2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979) (quoting Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq.L.Rev. 1, 54 (1976)). Kenosha County, in its motion to dismiss the complaint, claims that it is clear Ford cannot recover because the clerical An immunity is a "freedom from suit or liability." Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, 1032, sec. 131 (5th ed. 1984). Unlike a privilege, an immunity is conferred upon a defendant because of the status or position of the defendant, not because of the existence of a particular set of facts or the moral justification of an act. Id. Additionally, an "immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). For example, a judge, when performing judicial acts within the judge's jurisdiction, is absolutely immune from liability for damages. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-364, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104-1108, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
personnel and the assistant district attorney are immune from liability.
The theory of immunity, as stated by Judge Learned Hand, is that "it is better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950). 7 To allow unsatisfied litigants to sue a judge would "contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1966). The question is: does a similar policy support immunity for the clerical personnel and the assistant district attorney, as held by the circuit court?
In Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 393, 398 (1870), this court stated that:
no public officer is responsible in a civil suit for a judicial determination, however erroneous it may be, and however malicious the motive which produced it. Such acts, when corrupt, may be punished...
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