Calhoun v. Couch
| Decision Date | 25 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 28882,28882 |
| Citation | 232 Ga. 467,207 S.E.2d 455 |
| Parties | Johnny CALHOUN v. T. W. COUCH. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
James C. Bonner, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.
Joseph H. Briley, Dist. Atty., Wayne B. Bradley, Milledgeville, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Appellant, an indigent, pleaded guilty in Baldwin Superior Court on September 8, 1972, to two counts of burglary. He was represented by appointed counsel. The court pronounced sentences of seven years imprisonment in each case and probated the two concurrent sentences in the following language: 'As a condition of probation, probationer while thus under the supervision of the court shall pay a fine of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and restitution to (each of the two victims) as a condition precedent before this probationary sentence shall become operative.' (Emphasis supplied) Appellant began serving his sentences in the custody of the appellee Warden Couch. Subsequently, in August and September of 1973, the appellant's mother made full restitution to the two burglary victims on behalf of appellant, as provided in the sentences, but the $250 fine in each case was not paid. Thereafter, appellant sought release from his confinement by habeas corpus contending that payment of the fines was not a condition precedent to probation. Appellant further contended that if the sentences are construed to require payment of these fines as a condition precedent to probation, his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are offended because he is indigent and should not be deprived of probation simply because of his indigency. The trial court denied the habeas corpus relief and remanded appellant to the custody of the warden. Held:
1. A reasonable construction of the burglary sentences imposed upon appellant in this case leads us to conclude that these sentences clearly provide for payment of both a fine and restitution 'before (the) probationary sentence shall become effective.' Appellant's argument that only restitution was required as a condition precedent to probation is not persuasive as the provisions for payment of the fine and restitution are joined by the conjunction 'and' in each sentence and this means payment of both was intended as a condition precedent to probation of the sentence.
2. Appellant's insistence that the trilogy of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 26 L.Ed.2d 773 (1971); and, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) requires a conclusion that he has been denied equal protection of the law cannot be sustained under the record in this case. While it is true that any disparate treatment of indigents and the affluent runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)), there is nothing in the record to show that appellant has been discriminated against in this case. The three U.S. Supreme Court cases relied on by appellant reject the concept of 30 days or $30 as a valid sentence, but they are distinguishable on their facts from the present case. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 269, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 involved a 'work-off' statute. The sentence imposed there was one year imprisonment and a $500 fine. The prisoner, at the end of one year, having not paid his fine, was required to remain in prison at a rate of $5 a day until he worked off his $500 fine. The court held that though a state has considerable latitude in fixing the punishment for state crimes and may impose alternative sanctions, it may not under the Equal Protection Clause subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.
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Bearden v. Georgia
...v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E.2d 791 (1977), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 712, 58 L.Ed.2d 520 (1978); Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974). 6 See, e.g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo, 3 Cal.3d 100, 89 Cal.Rptr. 255, 473 P.2d 999 (1970); ......
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Hunter v. Dean, 32401
...in Barnett v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 694, 217 S.E.2d 280 (1975). Consequently, we are asked to reexamine our holdings in Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974), and Barnett v. Hopper, supra. In Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455, supra, and Barnett v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 694, ......
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Simpson v. State, s. 59871
...... However, we have neither situation in the instant case. See Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467(2), 207 S.E.2d 455. In essence, the Williams-Morris-Tate cases held that "the Due [154 Ga.App. 776] Process and ......
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Bearden v. State
...This contention has been decided adversely to appellant in Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E.2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974); but see Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 284-287, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1110-1111, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). We s......
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"garbage In, Garbage Out": the Litigation Implosion Over the Unconstitutional Organization and Jurisdiction of the City Court of Atlanta - Edward C. Brewer Iii
...not be paid under protest) (overruling Edwards v. City of Albany, 136 Ga. App. 488, 221 S.E.2d 681 (1975)); see also Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974) (stating choice does not deny equal protection to indigent defendant). 241. O.C.G.A. Sec. 40-5-57 (c)(1)(B) (1997). 242. ......