Cali v. United States, No. 72-1100.
Decision Date | 19 July 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1100. |
Citation | 464 F.2d 475 |
Parties | In re Thomas CALI v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Shirley Baccus-Lobel, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Joseph L. Tauro, U. S. Atty., Edward F. Harrington, Albert F. Cullen, Jr., and Sidney M. Glazer, Attys., Dept. of Justice, were on brief, for appellant.
Charlotte Anne Perretta, Boston, Mass., with whom Joseph S. Oteri, Kevin M. Keating, and Crane, Inker & Oteri, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
The appellee, Thomas Cali, having been called to testify before a grand jury, moved to suppress the contents and fruits of wire and oral communications intercepted by the government. The motion, made in the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515 and 2518(10) (a), was based primarily on the allegation that the government had failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2516.1 That section requires that either the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General authorize applications for the interception of wire communications. In the instant case the application was reviewed and authorized by Sol Lindenbaum, the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General. The district court granted appellee's motion, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (b) the government brought this appeal. The threshold question, and the only one we reach, is whether a motion to suppress is available to a grand jury witness.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Wire and oral communications obtained in violation of the statutory provisions, and the fruits of such unlawful interceptions, may not be introduced before a grand jury or other enumerated forums. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.2 Other sections of the Act detail the remedies for those aggrieved by unlawful interceptions: § 2518(10) (a) provides for motions to suppress, § 2511 for criminal sanctions, and § 2520 for civil relief. Also, in the recent case of Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (June 26, 1972), the Supreme Court approved the raising of a § 2515 violation in defense to a contempt citation.
It is the interpretation of § 2518(10) (a) which concerns us here. That section provides, in pertinent part:
It is therefore beyond dispute that the omission of "grand jury" was both intentional and significant.4
In Gelbard v. United States, supra, the Court examined the omission without deciding the availability of motions to suppress evidence to witnesses before a grand jury. The majority opinion stated:
The opinion refrained from holding that motions to suppress were unavailable to grand jury witnesses and relied instead on 28 U.S.C. § 1826 as authorizing a contempt defense based on 18 U.S.C. § 2515. The four dissenting Justices, looking to the statutory scheme and legislative history, argued, inter alia, that motions to suppress could not be made in the context of grand jury proceedings. The dissent noted that prior to the Omnibus Act grand jury witnesses were not entitled to suppression hearings, and that Congress did not intend to alter this rule.6
Although the Gelbard majority opinion does not provide explicit precedent to guide our statutory interpretation, we find that the language, context, and legislative history of § 2518(10) (a) mandate the conclusion that Congress has not authorized such suppression procedures for grand jury witnesses. We are mindful that prior to Gelbard, some courts7 contended that the Senate report's citation to Blue v. United States, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1966) somehow limited or weakened the language: "the provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of a grand jury proceeding . . . ." No case has been called to our attention, nor have we found any, in which a witness has been permitted to suppress evidence before a grand jury. It is hardly surprising therefore that the closest authority the Senate could find was Blue.8 Nor do we find the quoted language sufficiently ambiguous to lend substance to the argument that because motions to suppress are made in court rather than before the grand jury, they are authorized by § 2518(10) (a). The Court did not decide this question. While footnote 20 of the majority opinion9 suggests the distinction, we find the dissent's analysis compelling on this issue.10
We therefore hold that, whatever rights a witness may have in a defense to a contempt proceeding, he may not anticipate such a proceeding by bringing a motion to suppress evidence before the grand jury. This result strikes a balance between the requirements of the federal wiretap statute and the efficient functioning of the grand jury. It allows the grand jury to proceed, uninterrupted by lengthy suppression hearings unless and until the power to compel testimony is invoked. The aggrieved grand jury witness is not left without remedies for the unlawful interception. While remedies other than suppression may be less efficacious in protecting individual rights, it must be remembered that the Omnibus Act provides greater protection than previously existed.
The order of the district court is reversed and the motion to suppress is denied.
1 The appellee was aware of the wiretap due to the notification required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
2 Section 2515 provides in full:
3 An "aggrieved person" is one "who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception...
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