California Dental Assn. v. American Dental Assn.

• Citation: 23 Cal.3d 346,152 Cal.Rptr. 546,590 P.2d 401
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 20 February 1979
• Parties: , 590 P.2d 401 CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellant; Charles BLOCK, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. L.A. 30994.

Page 546

152 Cal.Rptr. 546

23 Cal.3d 346, 590 P.2d 401

CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellant Charles BLOCK, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

L.A. 30994.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 20, 1979.

Peterson, Ross, Schloerb & Seidel, Peter M. Sfikas, Larry R. Eaton, Mary Pat Chapin, Chicago, Ill., Musick, Peeler & Garrett and James B. Bertero, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Miller & Mandel, S. Jerome Mandel, Jesse D. Miller and Peter H. Mason, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

No appearance for real party in interest and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

In this case a private voluntary organization expelled one of its members for ethical misconduct, but the expulsion was subsequently reversed by its parent body. The question presented is whether the constituent organization can obtain judicial review of the adjudicatory decision by its parent when the latter assertedly failed to comply with its own bylaws. We conclude that when a private voluntary organization plainly contravenes the terms of its bylaws, the issues of whether and to what extent judicial relief will be available depend on balancing (1) the interest in protecting the aggrieved party's rights against (2) the infringement on the organization's autonomy and the burdens on the courts that will result from judicial attempts to settle such internal disputes. We further conclude that when the interest of the aggrieved constituent is its right to adopt and enforce higher ethical standards than those of the parent, it is appropriate for a trial court to direct the parent's adjudicatory body to consider the standards of the constituent, as required by the parent's bylaws, in deciding an appeal from the constituent.

The case arises out of an internecine dispute between the American Dental Association (ADA) and one of its constituent societies, the California Dental Association (CDA). To understand the procedural history leading to the controversy before us, it will be helpful to summarize the relationship between the parties.

The ADA is a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in Chicago and organized under the laws of Illinois; its purpose is to "encourage the improvement of the health of the public, to promote the art and science of dentistry and to represent the interests of the members of the dental profession and the public which it serves." The CDA is a constituent society of the ADA. Its name and territorial jurisdiction are set forth in the ADA charter, and its powers and duties as to membership, finances, and discipline are defined by ADA bylaws.

Professional conduct of ADA members is governed by its Principles of Ethics, in conjunction with the code of ethics of each member's constituent society. Discipline, which may include censure, suspension, or expulsion, must under ADA bylaws be preceded by written notice, a written decision with substantiating statement of facts, the verdict rendered, the penalty imposed, and notice of right of appeal. Appellate review is vested in the ADA Council on Judicial Procedures (Judicial Council), which has the responsibility of examining the hearing record, the written affidavit on appeal, and the briefs. The Judicial Council must determine whether the evidence supports the decision or warrants the punishment imposed, and must state the reasons for its conclusions in writing. It can (1) dismiss the appeal for technical reasons, (2) affirm or reverse the decision, (3) refer the case back to the society for new proceedings if the member was denied his rights, or (4) uphold the decision and reduce the penalty. At all times relevant hereto, real party in interest Charles Block was a practicing dentist and a member of the ADA, the CDA, and the Tri-County Dental Society, a local component of the CDA.

The CDA's disciplinary body cited Block for 12 alleged violations of the CDA Code of Ethics and ADA Principles of Ethics. A hearing was held before a trial panel, and in a written decision the panel found Block guilty of eight of the twelve charges and expelled him from the CDA. Block's appeal to the ADA Judicial Council resulted in a reversal of seven of the eight charges and a reduction in the penalty imposed from expulsion to a two-year suspension. The CDA and Block each filed petitions for redetermination before the Judicial Council. These petitions were denied because the council concluded that no authorization for rehearing appeals was provided in the bylaws of the ADA.

Thereafter, the CDA filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Riverside County. Based on alleged substantive and procedural defects in the Judicial Council's appellate proceedings, the petition sought an order vacating the decision of the ADA and reinstating the CDA decision. ¹ The trial court granted the CDA petition and ordered that (1) the ADA decision be vacated; (2) a new hearing on appeal before the Judicial Council be scheduled; and (3) upon such hearing, the Judicial Council specifically consider the charges and facts in light of the CDA Code of Ethics and more particularly its Advisory Opinions thereto.

I

The ADA contends that California courts do not have personal jurisdiction over it in the case before us. We disagree. Code of Civil Procedure section 410.50, subdivision (a), declares: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on him as provided by Chapter 4 . . . . A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party." (Italics added.) Thus, although a defendant may make a special appearance to challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person (Judson v. Superior Court (1942) 21 Cal.2d 11, 13, 129 P.2d 361, overruled on other grounds in Goodwine v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 481, 484, 47 Cal.Rptr. 201, 407 P.2d 1; Jardine v. Superior Court (1931) 213 Cal. 301, 2 P.2d 756; Lander v. Fleming (1874) 47 Cal. 614), when he simultaneously answers to the merits he is no longer entitled to make this challenge. (Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 134, 140, 231 P.2d 6; Childs v. Lanterman (1894) 103 Cal. 387, 37 P. 382; Ghiradelli v. Greene (1880) 56 Cal. 629.) It is well settled that "if a defendant wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court for want of jurisdiction over his person, he must specially appear for that purpose only, and must keep out for all purposes except to make that objection" (Olcese v. Justice's Court (1909) 156 Cal. 82, 87, 103 P. 317, 319); otherwise, he waives "any right (he) may have to insist that jurisdiction of (his) person had not been obtained." (Remsberg v. Hackney Manufacturing Co. (1917) 174 Cal. 799, 801, 164 P. 792, 793.)

In the case before us, the ADA has not only raised jurisdictional challenges but has also defended against all of the CDA's claims on the merits. (See Parts III and IV, Post.) We therefore conclude that under these circumstances the exercise of jurisdiction over the ADA by California courts is appropriate.

II

The ADA contends next that California courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to intercede in its internal procedures for review of CDA membership decisions. It insists that the CDA lacks standing to challenge the decision of its parent authority because only the person expelled, not the subordinate expelling body, possesses a judicially cognizable interest. The argument fails to distinguish two independent interests of the CDA implicit in its claim, the second of which qualifies the CDA as a "party beneficially interested" in the result (Code Civ.Proc., § 1086).

The first interest arises from the CDA's role as a subordinate body that has been overruled by a superior authority on appeal. With respect to this interest, the ADA correctly contends that the CDA cannot assert a claim based on cases in which we have applied common law principles of "fair procedure" to expulsion proceedings of private voluntary associations. Our concern in such cases is with protecting persons seeking membership in, or expelled by, private organizations that occupy positions of special importance in society. (See, e. g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (1974) 12 Cal.3d 541, 116 Cal.Rptr. 245, 526 P.2d 253; Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists (1969) 1 Cal.3d 160, 81 Cal.Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495; James v. Marinship Corp. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329; see generally Sloss & Becker, The Organization Affected with a Public Interest and Its Members Justice Tobriner's Contribution to Evolving Common Law Doctrine (1977) 29 Hastings L.J. 99.)

The second is the CDA's interest in ensuring that the ADA comply with its own bylaws. The CDA asserts this concern not as a subordinate adjudicatory body that has been reversed on appeal, but as a representative of the aggregate interests of its members. Whether such an interest is judicially cognizable depends not on our cases applying principles of "fair procedure," but on the more general common law principles that govern disputes within private organizations.

As was recognized in Dingwall v. Amalgamated Assn. etc. (1906) 4 Cal.App. 565, 569, 88 P. 597, 599, "the rights and duties of the members as between themselves and in their relation to (a private voluntary) association, in all matters affecting its internal government and the management of its affairs, are measured by the terms of (its) constitution and by-laws." (See also Stoica v. International etc. Employees (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 533, 535-536, 178 P.2d 21, 22-23.) In many disputes in which such rights and duties are at issue, however, the courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction. Their determination not to intervene reflects their judgment that the resulting burdens on the judiciary outweigh the interests of the parties at stake. One concern in such cases...