California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, No. 85-494

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtMARSHALL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in
Citation479 U.S. 272,107 S.Ct. 683,93 L.Ed.2d 613
Decision Date13 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. 85-494
PartiesCALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., Petitioners v. Mark GUERRA, Director, Department of Fair Employment and Housing et al

479 U.S. 272
107 S.Ct. 683
93 L.Ed.2d 613
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., Petitioners

v.

Mark GUERRA, Director, Department of Fair Employment and Housing et al.

No. 85-494.
Argued Oct. 8, 1986.
Decided Jan. 13, 1987.
Syllabus

The California Fair Employment and Housing Act in § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. A woman employed as a receptionist by petitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Association (Cal Fed) took a pregnancy disability leave in 1982, but when she notified Cal Fed that she was able to return to work she was informed that her job had been filled and that there were no similar positions available. She then filed a complaint with respondent Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which charged Cal Fed with violating § 12945(b)(2). Before a hearing was held on the complaint, Cal Fed, joined by the other petitioners, brought an action in Federal District Court, seeking a declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent with and pre-empted by Title VII and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

758 F.2d 390, affirmed.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, concluding that § 12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by the PDA, because it is not inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII nor does it require the doing of an act that is unlawful under Title VII. Pp. 284-292.

(a) Title VII's purpose is "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-430, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852-853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158. Rather than limiting Title VII principles and objectives, the PDA extends them to cover pregnancy. Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment opportunity. By requiring employers to reinstate women after a reasonable

Page 273

pregnancy disability leave, it ensures that they will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy. Pp. 284-290.

(b) Section 12945(b)(2) does not prevent employers from complying with both the federal law (as construed by petitioners to reject California's "special treatment" approach to pregnancy discrimination and to forbid an employer to treat pregnant employees any differently than other disabled employees) and the state law. This is not a case where compliance with both the federal and state laws is a physical impossibility. Section 12945(b)(2) does not compel employers to treat pregnant employees better than other disabled employees; it merely establishes benefits that employers must, at a minimum, provide to pregnant workers. Pp. 290-292.

Justice MARSHALL, joined by Justice BRENNAN, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice O'CONNOR, concluded in Part III-A that both §§ 708 and 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 severely limit Title VII's pre-emptive effect by leaving state fair employment laws where they were before Title VII was enacted. Pp. 280-284.

Justice STEVENS concluded that, for purposes of holding that § 12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted by Title VII, it is not necessary to reach the question whether § 1104 applies to Title VII or whether § 708 is the only provision governing Title VII's pre-emptive scope. Pp. 292-293, n. 1.

Justice SCALIA concluded that the only provision whose effect on pre-emption need be considered is § 708 of Title VII, which prohibits pre-emption unless a state law requires or permits the doing of an act outlawed by the PDA. Because § 12945(b)(2) does not require or permit the doing of an act outlawed under any interpretation of the PDA, it is not pre-empted. Accordingly it is unnecessary to decide how the PDA should be interpreted. Pp. 295-296.

MARSHALL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 292 SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 295. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 297.

Theodore B. Olson, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Page 274

Marian M. Johnston, San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that re-

Page 275

quires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy.

I

California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal.Gov't Code Ann. § 12900 et seq. (West 1980 and Supp.1986), is a comprehensive statute that prohibits discrimination in employment and housing. In September 1978, California amended the FEHA to proscribe certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Cal.Labor Code Ann. § 1420.35, 1978 Cal.Stats., ch. 1321, § 1, pp. 4320-4322 (West Supp.1979), now codified at Cal.Gov't Code Ann. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).1 Subdivision (b)(2)—the provision at issue here—is the only portion of the statute that applies to employers subject to Title VII. See

Page 276

§ 12945(e).2 It requires these employers to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. Respondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA,3 has construed § 12945(b)(2) to require California employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available due to business necessity. In the latter case, the employer must make a reasonable, good-faith effort to place the employee in a substantially similar job.4 The statute does not compel employers to provide paid leave to pregnant employees. Accordingly, the only benefit pregnant workers actually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is a qualified right to reinstatement.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of employment

Page 277

discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), this Court ruled that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII.5 In response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.6

Page 278

II

Petitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Association (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savings and loan association based in Los Angeles; it is an employer covered by both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2). Cal Fed has a facially neutral leave policy that permits employees who have completed three months of service to take unpaid leaves of absence for a variety of reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Although it is Cal Fed's policy to try to provide an employee taking unpaid leave with a similar position upon returning, Cal Fed expressly reserves the right to terminate an employee who has taken a leave of absence if a similar position is not available.

Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a receptionist for several years. In January 1982, she took a pregnancy disability leave. When she was able to return to work in April of that year, Garland notified Cal Fed, but was informed that her job had been filled and that there were no receptionist or similar positions available. Garland filed a complaint with respondent Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on her behalf.7 Respondent charged Cal Fed with violating § 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Prior to the scheduled hearing before respondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, Cal Fed, joined by petitioners Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the California Chamber of Commerce,8 brought this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Page 279

They sought a declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent with and pre-empted by Title VII and an injunction against enforcement of the section.9 The District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. 33 EPD ¶ 34,227, p. 32781, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984). Citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983),10 the court stated that "California employers who comply with state law are subject to reverse discrimination suits under Title VII brought by temporarily disabled males who do not receive the same treatment as female employees disabled by pregnancy. . . ." 34 FEP Cases, at 568. On this basis, the District Court held that "California state law and the policies of interpretation and enforcement . . . which require preferential treatment of female employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions are pre-empted by Title VII and are null, void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution." Ibid.11

Page 280

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 758 F.2d 390 (1985). It held that "the district...

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    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
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    ...omitted). The guiding principle throughout the preemption analysis is Congressional intent. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 Defendants acknowledge that the Medicare statute does not explicitly preempt the state consumer protection statutes. S......
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    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • January 11, 1999
    ...of congressional intent. French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (citing California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987)). Congressional intent to preempt state law can be found in the explicit language of a statute, ......
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    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania
    • August 17, 2017
    ...PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy." California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra , 479 U.S. 272, 277, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The United States Supreme Court explained in Guerra that:[r]ather than limiting existing Title VII......
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  • In re Pharmaceutical Industry, M.D.L. No. 1456 (D. Mass. 5/13/2003), M.D.L. No. 1456.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • May 13, 2003
    ...omitted). The guiding principle throughout the preemption analysis is Congressional intent. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 Defendants acknowledge that the Medicare statute does not explicitly preempt the state consumer protection statutes. S......
  • Somes v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 98-CV-10183-MEL.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • January 11, 1999
    ...of congressional intent. French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (citing California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987)). Congressional intent to preempt state law can be found in the explicit language of a statute, ......
  • Wood v. General Motors Corp., No. 87-1750
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • December 9, 1987
    ...against the background of its legislative history and historical context." California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 691, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Examining the historical context of the Safety Act's enactment in 1966, we find it unlikely that anyon......
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    ...(1981). Id. at 873-74. 33. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). See also California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (“In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu......
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    ...199.Califano v. Webster. 1977. 430 U.S. 313.Califano v. Westcott. 1979. 443 U.S. 76.California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra. 1987. 107 S. Ct. 683.City of Richmond v. Croson. 1989. 109 S. Ct. The Civil Rights Cases 1883. 109 U.S. 3. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur. 1974. 414 U.......
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    ...96 S.Ct. 2074.Brock v Roadway Express, Inc. (1987). 107 S.Ct. 1940.California Federal Savings and Loan Association v Guerra (1987). 107 S.Ct. 683.Camara v Municipal Court (1967). 87 S.Ct. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson (1986). 106 S.Ct. 1066.City of Richmond v. ......
  • 'LEAST FAVORED NATION': PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS POST-YOUNG.
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    ...at 138-39. (26) Id. at 138. (27) Id. (28) See 42 U.S.C. [section] 2000e(k). (29) Id (30) See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987) ("[T]he first clause of the [PDA] reflects Congress' disapproval of the reasoning in Gilbert [by] adding pregnancy to the definiti......
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