California Ins. Co. v. Blumburg, 38184

Decision Date05 May 1960
Docket NumberNo. 38184,No. 2,38184,2
Citation115 S.E.2d 266,101 Ga.App. 587
PartiesCALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMPANY v. A. O. BLUMBURG et al
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where a witness for the defendant insurance company testified to having taken a written statement from a witness who testified for the plaintiffs, and to the signing of the statement by the plaintiffs' witness, and where the witness for the plaintiffs was shown the statement, and the time, place and circumstance of the taking of the statement was called to his attention, and where the statement, if believed by the jury to be true, tended to contradict the witness, such statement was admissible for the purpose of impeaching him, and the trial court erred in excluding it.

2. There being no issue in the case as to the meaning of obscurely written words in the policy of insurance, it was error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that they should construe the insurance contract against the company.

(a) The phrase 'regular and frequent trips' contained in a promissory warranty in the policy that the insured vehicles would not be operated on regular and frequent trips beyond certain designated radii from the city where they were principally garaged is not ambiguous so as to authorize the court to submit to the jury the meaning thereof.

(b) Rules of law relating to the construction of contracts as set forth in the Code are for the guidance and direction of the courts.

3. The evidence did not demand a verdict for the defendant.

Arthur O. Blumburg and others as partners, doing business as Southern Hardwood Lumber Company filed suit in the Civil Court of Fulton County against the California Insurance Company to recover an amount alleged to be due under a policy of collision insurance issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs and insuring the plaintiffs against loss and damage due to collision or upset of certain designated motor trucks owned by the plaintiffs. It was alleged and admitted that the defendant had issued the policy on or about April 28, 1958. It was further alleged that the plaintiff suffered a loss when two of its trucks overturned on the highway between Asheville, and Marion, North Carolina; that the units insured each consisted of a tractor and a trailer, and that the total damage to the trucks amounted to $16,450.53, for which amount they sued. The defendant denied liability, basing its defense on the contention that the policy sued on with respect to the coverage on the particular vehicles involved carried a limitation in which the plaintiffs warranted that no regular or frequent trips would be made by such vehicles during the policy period to any location, in the case of one of them, beyond a radius of 50 miles from the city limits of Atlanta, Georgia, where the vehicle was principally garaged, and, as to the other, beyond a radius of 150 miles from the city limits of Atlanta, and that the vehicles involved in the accident had been regularly and frequently operated during the policy period beyond their permissible radii of operation. The jury returned a verdict of $13,678.05 for the plaintiffs. The defendant made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a motion for a new trial on the general grounds which it amended by the addition of two special grounds. the trial court denied those motions, and the exception here is to that judgment.

Smith, Field, Ringel, Martin & Carr, Sam F. Lowe, Jr., Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Haas, Holland & Zinkow, Richard C. Freeman, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

CARLISLE, Judge.

1. As will be seen from the statement of facts above, the policy sued on in this case was issued by the defendant on April 28, 1958. The loss occurred on May 13, 1958, exactly 15 days after the policy became effective. The defendant's contention with regard to the violation of the limitation on the radius of operations clause in the policy depended on proof that during the policy period the insured vehicles had made regular or frequent trips beyond their respective permitted radii of operation. The provision in the policy thus relied on was in the nature of a promissory warranty. Karp v. Fidelity-Phenix fire Ins. Co., 134 Pa.Super. 514, 4 A.2d 529. It is executory in character and in the nature of a condition subsequent. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Wade, 59 Tex.Civ.App. 631, 127 S.W. 1186.

In the first special ground of the motion for a new trial, complaint is made of the refusal of the court to admit in evidence the following written statement allegedly signed by the driver of one of the plaintiffs' vehicles, which statement was taken by one of the defendant's witnesses, an insurance adjuster, who had testified to the circumstances as to the time and place of the taking of the statement and to having witnessed the driver sign the statement: 'I am Tom Walton, Jr., age 35, residing Apt. 4-528 Johnson Ave., N. E., Atlanta, Ga. I am employed with Southern Hardwood Lumber Co. as a driver. I have been with them for about 10 years. I have been operating their 1957 G.M.C. Tractor #22 and pulling a 1952 Trailmobile Trailer 22. This unit is used to haul Hardwood Lumber to and from Atlanta, Ga. We travel over quite a few states. Most of my trips are to and from Morganton, N. C. Some time I make two (2) or three (3) trips a week. I also haul to Marion, N. C. I have been to Wabeno, Wisc. I have also hauled to Brooklyn, N. Y. On this trip I took a load to Morganton, N. C. then to McMinnville, Tenn. picked up a load going to Morganton, N. C. but was involved in an accident on 5-14-58 about 11:50 a. m., on Hwy. #36 about 20 miles north of Marion, N. C. I was following another of our units being driven by Nathaniel who turned over in the Hwy. in front of me. We were going down a mountain with a bad curve on it. I was traveling in low gear and saw these units upset. I had on my brakes but my units were picking up speed as the brakes were not holding as they should. I thought I could pass by the other units but as I came to them I realized that I could not get by nor stop my units. I was not going fast so I jumped out the left door. My units then went off the right side of the road and down the mountain side. I broke my right foot when I jumped out. Tom Walton, Jr.'...

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14 cases
  • Roebuck v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 22, 2003
    ...and the jury could determine for itself whether it was labeled with the name "Gregory Roebuck." See California Ins. Co. v. Blumburg, 101 Ga.App. 587, 591(2), 115 S.E.2d 266 (1960) (proper reading of an obscurely written word is for the jury). Under the circumstances, the uncontested testimo......
  • Eickhoff v. Eickhoff
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1993
    ...with respect to the construction of contracts are framed for the guidance and direction of the courts." California Ins. Co. v. Blumburg, 101 Ga.App. 587, 591(2), 115 S.E.2d 266 (1960). "Contracts, even when ambiguous, are to be construed by the court and no jury question is presented unless......
  • American Cas. Co. v. Crain-Daly Volkswagen, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 6, 1973
    ...etc., Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 119 Ga.App. 579, 584, 168 S.E.2d 171. A case on all fours to that at bar is California Ins. Co. v. Blumburg, 101 Ga.App. 587, 115 S.E.2d 266. There the trial judge used the same language as was used here in instructing the jury to construe the insurance policy ......
  • Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burnett
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 1983
    ...ambiguity remains. See American Cas. Co. v. Crain-Daly Volkswagen, 129 Ga.App. 576, 579, 200 S.E.2d 281. In Calif. Ins. Co. v. Blumburg, 101 Ga.App. 587 (2), 592, 115 S.E.2d 266, this court held it was reversible error for the trial court to give the jury any instructions with regard to the......
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2 books & journal articles
  • A Better Orientation for Jury Instructions - Charles M. Cork, Iii
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 54-1, September 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...issue about meaning of contract—the only issue for the jury is whether the parties performed those duties); Cal. Ins. Co. v. Blumburg, 101 Ga. App. 587, 592, 115 S.E.2d 266, 269-70 (1960) (holding it was error to instruct jury that insurance contracts should be liberally construed—the fact ......
  • Insurance - Maximilian A. Pock
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 47-1, September 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...50. Id. at 300, 447 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting the instructions). 51. Id. at 301,447 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting California Ins. Co. v. Blumberg, 101 Ga. App. 587, 591-92, 115 S.E.2d 266, 269 (I960)). 52. 216 Ga. App. 230, 453 S.E.2d 749 (1994). 53. Id. at 230, 453 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting the policy,......

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