California Portland Cement Co. v. Picture Rocks Fire Dist.
| Decision Date | 20 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 692 P.2d 1019,143 Ariz. 170 |
| Parties | CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, a California corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. The PICTURE ROCKS FIRE DISTRICT, an unincorporated association; the District Board of the Picture Rocks Fire District and Its Members, David Capen, Michael De Spain, Laura Kruger, Will Talbort, and Frank Chernis, Defendants/Appellants. 5117. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
In this appeal the fire district contends the trial court erred in voiding its annexation of the area in which appellee's plant is located and in ordering it to refund taxes collected from appellee in the sum of $164,410.99 for the year 1982 and $147,883.48 for taxes collected for 1981. Since we find the trial court based its decision upon two false conclusions of law, we agree and reverse.
The fire district was organized in 1977 pursuant to A.R.S. § 9-1001. A portion of appellee's Rillito plant property was included within the boundaries of the district at that time. In 1978 the fire district adopted a budget of $40,320. The real property taxes levied for the fire district on that portion of the Rillito plant property which was then located in the district was $4,462, a sum which increased appellee's total 1978 real property tax bill of $1,528,933 by approximately 0.29 per cent.
On September 7, 1980, the board of directors of the fire district voted to annex additional territory into the geographical boundaries of the fire district, which territory included a substantial additional portion of appellee's Rillito plant property. The minutes of the March 2, 1980, meeting of the fire district report that the cement plant was to be annexed before the next budget and do not report any discussion about the need for fire protection in the area annexed, nor do they report any discussion of annexation of property other than the cement plant and the town of Rillito.
The area which was to be annexed was sparsely populated but was contiguous to the existing fire district boundaries. The seven persons who signed the petition all resided on five residential lots immediately adjacent to the southernmost tip of the cement plant parcels but in excess of one-half mile from the fire district boundary. Appellee received no notice from the fire district of the proposed annexation and since appellee is not a "qualified elector," it had no opportunity to either vote or protest the annexation of its property by the fire district.
In August 1981 the fire district submitted to the Pima County Board of Supervisors its first post-annexation budget. The 1980 budget of $97,715 was more than doubled in the 1981 budget of $213,134. The board of supervisors then levied a tax on all real property within the territory of the fire district including the cement plant parcels. The levy upon the cement plant parcels increased the Pima County real property taxes payable by appellee in 1981 by the sum of $147,883.48, which increased appellee's total 1981 Pima County real property tax bill of $1,708,653 by 8.7 per cent. The taxes collected from appellee represented over 60 per cent of the fire district's total budget in 1981. Appellee paid its 1981 real property taxes under protest and filed a petition to withdraw from the fire district. On March 21, 1982, the fire district heard the evidence in support of appellee's application to withdraw.
The evidence introduced at the hearing on appellee's petition to withdraw from the fire district established that appellee had received and could receive no benefit from inclusion within the district. A former chief of several fire departments testified that the fire experience of the cement industry generally and of appellee particularly was excellent. He also testified that the cement plant was constructed of non-flammable fire resistant materials which were unlikely to burn. He told the board that the resources of the fire district were inadequate to suppress or control a fire at the cement plant. He also maintained that the nature of the fire district as a volunteer fire company, the distance of the headquarters of the fire district and of its members from the plant, and the specialized nature of the manufacturing process employed at the plant all indicated that the fire district would not be able to prevent a loss of property at the plant due to fire. He also testified that appellee's property offered no fire hazard whatsoever to other property within the territory of the fire district. The fire district presented no evidence in opposition to appellee's application. Nevertheless, it denied the petition to withdraw.
In 1982 the fire district increased its budget to $256,124. Appellee's contribution to that budget totaled $164,410, again more than 60 per cent of the total budget. Those taxes were also paid under protest.
Evidence similar to that introduced before the fire district was introduced in the trial of this action. Appellee not only introduced evidence that it would not receive any benefit from its inclusion within the territory of the fire district, but also that it could obtain similar services from a Rural Metro fire station for $7,323 per year.
The trial court made findings of fact which included, inter alia, a finding that the property of appellee did not constitute a fire hazard and that appellee would receive no benefit from its inclusion within the fire district. The court also found that although the fire district offered emergency medical service, appellee could obtain fire and emergency medical service from a private contractor at the approximate cost of $7,323 per year.
In its conclusions of law the trial court found that appellee, in the proceedings to withdraw from the fire district, failed to meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 9-1007(A) and therefore, was not entitled to withdraw from the district; that volunteer fire districts are more like special improvement or assessment districts than traditional municipal corporations and that as improvement districts they must offer significant special benefits to persons or property included within their boundaries beyond the benefits offered to the general public; that if there is no significant benefit derived, the levying and collecting of a tax for the protection of a specific property in the district was, as to that property, unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory; that any assessment by a fire district must not be in excess of the proportional benefits received by the property as compared to other properties affected; that the benefit to the property must at least equal the assessment or tax; and that appellee's property, after annexation, was not benefitted to any extent approaching the amount of taxes levied and collected annually for the fire district. The trial court also concluded that the annexation was void because the property of the persons who signed the petition was not contiguous to the existing fire district.
As we previously stated, the trial court went astray on two conclusions of law. The first error was to conclude that the annexation was void because the persons who signed the petition did not reside on land contiguous to the existing fire district. The second error was to conclude that the fire district was a quasi improvement district and therefore appellee's property had to receive some special benefit before it could be validly assessed any fire district taxes.
Procedures for annexing territory in a fire district are governed by A.R.S. § 9-1006.01. Subparagraph A states:
"When the qualified electors of an unincorporated area contiguous to a fire district administered by a district board desire their territory to be annexed by such district, they shall present to the chairman of such board a written petition, signed by at least fifty-one per cent of the qualified electors in the territory proposed to be annexed...."
Although the territory proposed to be annexed was contiguous to the fire district, the trial court found that since the persons who signed the petition did not live on land contiguous to the fire district, the petition was invalid and the annexation was void ab initio. This conclusion is patently erroneous. Persons who can validly sign the petition need not even be landowners. They need only be qualified electors, residing within the proposed boundaries as defined in A.R.S. § 16-121 which states:
"A person whose name appears on the register for the last preceding general election and whose registration has not been subsequently cancelled, or a person who has registered under a subsequent registration or changed his registration pursuant to § 16-135, 16-136 or 16-137, shall, if he is eighteen years of age and has been a resident of the state fifty days, be deemed a qualified elector for any purpose for which such qualification is required by law, except as provided in § 16-126 and 16-127." 1
The key requirement of § 9-1006.01(A) is contiguity. The district must be a self-contained area and not one comprised of two or more non-contiguous areas. Since the petition here was signed by at least fifty-one per cent of the qualified electors of the territory of an unincorporated area contiguous to the fire district, the petition was valid and when it was approved by the board of the fire district, the annexation effectively included appellee's property.
The trial court found that the fire district was a "quasi improvement district" and as such could tax appellee's land only in an amount equal to the benefits that the land received. We find this characterization to be erroneous. While it is well accepted that the authority of a special improvement district to make assessments against property within its territory is restricted by the...
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...based on a claim of taxes being disproportionate to benefits. Similarly, the trial court in California Portland Cement Co. v. Picture Rocks Fire District, 143 Ariz. 170, 692 P.2d 1019 (Ct.App.1984), found that the cement company's property annexed to the fire district would receive no benef......
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