California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board

• Decision Date: 30 October 1984
• Docket Number: B-003195
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 20 Ed. Law Rep. 1187 CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION and Simi Educators Association, Respondents, v. The GOVERNING BOARD OF the SIMI VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant. Civ.

Page 659

207 Cal.Rptr. 659

161 Cal.App.3d 393, 20 Ed. Law Rep. 1187

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION and Simi Educators Association, Respondents, v. The GOVERNING BOARD OF the SIMI VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.

Civ. B-003195.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

Oct. 30, 1984.

Hearing Denied Jan. 24, 1985.

Richards, Watson, Dreyfuss & Gershon, J. Robert Vaughan, Lee T. Paterson and Deborah S. Gershon, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Hathaway, Perrett, Webster & Powers and Paul D. Powers, Ventura, for respondents.

STONE, Presiding Justice.

The Governing Board of the Simi Valley Unified School District appeals an order striking its claim for costs and attorneys' fees. We reverse the judgment.

Appellant Governing Board of the Simi Valley Union School District ("District") and respondents California Teachers Association and Simi Educators Association ("the Associations") entered into a "Contract of Agreement 1979-80" ("Contract") in 1979 establishing the terms and conditions of employment of certificated employees by the District. Certificated employees of the District are not required to join the Associations. However, because they benefit from the Associations' activities on behalf of members, non-member employees are required to pay a "service fee" to the Associations.

In late 1979, a dispute arose between the Associations and the District because certain non-member employees had not paid the service fee. The Associations requested that the District either (1) compel the non-member employees to comply or (2) terminate them if they did not do so pursuant to the "Organizational Security" provision in the Contract: "In the event an employee within the unit does not submit to the District a Dues Deduction Form, or a Service Fee Deduction Form or a Religious Conviction Form, within 30 days from the signing of this contract or employment with the District, the Association is authorized to request Board action to initiate termination proceedings of such employee in accordance with this agreement, recognizing the failure of such employee to comply with this provision shall be reasonable cause for discharge."

The District refused to terminate the non-member employees, and requested the Associations to initiate proceedings pursuant to the Contract's "Grievance" provisions. Apparently, the parties could not resolve their dispute in that manner either. The Associations then requested that the District enter into arbitration, also pursuant to the Contract. When the District would not agree, the Associations sought relief in the superior court.

The Associations filed a "Petition for Writ of Mandate" seeking, in the alternative, (1) an order compelling the District to commence arbitration pursuant to the Contract's arbitration clause regarding whether it had breached the Contract by refusing to terminate the challenged employees; (2) an order directing the District to compel those employees to pay the fees and to indemnify the Associations in any action they may take directly against the employees; (3) attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Government Code section 800. ¹

The court issued an alternative writ, directing the District to commence arbitration or to take action to compel the payment of service fees to the Associations. The alternative writ also provided that the District indemnify the Associations as requested and awarded $1,500 attorneys' fees to the Associations. However, the order for peremptory writ vacated the indemnity order and the attorneys fee award. The Associations were awarded costs, which the District paid.

The parties then commenced arbitration. We do not have before us the record of that proceeding. However, we may safely assume that it did not go very well; the parties found themselves back in superior court when the Associations failed to comply with a request by the District to produce certain financial documents.

The court ordered the Associations to produce the requested documents or suffer dismissal of the arbitration proceeding. Still, the Associations failed to comply and, on June 9, 1983, the court granted the District's motion and dismissed the arbitration proceeding and the writ proceeding with prejudice. The District filed a memorandum requesting costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to an indemnity clause in the Contract. The Associations responded with a motion to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc to reflect that only the proceeding before the arbitrator, and not the mandate action, was dismissed. The court granted the Associations' motion and struck the District's cost bill as premature.

The District then moved to dismiss the mandate proceeding. The Associations replied that the court had no jurisdiction to do so. The court ordered the action dismissed with prejudice; the judgment expressly stated that it was entered on the merits pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 582. ²

The Associations then filed a memorandum of costs; the District filed for costs and disbursements also, requesting attorneys' fees pursuant to the indemnity clause. On cross-motions to tax costs, the court struck all fees and costs and amended its judgment nunc pro tunc to delete the reference to section 582. The District appeals the striking of its costs and fees.

The Associations seek to avoid an award of attorneys' fees and costs against them by distinguishing their "mandate" (section 1085) proceedings from a "petition to compel arbitration" pursuant to a contractual provision (section 1280, et seq.). They correctly note that the "legal consequences of this distinction are critical on this appeal."

The Associations argue that the superior court lost jurisdiction in May of 1980 when the writ of mandate issued. At that point, the Associations contend, the "judgment" was entered and they were the prevailing party because the court granted their request and ordered the District to commence arbitration. We disagree.

This case involves the parties' contractual agreement to arbitrate their disputes. For the reasons outlined herein we hold that mandate is not an appropriate vehicle by which to enforce that agreement. The issue is one of first impression. ³

In some instances, the label attached to the remedy which a party requests does not affect the outcome of the litigation; the court may fashion the appropriate remedy in any event. See e.g., Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 15-16, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839; Robinson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 379, 382-383, 218 P.2d 10. However, in this case the remedy affects the continuing jurisdiction of the court; it determines whether the court may award attorneys' fees and costs to the District. We conclude that it would be manifestly unjust to allow a party to manipulate the result of the litigation and to avoid the ramifications of its agreement by switching the name on the pleading.

A writ of mandamus will lie when there is no plain, speedy and adequate, alternative remedy "to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins ..." (section 1085; Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 925, 132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565.) There are two reasons why mandate is not appropriate here. The "Petition for Writ of Mandate" states on its face that arbitration is required by the agreement between the parties. Therefore, the act which the Associations sought to compel--the District's participation in arbitration--is not an act required by law. Second, the procedures set forth in section 1281.2 afford a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. (Cf. Sauter v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 25, 29, 82 Cal.Rptr. 395.) To allow a party to proceed by mandate would thwart the purpose of section 1280 et seq.

The statutory scheme outlined in section 1280 et seq., contemplates the court's continuing involvement in the arbitration process. "The proceeding to compel arbitration [section 1281.2] is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of the contract." (La Pietra v. Freed (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 1025, 1030, 151 Cal.Rptr. 554.) If the parties fail to agree upon an arbitrator the court "shall", upon petition, appoint one. (section 1281.6.)

The underlying action is stayed once arbitration begins (section 1281.4). However, the court retains jurisdiction over the matter (section 1292.6) and there are several specific instances in which that jurisdiction might be exercised. In contract actions, for example, if the parties' agreement does not grant the arbitrator general law discovery powers, the court must intervene. (sections 1283.1, 1283.05, 2019(b)(1).) This court has also held that a court which has ordered arbitration retains "the power on the one hand to entertain a petition by the plaintiff for judicial assistance in moving the arbitration forward where the matter is foundering for reasons beyond plaintiffs' control, or on the other hand, to entertain a motion by defendants to dismiss the arbitration where plaintiffs have failed to exercise reasonable diligence in moving the dispute to a conclusion." (Preston v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 402, 407, 178 Cal.Rptr. 882; see also Young v. Ross-Loos Medical Group, Inc. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 669, 185 Cal.Rptr. 536.)...