Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp.
Decision Date | 23 May 2017 |
Docket Number | C.A. PC-2014-5680 |
Parties | CHRISTINE CALLAGHAN, Plaintiff, v. DARLINGTON FABRICS CORPORATION and THE MOORE COMPANY, Defendants. |
Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
-The Beatles, 1967
For Plaintiff: Carly Beauvais Iafrate, Esq.
For Defendant: Timothy C. Cavazza, Esq.; Meghan E. Siket, Esq.
DECISION
Over fifty years ago, pop culture addressed the use of marijuana in our society. Within the past decade, the General Assembly legalized the use of medical marijuana, and it became lawful to sell Rocky Mountain High cannabis in Colorado. Last fall the voters of our neighbor, Massachusetts, authorized the legal possession and sale of marijuana. Today, the debate rages in Rhode Island political circles over legalizing the recreational use of "pot." Until recently, Rhode Island courts have dealt with the subject solely from the perspective of the criminal law. However, our civil jurisprudence will undoubtedly face an onslaught of litigation concerning the lawful use of marijuana. A colleague recently analyzed the zoning law of a town to determine if growing marijuana is agriculture. Carlson v Zoning Bd. of Review of South Kingstown, No WC-2014-0557, 2016 WL 7035233 (R.I. Super. Nov. 25, 2016). We read of towns enacting zoning ordinances outlawing the cultivation of medical marijuana, which ordinances will most certainly be challenged. See, e.g., Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 2014).
While the legal use of marijuana, whether medicinal or recreational, makes for interesting political and philosophical discourse from law review articles to the dinner table, a Superior Court justice cannot participate in that debate. Consequently, this Court's challenge is limited to discerning the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act (the Hawkins-Slater Act), G.L. 1956 §§ 21-28.6-1 et seq. To adequately perform its task, this Court must wade into the weeds of the law of private rights of action, federal preemption, and statutory interpretation. Hopefully, it will not write out of key or analyze out of tune.
Plaintiff Christine Callaghan (Plaintiff) has brought this action against Defendants Darlington Fabrics Corporation (Darlington) and the Moore Company (together, Defendants), alleging employment discrimination with respect to hiring for an internship position because she held a medical marijuana card. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all three counts under Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 56; Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on Counts I and III, and otherwise opposes Defendants' motion on Count II. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff's cross-motion and denies the Defendants' motion.
Most of the facts in this case are undisputed. In June 2014, Plaintiff, then a Master's student studying textiles at the University of Rhode Island, sought an internship as a requirement of her program. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11-12. Her professor referred her to Darlington, a division of the Moore Company. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 13. Plaintiff met with Darlington Human Resources Coordinator Karen McGrath on June 30, 2014. Defs.' Mem. 3. At this meeting, Plaintiff signed Darlington's Fitness for Duty Statement, acknowledging she would have to take a drug test prior to being hired. Id. at 3-4. During this meeting, Plaintiff also disclosed that she held a medical marijuana card, authorized by the Hawkins-Slater Act. Id. at 4. The interview concluded shortly thereafter.
On the morning of July 2, 2014, Ms. McGrath and a colleague, Ms. Linda Ann Morales, had a conference call with Plaintiff. Id. Ms. McGrath asked Plaintiff if she was currently using medical marijuana, to which Plaintiff responded affirmatively. Id. Plaintiff also indicated that as a result, she would test positive on her pre-employment drug screening. Id. Ms. McGrath responded by informing Plaintiff that a positive test would "prevent the Company from hiring her." Id. Plaintiff informed Ms. McGrath that she was allergic to many other painkillers and that she would neither use marijuana in or bring it to the workplace. Defs.' Answers to Interrog. 3.
Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint on November 12, 2014. Count I seeks a declaration that the "failure to hire a prospective employee based on his or her status as a medical marijuana card holder and user is a violation of the" Hawkins-Slater Act. Compl. ¶ 29. Counts II and III seek damages: Count II alleges Defendants' conduct violated the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), G.L. 1956 §§ 42-112-1 et seq.; Count III alleges violations of the Hawkins-Slater Act due to employment discrimination.
"Summary judgment is 'a drastic remedy, ' and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I. 2008) (citation omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant must "establish that there exists no genuine dispute with respect to the material facts of the case." Id. at 391. This Court can grant summary judgment only if it concludes, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I. 2006).
Because Count I, the declaratory judgment request, and Count III, the Hawkins-Slater Act claim, both deal with the Hawkins-Slater Act, the Court will address those first. The Court deals with Count III initially as the reasoning therein informs the analysis of Count I. After those counts, the Court will move to Count II, the RICRA claim.
Count III: Employment Discrimination under the Hawkins-Slater Act
First the Court must determine whether the Hawkins-Slater Act provides a private right of action through which Plaintiff can seek relief. Section 21-28.6-4(d)[1] of the Hawkins-Slater Act provides: "No school, employer, or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a cardholder." Plaintiff contends that she was not hired because she was a cardholder, and she contends that this prohibition against discriminatory hiring practices should apply to her. Despite this direct prohibition, the statute fails to provide an express private right of action. Thus the first of many questions this Court must tackle is whether the General Assembly intended § 21-28.6-4(d) to be enforceable or not. To do so, the Court must turn to statutory interpretation, as the intent of the Legislature is not obvious. "'In matters of statutory interpretation [the Court's] ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.'" Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530, 540 (R.I. 2016) (quoting GSM Indus., Inc. v, Grinnell Fire Prot Sys. Co., Inc., 47 A.3d 264, 268 (R.I. 2012)). To discern that purpose, however, the Court must resolve several conflicting jurisprudential principles.
On the one hand, "[i]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning." Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 584 (R.I. 1998). "When a statute 'does not plainly provide for a private cause of action [for damages], such a right cannot be inferred.'" Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711, 716 (R.I. 2003); but see Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 585 ( ). Our Supreme Court has routinely refused to imply a private right of action. E.g., Great Am. E & S Ins. Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571, 575 (R.I. 2012) ( ); Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 1258 (R.I. 2012) ( ); Heritage Healthcare Servs Inc. v. Marques, 14 A.3d 932, 939 (R.I. 2011) ( ); Stebbins, 818 A.2d at 716 ( ); Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 685 (R.I. 2000) (no private right of action under G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-11(b) and 44-5-22 for missed tax certification deadlines); Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 584 ( ); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 868 (R.I. 1997) ( ); Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996) (no private right of action under G.L. 1956 § 37-13-14, requiring governmental entities to demand bonds from contractors they employ); In re...
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