Callaghan v. Judge of Superior Court

• Citation: 59 Mich. 610,26 N.W. 806
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 10 February 1886
• Parties: CALLAGHAN v. JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT.

26 N.W. 806

59 Mich. 610

CALLAGHAN v. JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT.

Supreme Court of Michigan

February 10, 1886

Application for mandamus.

John D Conely, for relator.

SHERWOOD J.

Suit was commenced by Hollis Jacobs against the said Callaghan on the eighteenth day of May, 1885, in the Wayne circuit court. Upon filing the bond required by statute, and upon the petition of the defendant, the cause was transferred for further proceedings to the superior court of Detroit on the ninth day of June, 1885, On the fifteenth day of December following, upon the petition of the plaintiff in the case the cause was remanded, by order of the superior court back to the circuit court; for the county of Wayne for trial. The relator now comes into this court and asks for a mandamus requiring the judge of the superior court to vacate and set aside the order made by him remanding said cause to the circuit court, he having refused so to do on petition of the plaintiff. Respondent shows cause, and in his return says that the case was improperly transferred to the superior court by the circuit court for the county of Wayne and further states "that the facts, proceedings, and orders are correctly stated in the petition of relator."

The act establishing the superior court of Detroit was adopted in March, 1873. How.St. c. 245, p. 1693. The act was entitled "An act to provide for a municipal court in the city of Detroit, to be called the 'Superior Court of Detroit.' " Laws 1873, p. 61. The act has since been amended three times: in 1875, (see Laws 1875, p. 5,) in 1879 (see Laws 1879, p. 90,) and in 1885. By this last amendment the act passed in 1879 purports to be amended, and is referred to as including "sections 6539 and 6555 of Howell's Annotated Statutes." See Laws 1885, p. 61. The title to this last-named act reads as follows: "An act to amend sections 5 and 21 of act number 97 of the Session Laws of 1879, as amended, being sections 6539 and 6555 of Howell's Annotated Statutes of Michigan of 1882, relative to filling vacancies in the superior court of Detroit." The act of 1885 consists of two sections, numbered, respectively, 5 and 21, the latter of which is given in the margin. ^[1]

Under the original act creating the superior court of Detroit, and the acts amendatory thereto, previous to that of 1885, there was no provision for the removal or transfer of causes from the superior court to the circuit. In fact, the main object in establishing the superior court was to relieve the circuit court for the county of Wayne from the plethora caused by the long-continued accumulation of business therein, and for that purpose, or perhaps for the purpose of more immediate relief, the circuit court was authorized, upon the application of either party, and upon filing a bond for certain purposes required by the statute, to transfer a cause from the circuit to the superior court for further proceedings, provided the cause was within the jurisdiction of the latter. See How.St. � 6555. The amendment of 1885, however, provides for the transfer of causes from the superior court to the circuit, as well as from the circuit to the superior court. It is an order of this kind, made under the statute of 1885, by the judge of the superior court, that relator asks to have set aside.

There seems to be no contest but that the transfer of the cause to the superior court was regular and proper. From first impressions, it would most naturally appear that in the change made in the law in establishing the superior court one of the principal objects to be attained in creating that court had been lost sight of in making the amendment of 1885. However this may be, the legislature had the power to make the amendment, and the fact can be considered in this case only as it has a bearing upon the necessity for more closely considering the legality of the action taken by which it has been done, if at all.

Counsel for the parties very ably discussed the question involved, upon the hearing, and have furnished us also with briefs showing patient research and investigation, which have materially aided us in our examination of the subject presented. The learned counsel for the relator bases his right to the writ prayed for alone upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the law of 1885. Laws 1885, p. 61. This is placed upon two grounds: (1) that the title of the act fails to comply with article 4, � 20, of the constitution, which requires that "no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title;" (2) that section 28 of article 4 of the constitution provides that "no new bills shall be introduced into either house of the legislature after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired," and that section numbered 21 of the act was not introduced, and constituted no part of the bill, until a hundred days after the session commenced.

Of course, the latter ground, whether tenable or not, depends very much upon the disposition to be made of the first, because, if the title of the act is not defective, and sufficiently broad to cover section numbered 21, and the subject is germane to the principal object stated in the other section, it might properly be introduced by way of amendment after the first 50 days of the session had expired.

The first ground stated is the one presenting, as I view the case, the important question to be settled. The intention, scope, and object to be accomplished by the adoption of the twentieth section of article 4 of our constitution has been so often before this court, and so frequently and well stated, that I could not hope to add anything new or useful by a further discussion of the subject here. Much that has been said has found its way into the text-books of the country, and has come to be regarded and accepted as elementary law. I shall therefore only refer to a statement of such principles and views as I regard as applicable to, and which necessarily rule, this case.

It is not necessary to set out in the title of an act every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general object sought by the legislation contemplated. "The generality of a title is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection." Cooley, Const.Lim. 144; Harrington v. Wands, 23 Mich. 385; Kurtz v. People, 33 Mich. 279; People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553. "If the act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can stand, because indicated by the title, while, as to the object not indicated by the title, it must fail." Cooley, Const.Lim. 148. "If, by striking from the act all that relates to the object not indicated by the title, that which is left is complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of that which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitutional. The principal questions in each case will therefore be whether the act is broader than the title; and, if so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a complete and sensible enactment which is capable of being executed." Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Metc. (KY.) 72; Cooley, Const.Lim. 148, 149; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 566. On the other hand, "as the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included the act which might, with entire propriety, have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are vested with no dispensing power. The constitution has made the title the index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so." Cooley, Const.Lim. 148, 149; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; People v. O'Brien, 38 N.Y. 193.

The object and purposes of the constitutional provision now under consideration is stated by Mr. Justice COOLEY, in the case of People v. Mahony, 13 Mich. 48, as follows: After referring to a practice which had prevailed of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and saying that it was corruptive both to the legislature and the state, he adds: "It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also intended to be remedied by the constitutional provision, by which, through dexterous management, claims were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect. *** The framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly notified of its design when required to pass upon it." The same views have been taken of the object and purposes of the provision in other states....