Callaway v. N.J. State Police Troop A, Civil Action No. 12-5477 (RBK)
| Decision Date | 05 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-5477 (RBK) |
| Parties | OREADER CALLAWAY, JR., Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE TROOP A, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OPINIONAPPEARANCES:
OREADER CALLAWAY, JR., Plaintiff pro se
Plaintiff, Oreader Callaway, Jr., a state inmate confined at the Gloucester County Jail in Woodbury, New Jersey, at the time he filed this Complaint, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether itshould be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint should be proceed in part at this time.
Plaintiff, Oreader Callaway, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), brings this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the following defendants, New Jersey State Police Troop A Bridgeton Barracks, Trooper McCreen, and Woodstown State Police Troop A. (Complaint, Caption, ¶¶ 4b, 4c and 6.) The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff's allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 30, 2012, at about 7:45 a.m., he was arrested by the Bridgeton State Police Barracks for having stolen property in his possession. Plaintiff alleges that he was questioned repeatedly without having first been read his Miranda rights. When Plaintiff requested an attorney, he was called a "Black snake," grabbed from behind and lifted up by one of the State Troopers, "tearing [Plaintiff's] ribs, cartilage that has disfigured [Plaintiff] to this date." (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was then placed in a cell forapproximately five hours, during which time he repeatedly asked for medical attention. He was allegedly told that "if he continued to ask for a doctor, [his] black ass would really need one." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he feared for his life after that remark. (Id.)
After about twelve hours, Trooper McCreen entered Plaintiff's cell with several other state troopers, and asked Plaintiff again how he came into possession of the stolen property. Plaintiff alleges that, because of his injury and fear, he told the officers that someone threw the bag while running and Plaintiff picked it up. At that statement, McCreen allegedly stated, "you think I'm stupid, you dope feins (sic) need to be put down or put away for a very long time." (Id.) Plaintiff was then asked to remove his shoes and was told he was never going home again." Plaintiff asked if he could have a drink of water or something to eat, which request was denied. At 8:30 p.m., Plaintiff was transferred to the Woodstown State Police Barracks. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, immediately upon his arrival at the Woodstown State Police Barracks, he asked for medical attention and something to drink. The sergeant on command told Plaintiff he had a better chance of seeing "God." Plaintiff told the sergeant that he could not raise his right arm more than 20degrees, that it was "frozen" from three prior surgeries, and that his left side was in "excruciating pain" probably from a broken rib. Despite Plaintiff's right arm being "frozen," three troopers in the presence of the shift sergeant lifted Plaintiff's arms over his head, causing Plaintiff to scream in pain. Plaintiff was then handcuffed for four to five hours with no food or water for 14 hours total, and no medical attention for his injuries. (Id.)
At 10:00 p.m., Plaintiff was questioned by a detective regarding a home invasion from which the stolen property found on Plaintiff had come. Plaintiff explained that he knew nothing about a home invasion and asked for an attorney. He further alleges that no Miranda rights were read to him during this time and his request for an attorney was denied. He was then transferred to county jail. (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks $ 100 million in damages for the above alleged constitutional violations and physical and mental abuse. He also asks that the defendants be "sanctioned, demoted or terminated." Finally, Plaintiff seeks protection from any retaliation. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff does not allege any acts of retaliation in his Complaint.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the proposition that "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009)(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are plausible. See id. at 678-79; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc. , 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). See also Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 73 (3d Cir. 2011); Bistrian v. Levi, 2012 WL 4335958, *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2012)(allegations thatare no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth; a court should "look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then 'determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'") (quoting, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
The Third Circuit cautioned, however, that Twombly and Iqbal "do not provide a panacea for defendants," rather, "they merely require that plaintiff raise a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Covington v. International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 979067, *2 (3d Cir. March 14, 2013)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Thus, factual allegations must be more than speculative, but the pleading standard "is not akin to a 'probability requirement.'" Covington, supra (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff alleges that certain unidentified state trooper defendants from the New Jersey State Police Troop A Bridgeton Barracks used excessive force in their arrest of Plaintiff by lifting him and tearing his ribs and cartilage. Claims of excessive force during arrests, investigatory stops and other seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004). When construing an excessive force claim, this Court must consider whether the defendant troopers' use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, regardless of the their underlying motive or intentions. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397...
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