Callaway v. State, 44236
| Citation | 354 S.E.2d 118,257 Ga. 12 |
| Decision Date | 08 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 44236,44236 |
| Parties | CALLAWAY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Martin C. Puetz, Fleming, Blanchard & Bonner, P.C., Augusta, for Michael Callaway.
Sam B. Sibley, Jr., Dist. Atty., Augusta, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., J. Michael Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Michael Callaway was convicted of the malice murder of Sheridan J. Lendrum and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1
The evidence presented at trial shows that between 5:00 p.m. and 5:55 p.m. on September 1, 1985, the victim and his roommate, Timothy Holcomb, drove to a car wash in Augusta, Georgia with the intention of purchasing five dollars worth of marijuana. Holcomb testified that the defendant approached the car and offered to sell them this amount. The victim, who was driving the car, took the marijuana to inspect it, then drove away without paying for it. Holcomb testified that he and the victim drove in a direction away from the car wash for a few minutes, then turned the car around and headed toward their residence. As their car was stopped at a traffic light, the defendant pulled his car parallel with theirs in the left-turn lane. The victim and defendant exchanged heated words, then the defendant shot the victim in the head, killing him. The defendant left the scene. According to police records the shooting occurred at 5:55 p.m.
Joe Jones was stopped at the traffic light directly behind the victim's car. He testified he observed a black male in the left-turn lane conversing with the victim. The black male drew a weapon and fired at the victim, then sped away. Jones was able to obtain the license number of the perpetrator's car which he gave, along with a description of the car, to a police officer who arrived two to three minutes after the shooting occurred. The officer testified that it took less than five minutes to determine that the car Jones had seen was registered to the defendant. An officer was immediately dispatched to the defendant's residence, located less than one-half mile from the scene of the crime. There the officer observed the car described by Jones. The defendant then approached the officer. According to the officer's testimony the defendant asked whether the officer was looking for him. 2 The officer asked the defendant to identify himself. After the defendant had done so the officer radioed for assistance. Without being questioned the defendant volunteered that he had been having dinner until 5:30, had then stopped by a service station, and had been playing basketball until the officer arrived. When additional police officers arrived on the scene about three minutes later, the defendant was placed under arrest and given Miranda warnings.
At trial the defendant testified that he had eaten dinner with friends and left the restaurant at 5:30. He then went to a service station, returned to his residence and had been playing basketball for twenty to twenty-five minutes when police arrived. The defendant stated that no one other than himself had been driving his car on the evening in question. Two defense witnesses testified they had eaten dinner with the defendant on the night of the shooting and had left the restaurant at 5:30. An expert from the State Crime Lab testified that he performed an analysis of the wipings taken from the defendant's hands and concluded that the levels of barium, ammonia and lead found were below the levels which would indicate a gun had been fired.
1. While not an issue raised by the defendant, we conclude that the evidence authorized a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. The defendant maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two custodial statements made to police. The defendant argues that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him, making his post-arrest statements inadmissible. We disagree.
The evidence shows that the elapsed time between the shooting of the victim and the arrest of the defendant was less than thirty minutes. An eyewitness to the shooting was able to identify the make and license tag of the defendant's vehicle, and was able to describe the perpertrator of the crime as a black male. Further, when the defendant became aware that a police officer was observing his car, he identified himself as the owner of the car and, without inquiry, began explaining to the officer where he had been during the past half-hour.
A "warrantless arrest" is constitutionally valid if, at the moment the arrest is made, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense. Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 326, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). We conclude under the facts of this case there was probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant.
Furthermore, the State is...
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