Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Com'rs

• Decision Date: 31 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. AM-472,AM-472
• Parties: CALOOSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Caleffe Investment, Ltd., and Worthington Enterprises, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1260

429 So.2d 1260

CALOOSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Caleffe

Investment, Ltd., and Worthington Enterprises,

Inc., Appellees.

No. AM-472.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

March 31, 1983.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1983.

Tracy R. Sharpe of Farish, Farish & Romani, West Palm Beach, and Randall E. Denker of Lehrman & Denker, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Alan J. Ciklin of Boose, Ciklin & Martens, West Palm Beach and Robert M. Rhodes and James C. Hauser of Messer, Rhodes & Vickers, Tallahassee, for appellees Caleffe Inv., Ltd. and Worthington Enterprises, Inc.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Nancy G. Linnan, Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen., Linda Loomis Shelley, Governor's Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Com'n.

Charles F. Schoech, County Atty., John Corbett, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, for appellee Palm Beach County.

ERVIN, Judge.

Appellant, an organization of property owners, seeks review of an order of the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission which dismissed its administrative appeal on the ground that the association, comprised of persons owning property adjoining a development of regional impact (DRI), ¹ had no standing, under the provisions of Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, to appeal the order entered by the local governmental entity having jurisdiction over the property affected by the proposed DRI. We affirm on all points raised.

Pursuant to the procedure set out in Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, for approval of a DRI, the developers in September, 1981, filed an application for development approval (ADA) with the local governmental entity having jurisdiction over the property--appellee Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners. § 380.06(6), Fla.Stat. Because a DRI impacts on more than a mere neighborhood or one community, the statutory procedure for review of a DRI requires consideration by both the local government and a "regional planning agency." § 380.06(9)-(11), Fla.Stat. ² In this case the regional planning agency--the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council (TCRPC) ³--conducted a hearing and approved the developer's ADA in December, 1981. ⁴ The regional planning agency recommended approval of the DRI. In early 1982, the Palm Beach County Commission considered the regional planning council's recommendation, held a public hearing regarding the developers' DRI proposal, approved the DRI, and issued a section 380.06(2) development order.

Appellant then filed an administrative appeal with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission ⁵ under the provisions of section 380.07(2), stating in relevant part:

(2) Whenever any local government issues any development order in any area of critical state concern, or in regard to any development of regional impact, copies of such orders as prescribed by rule by the state land planning agency shall be transmitted to the state land planning agency, the regional planning agency, and the owner or developer of the property affected by such order. Within 45 days after the order is rendered, the owner, the developer, an appropriate regional planning agency, by vote at a regularly scheduled meeting, or the state land planning agency may appeal the order to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission by filing a notice of appeal with the commission ....

(e.s.) The appeal to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, naming the Palm Beach County Commission as respondent/appellee, sought to overturn the issuance of the development order. However, before the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission could consider the merits of the appeal, the developers intervened ⁶ and moved for dismissal of the appeal, because appellant Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc., was not a proper party for appellate purposes under section 380.07(2).

The case was assigned to a hearing officer, who agreed that appellant was not a proper party to appeal a DRI development order under the provisions of section 380.07(2). The hearing officer recommended dismissal of the appeal with prejudice, and the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission adopted the hearing officer's recommended order. Appellant now asserts that the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission has erred; that it has a right of appeal under section 380.07(2) or, alternatively, under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes; or that if it is not a proper party under either section 380.07(2) or Chapter 120, that section 380.07(2) is violative of both its Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as its Florida constitutional rights to equal protection and access to courts. Art. I, §§ 2, 21, Fla. Const.

Regarding appellant's standing to appeal the development order to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, we find no less than two reasons for affirming the Commission's determination that appellant is not a proper party to appeal a development order under section 380.07(2). First, the second sentence in the statute states that four individuals or entities may appeal a development order, including the state land planning agency, ⁷ the appropriate regional planning council--in this case the TCRPC, ⁸ the developer, ⁹ or the owner. Each of these terms is defined by statute or administrative rule with the exception of the term "owner." We think it obvious that the term "owner" in section 380.07(2) refers to the owner of the property on which the DRI is to be located. The second sentence of the statute refers to "the owner" as one of the designated parties entitled to take an appeal to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (e.s.). The second sentence of the statute must be read in pari materia with the first sentence of the statute in an effort to give the statute meaning. State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla.1977); 30 Fla.Jur. Statutes § 16 (Rev.1974). The first sentence states that copies of the development order are to be sent, inter alia, to "the owner or developer of the property affected by such order." § 380.07(2), Fla.Stat. (e.s.) The legislature, in enacting this statute, did not refer to "an owner" or to "any property affected by such order." Rather, the legislature referred to the property that is the subject of the Chapter 380 review and to the owner of that property.

"The" is a term used "[b]efore singular or plural nouns ... that denote particular specified persons or things ... [or] [b]efore a noun, and generally stressed emphasizing its uniqueness or prominence." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1333 (New College ed. 1979). Since the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words it utilizes and to convey its intent by use of specific terms, ¹⁰ we must apply the plain meaning of those words, if they are unambiguous. Sachs v. Hoglund, 397 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Use of the word "the" to refer to "the" owner or "the" property is sufficiently unambiguous to specify the narrow class of property owner entitled under section 380.07(2) to appeal a development order.

In reaching this determination, we are mindful of the legislative intent in setting up the DRI review process, which forms the second reason for our interpretation of the statute. Section 380.021, Florida Statutes, unequivocally provides that the procedures set forth in Chapter 380 are for the purpose of preserving our state's natural resources, as well as to "facilitate orderly and well-planned development" through state-established growth management techniques. Implicit in this statement of legislative purpose and the review procedures in Chapter 380 is the view that the DRI review process is primarily a comprehensive land use review technique for large scale development involving primarily two groups--developers on one hand, and on the other, governmental planners and permitting authorities. We alluded to this in Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v. State, Department of Community Affairs, 384 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), wherein we stated:

We recognize it is not the purpose of Chapter 380 to provide a forum for parties whose complaints focus on alleged detriment to activities they wish to conduct on adjoining land. "Regional impact" is concerned with matters affecting the public in general, not special interests of adjoining landowners. We point out that such special interests are properly asserted before the local governing body having jurisdiction to control land use and development under zoning and building regulations.³

3 Emphasis on local control and the limited scope of Chapter 380 is expressed in the legislative intent, found in Section 380.021, that 'state land and water management policies should, to the maximum possible extent, be implemented by local governments through existing processes for the guidance of growth rights of private property be presevered in accord with the constitutions of this state and of the United States."

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We consider that merely because section 380.07(2) does not permit adjoining landowners or other affected parties to appeal a development order to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, the lack of such a remedy does not abrogate the right of such parties to seek redress in court, caused by a taking of their property. ¹¹ Nor does it affect the right of any citizen to intervene in a proceeding before any administrative, licensing or other proceeding--such as a Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission appeal--for the protection of the environment, ¹² or the right of an adversely affected party to file a court challenge to a zoning decision that forms a part of or that is related to a development order, ¹³ or to seek any other action permitted by law.

Appellant next contends that it has a right of appeal to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, because it is a "substantially affected par...