Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Great Pac. Packaging, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | CV 14-2794 RSWL (JEMx) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | CALTEX PLASTICS, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. GREAT PACIFIC PACKAGING, INC., a California corporation; AMAZING PACKAGING SUPPLIES, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive; Defendants. |
Currently before the Court is Defendant Great Pacific Packaging, Inc.'s ("Great Pacific") Motion to Transfer Venue filed June 20, 2014 [17]. Plaintiff Caltex Plastics, Inc. ("Plaintiff") filed its Opposition on July 8, 2014 [24] and Defendant Great Pacific filed its Reply on July 15, 2014 [27]. This matter was taken under submission on July 24, 2014[28]. Having reviewed all papers and arguments submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
The Court hereby DENIES Defendant Great Pacific's Motion.
Plaintiff is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Vernon, California. Compl. ¶ 3. Defendant Great Pacific is a corporation that manufactures products in California with headquarters in San Jose, California. Id. at ¶ 4. Defendant Amazing Packaging is also a California corporation with headquarters in San Jose, California. Id. at ¶ 5. Defendant Amazing Packaging Supplies, Inc. ("Amazing Packaging") distributes, sells, ships, and advertises product packaging materials. Id.
Plaintiff manufactures industrial and commercial packaging, including military packaging material for electronic devices. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff's products have been granted permission by the Department of Defense ("DOD") to be advertised as meeting the MIL-PRF-81705 Type III ("81705 Spec") military specifications for heat-sealable, electrostatic discharge protective, flexible barrier materials. Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. At the commencement of the Action, Plaintiff was the only manufacturer of static shielding bags that met the special 81705 Spec designation. Id. at ¶ 17.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have misrepresented their products to meet the 81705 Spec in their advertisements when their products have not been certified as such. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. Although Plaintiff has demanded that Defendants stop selling their falsely-advertised line of products, Defendants have continued with their sales. Id. at ¶ 21. As a result of the sales, Plaintiff alleges that customers have been deceived and that Plaintiff has been economically injured. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.
Plaintiff brings the instant Action, asserting claims for unfair competition under California law and false advertising under California and federal law against Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 1-2, 24-45.
Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendants on April 11, 2014 [1]. Defendants filed an Answer on June 20, 2014 [16].
B. Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Before a court may transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, it must find that: (i) the action is one that might have been brought in the transferee court and(ii) the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice favor the transfer. Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy Enter., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1985)). Transfer under § 1404(a) is discretionary. A.J. Indus. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 503 F.2d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 1974). The purpose of § 1404(a) is to "prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Cont'l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960)).
An action is one that might have been brought in the transferee court when (i) the transferee court would have had subject matter jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; (ii) defendants would have been subject to personal jurisdiction; and (iii) venue would have been proper. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. F. & P. S.p.A., 899 F. Supp. 465, 466 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960)).
In determining whether the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice favor transfer, the court should consider certain factors, including:
(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (4) the respectiveparties' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.
Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 485, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1985).
The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the balance of these factors favors the transfer. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1986); Pfeiffer v. Himax Techs., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Florens Container v. Cho Yang Shipping, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2002). A transfer of venue is not appropriate unless the factors enumerated strongly favor venue elsewhere. Pac. Car & Foundry v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1968). "The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum." Decker Coal v. Commonwealth Edison, 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986).
Defendant Great Pacific seeks to transfer the instant Action from the Central District of California("CDCA") to the Northern District of California ("NDCA").
District courts have the discretion to grant a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) when the transferee forum is a forum where a case might have been brought originally and when the interest of justice favors a transfer of venue. Colt Studio, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citing Hatch, 758 F.2d at 414). To determine whether a transfer is in the best interests of justice, courts undergo an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Id. "Unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendant, plaintiff's choice of forum should not, or should rarely, be disturbed." Id. (citing Continental Oil Co. v. Atwood & Morrill Co., 265 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mont. 1967)).
A district is one where an action might have been brought if, at the time of the action's commencement, the transferee court would have had subject-matter jurisdiction, the defendants would have been subject to personal jurisdiction there, and venue would have been proper. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 899 F. Supp. at 466.
At the time of the Action's commencement, the NDCA would have had subject-matter jurisdiction over this Action because Plaintiff brings federal Lanham Act claims. Compl. ¶¶ 24-31; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338; 15U.S.C. § 1121. Additionally, because Defendants' headquarters are located in the NDCA, Defendants would have been subject to personal jurisdiction in the NDCA and venue would have been proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Section 1391(b)(1) states that venue is proper in "a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located." Accordingly, the Court finds that the Action could have originally been brought in the NDCA.
Defendant Great Pacific argues that transfer is warranted because its counsel and Defendants' principal places of business are located in the NDCA. Mot. 4:15-16; Brock R. Lyle Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.1
The convenience of counsel is irrelevant to determining the convenience of the parties. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195-96 (S.D. Cal. 2007). Still, the Court finds that the location of Defendants' headquarters, employees, and relevant business activities in the NDCAweighs slightly in favor of transfer. Adachi v. Carlyle/Galaxy San Pedro, L.P., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151-52 (S.D. Cal. 2009) ().
Courts also weigh the relative sizes of parties' businesses in determining the balance of inconveniences. Allstar Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Your Store Online, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1131-32 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In Allstar, the Court found that transfer was appropriate in part because the plaintiffs were large corporations and the defendants were small businesses whose operations would be disrupted if they were forced to send their two employees to litigate outside of their home forum. Id.
Defendant Great Pacific states that Defendants are "small businesses" that would be "seriously inconvenienced" by litigating in the CDCA. Reply 6:134. However, Defendant Great Pacific does not provide any evidence other than this conclusory statement that it and Defendant Amazing Packaging are smaller businesses than Plaintiff. Defendant Great Pacific also fails to show that litigating in the NDCA would be so inconvenient as to disrupt its business activities.
Accordingly, as Defendant Great Pacific does not provide any evidence that Defendants would be seriouslyinconvenienced if required to litigate in the CDCA, the Court finds that the...
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