Calzadilla v. Dooley

• Decision Date: 18 January 1968
• Citation: 286 N.Y.S.2d 510,29 A.D.2d 152
• Parties: , 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9850 In the Matter of Silvia T. CALZADILLA, Respondent, v. Edwin B. DOOLEY, Albert Berkowitz and Raymond J. Lee, Constituting the New York State Athletic Commission, Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 510

286 N.Y.S.2d 510

29 A.D.2d 152, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9850

In the Matter of Silvia T. CALZADILLA, Respondent, v. Edwin B. DOOLEY, Albert Berkowitz and Raymond J. Lee Constituting the New York State Athletic Commission, Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Argued Oct. 24, 1967.

Decided Jan. 18, 1968.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany, for appellants (Winifred C. Stanley and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel).

Lutwack, Feldman & Burke, Buffalo, for respondent (David P. Feldman, Buffalo, of counsel).

Before [29 A.D.2d 157] WILLIAMS, P.J., and BASTOW, GOLDMAN, HENRY, and DEL VECCHIO, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDMAN, Justice.

The New York State Athletic Commission (hereinafter, called 'Commission') appeals from a denial of its motion to dismiss respondent's petition which seeks to annul the Commission's refusal to issue a professional wrestling license. In support of its position the Commission raises various objections in point of law and cites as its authority the decision of this court in Matter of Whitehead v. Krulewitch, et al., 25 A.D.2d 956, 271 N.Y.S.2d 565, in which we affirmed the dismissal of the petition of a female wrestler who sought to be licensed, as does the petitioner-respondent.

The Commission denied petitioner's application on the ground that State law does not permit women to wrestle or be licensed. Section A, subd. 14 (19 N.Y.C.R.R. 205.15) of the Rules promulgated by the Commission provides that 'No women may compete in any wrestling or boxing contest or exhibition and no women may be licensed as a boxer, wrestler, manager or second'. The Commission contends that its determination was proper for three reasons: first, that regulation and control of professional sports exhibitions are within the scope of the State's police powers; second, that in promulgating Rule A--14 the Commission acted properly within its authority and lastly, that the Rule is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, for the Legislature, in granting the Commission 'sole control, authority and jurisdiction over all licenses' in a restricted field, has set up adequate standards for the issuance of such licenses. The petitioner counters with the claim that the denial of the license 'violates the constitutional rights of females in adherence to Rule A--14, an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State'.

The principal issue is whether there has been a valid delegation of legislative power. The prohibition against invalid delegation of authority is deeply embedded in federal constitutional law. 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power (even) to the President * * *' (Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 55 S.Ct. 837, 846, 79 L.Ed. 1570). This same principle is also rooted in the law of New York. The clearest expression of this doctrine in our State is found in Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of State of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 184, 189, 81 N.E.2d 80, where the Court held that the Legislature, in the exercise of the police power, has a limited right to regulate private schools and that it cannot delegate to any official an unlimited and undefined power to make any regulations he desires and to issue or deny licenses upon the school's compliance with such regulations. While declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court recognized the authority of the Legislature to make valid and legal delegation of power when proper standards and guidelines are provided. It specifically so stated in Mtr. of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 164, 169, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587, 156 N.E.2d 301, 304, where, in discussing standards, it said: 'That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must be furnished in a field 'where flexibility and the adaption of the (legislative) policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program', Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 1316, 92 L.Ed. 1694.' The Supreme Court clearly stated this rule in its earlier decision in United States v. Shreveport Grain & El. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85, 53 S.Ct. 42, 44, 77 L.Ed. 175, where it wrote: 'But Congress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and regulations'. Once the Legislature has set up these standards for the Commission's guidance it is not only proper but highly essential, if administrative agencies are to operate effectively, that the details and execution be left to the administrator.

The Legislature vested the Commission with the right to make a judgment in determining whether the application by a female for a wrestling license 'will be consistent with the public interest, convenience or necessity and with the best interests of * * * wrestling generally'. (L.1920, ch. 912, § 12, as amd. by L. 1952, ch. 666, § 11; McK.Unconsol.Laws, § 8912.) Chapter 137 of the Laws of 1953, amending section 6 of Chapter 912 of the Laws of 1920, McK.Unconsol.Laws, § 8906 (McKinney's, Book 65, Part 3, p. 319) deals with the scope of the Commission's authority and specifies and defines the Commission's jurisdiction:

'The commission shall have and hereby is vested with the sole direction, management, control and jurisdiction over all such boxing, sparring and wrestling matches or exhibitions * * * within the state of New York. The commission is hereby given the sole control, authority and jurisdiction over all licenses to hold boxing, sparring or wrestling matches or exhibitions * * * and over all licenses to any and all persons who participate in such boxing, sparring or wrestling matches or exhibitions, as hereinafter provided.'

In issues of this kind there is always the claim, as urged by petitioner, that the delegation of authority by the Legislature is invalid because the Legislature did not set up proper standards. The question, then, is did the Legislature set sufficient standards so that the Commission had the legal authority to promulgate rules for licensing. Section 11 of chapter 666 of the Laws of 1952, amending section 12 of chapter 912 of the Laws of 1920, McK.Unconsol.Laws, section 8912 provides the following standards for the issuance of licenses:

'If in the judgment of the commission the financial responsibility, experience, character and general fitness of an applicant * * * are such that the participation of such applicant will be consistent with the public interest, convenience or necessity and with the best interests of boxing or wrestling generally and in conformity with the purposes of this act, the commission may grant a license in accordance with the provisions herein contained.'

The very same standard of 'public convenience, interest, or necessity' was approved in Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mort. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279, 53 S.Ct. 627, 634, 77 L.Ed. 1166, which upheld a federal statute authorizing the Radio Commission to assign frequencies 'from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires'. The standards must be interpreted in the light and purpose of the whole act. Applying this principle to the instant case, we find that the standards (and particularly that of 'consistent with the public interest') are not so indefinite as to confer unlimited authority and power (Matter of International R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 264 App.Div. 506, 36 N.Y.S.2d 125, affd. 289 N.Y. 830, 47 N.E.2d 435).

The history and record of professional wrestling and boxing is, unfortunately, not one to which we can always point with pride and confidence. Justice Eder in Mtr. of London Sporting Club v. Helfand, 3 Misc.2d 431, 152 N.Y.S.2d 819, affd. 6 A.D.2d 775, 175 N.Y.S.2d 152, made this cogent observation at page 436, 152 N.Y.S.2d at page 824, with which we certainly concur:

'A great deal of latitude and discretion must be accorded a commission which is responsible to the People of the State for the maintenance of fair dealing, honesty, and clean sport in a field which has in the past been infested with undesirable elements. Its rules should be enforced...