Camacho-torres v. Betancourt-vazquez .
| Decision Date | 13 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 09-1495 (JAG). |
| Citation | 722 F.Supp.2d 150 |
| Parties | Alvan CAMACHO-TORRES, Plaintiff v. Maria Del C. BETANCOURT-VAZQUEZ, et al., Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Godwin Aldarondo-Girald, Ericson Sanchez-Preks, Aldarondo Girald Law Office, Laura Maldonado-Rodriguez, Laura Maldonado Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Miguel A. Rangel-Rosas, Maymi, Rivera & Rotger, PSC, Wandymar Burgos-Vargas, P.R. Department of Justice-Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Maria del C. Betancourt-Vazquez (“Betancourt”), Grymarys De Jesus-Afanador (“Afanador”), and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's (“the Commonwealth”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Alván D. Camacho-Torres (“Camacho”) is a former career employee of the Comisión Apelativa del Sistema de Administración de Recursos Humanos del Servicio Público (“CASARH”) filing a political discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims under Puerto Rico state law for discrimination, retaliation, and negligence. Plaintiff seeks upward of $20 million in damages, including punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Docket No. 2).
Defendants in this case are the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and two officers of CASARH 1 in their personal and official capacities, individually and on behalf of their conjugal partnerships. (Docket No. 2).
Camacho has been an active member in the New Progressive Party (“NPP”), and was hired to work for CASARH (then known as JASAP) on August 1, 2000 by an appointee of former NPP governor Pedro Rosselló. On April 16, 2002, Camacho was selected for a career position at what is now CASARH. (Docket No. 2).
Betancourt, said to be an active and well-known member of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”), was appointed as Chairwoman of CASARH near the end of 2004. This is when Camacho claims that political discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliatory measures against him began. Camacho claims to have criticized Betancourt's decisions regarding the “management of public documents” as being against Puerto Rico state law, and thereafter was the target of retaliatory measures meant to force him to resign from CASARH. (Docket No. 2).
Camacho asserts that on October 21, 2004 Betancourt eliminated a salary differential he was receiving as retaliation for his criticism of her performance, while leaving in effect the additional duties assigned to him that gave rise to the differential in the first place. (Docket No. 2).
Betancourt and Afanador are alleged as having been aware of Camacho's back problems and not only failing to make reasonable accommodation for him, but proceeding to assign him tasks that were contraindicated for his condition. (Docket No. 2).
Afanador sent Camacho an official memorandum alerting him to an impending disciplinary action for taking days off due to a medical condition. Camacho responded during work hours on January 17, 2006, using a work computer. His superiors then drafted a new policy to apply retroactively and characterized his behavior as the use of a work computer “for personal benefit.” Camacho states that he is the only person to be fired under this policy. (Docket No. 2).
Camacho then filed a Complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on August 3, 2007, alleging political discrimination under § 1983 and several Puerto Rico state law claims seeking monetary and injunctive relief. (07-1691(ADC) Docket No. 1).
Judge Delgado-Colón entered judgment on February 10, 2009, dismissing with prejudice the § 1983 claims for monetary relief against the Commonwealth, and against Betancourt and Afanador in their official capacities. The § 1983 claim for injunctive relief was dismissed without prejudice. The supplemental state law claims were then dismissed without prejudice once the federal claims had been dismissed. (07-1691(ADC) Docket No. 1).
Camacho proceeded to file another Complaint with this Court on June 2, 2009, copying language from his 2007 Complaint, alleging the same claims against the Commonwealth, Betancourt, and Afanador (all parties in the first suit), based on the same set of alleged facts. (Docket No. 2).
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 10, 2009, claiming that res judicata precluded Camacho's claims, and that in any event, his claims were no better able to withstand the standard for a motion to dismiss this time than they had several months before. (Docket No. 12).
“Under the federal law of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating claims that were raised or could have been raised in that action.” Apparel Art Int'l, Inc. v. Amertex Enters., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir.1995). For res judicata to apply, three requirements must be met: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) a sufficient identity between the parties in the two suits; and (3) a sufficient identity of the causes of action in the two suits.”
Ortiz-Cameron v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 139 F.3d 4, 5 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Porn v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.1996)), aff'd, 139 F.3d 4 (1998).
First, when determining whether the dismissal of a claim acts as a judgment on the merits, Rule 41 is instructive. Rule 41(b) states:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
During this controversy's first journey through the court system, Camacho's claims for monetary relief under § 1983 against Defendants in their official capacity 2 were dismissed with prejudice, whereas his § 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief were dismissed without prejudice, following a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (07-1691(ADC) Docket No. 26). Dismissal without prejudice does not have the force of a judgment on the merits, and so this Court will review Camacho's claim for injunctive relief. 3 Any claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacity under § 1983, however, is barred by res judicata if it meets the criteria established above.
Secondly, Camacho was a plaintiff in the first suit, and is also a plaintiff in the present case. Betancourt, Afanador, and the Commonwealth were all defendants in the first suit, and are renamed as such here. There are no additional plaintiffs or defendants this time who did not have an opportunity to litigate this controversy in 2007. Nothing about the present case presents a reason to doubt the sufficiency of identity of the parties between the cases.
Thirdly, Camacho's cause of action under § 1983 in the current Complaint relates to political discrimination under the First Amendment and denial of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights premised on Camacho's “arbitrary” firing. Not only is the underlying cause of action identical to his 2007 suit, but so is the language; his Complaint has been almost entirely lifted from his first suit. The few new or extended sentences that grace the Complaint's fifteen pages are neither helpful nor illustrative. The two causes of action are undeniably of sufficient identity for res judicata to bar Camacho's § 1983 claims for monetary relief without reservation.
In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95-96 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). While Twombly does not require of plaintiffs a heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to have “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Accordingly, in order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court upheld Twombly and clarified that two underlying principles must guide this Court's assessment of the adequacy of a plaintiff's pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. The First Circuit has recently relied on these two principles as outlined by the Supreme Court. See Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009). Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
“Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Thus, any nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, must be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Determining the existence of plausibility is...
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...pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion."Camacho-Torres v. Betancourt-Vazquez, 722 F.Supp.2d 150, 154, 2010 WL 2756555, at *3 (D.P.R. July 13, 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50). "The First Circuit has recently relied on these two......