Camacho v. Gardner
Citation | 104 Ariz. 555,456 P.2d 925 |
Decision Date | 26 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 9389--PR,9389--PR |
Parties | Jerry CAMACHO, a minor by his mother and best friend Helen Camacho, Appellant, v. Henry M. GARDNER and Jane Doe Gardner, husband and wife, and Ralph T. Badilla, Appellees. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
William Messing, Tucson, for appellant.
Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Richmond, David Pakula, Tucson, for appellees.
This case is before us on a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming an order of the superior court setting aside a judgment and a default. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported in 6 Ariz.App. 590, 435 P.2d 719, as modified by a supplemental opinion in 7 Ariz.App. 483, 441 P.2d 249.
Plaintiff, Jerry Camacho, was a passenger in an automobile driven by Ralph Badilla. That car collided with a truck driven by Henry Gardner, and plaintiff was injured. He filed suit against both drivers. Gardner and his wife (hereinafter referred to as defendants) were served, but Badilla could not be found. The Gardners were covered by a liability insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange, but they neglected to notify the insurer that they had been served. A default and a default judgment for $50,000 were entered in favor of plaintiff. The insurer's attorney heard about the judgment, and, within seven days, filed a motion to vacate it. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, and plaintiff appealed.
The question presented is whether the lower court abused its discretion under the facts in the instant case.
On or about December 22, 1966, personal service was made upon Henry Gardner and his wife. At the time of service on the Gardners, the process server told defendants to give the papers to the insurance company. The defendants failed to take any action. The reasons given are set forth in the affidavit of defendant Henry M. Gardner. Omitting the formal parts, he stated:
Prior to the filing of this suit defendants had retained their own attorney, David L. Pakula, who negotiated and settled an uninsured motorist claim (Badilla was not insured) against defendants' insurance carrier, Farmers Insurance Exchange (hereinafter referred to as Farmers). About November 17, 1966, defendants received a letter from plaintiff's attorney advising them, among other things, to forward it to their insurance carrier. Mr. Gardner called his attorney, who told him that
'He would probably be sued and if he was served with papers he should immediately take them to the insurance company.'
Mr. Pakula then called Farmers, and notified them of receipt of the letter. He also called plaintiff's attorney, and stated to him that defendants were not at fault.
The affidavit of Farmers' adjuster, omitting the formal parts, stated:
To complete the background, we set forth the greater part of the affidavit of defendants' attorney, Mr. Pakula:
It is apparent that Farmers actively engaged in negotiation and settlement of an uninsured-motorist claim made by defendant under Farmers' policy, but took no action on the potential claim by the plaintiff under the liability clauses of its policy. However, Farmers was galvanized into immediate activity when, on January 13, 1967, they were advised by Mr. Pakula that the plaintiffs had taken a default, and a judgment thereon in the amount of $50,000 earlier that same day. Seven days later--on January 20, 1967--Farmers, on behalf of defendants, filed a motion under Rule 60(c), Rules of Civ.Proc., 16 A.R.S., seeking to set aside the default and the judgment. The Pima County Superior Court had a hearing on the motion on January 30, 1967, and that court entered an order the following day setting aside the default and default judgment and ordered a trial on the merits.
We are confronted with the question of whether an insurance company is entitled to have a default set aside under this set of facts. In Jenkins v. Mayflower, 93 Ariz. 287, 380 P.2d 145, we held that 'an omnibus clause is a part of every motor vehicle liability policy, by whatever name it may be called.'
In Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 428 P.2d 98, in discussing the failure of the insured to notify the insurer of the filing of a suit against the insured as required by its policy, we stated:
'In Schecter v. Killingsworth, supra (93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136), we further stated that the primary purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act was 'the providing of security against uncompensated damages arising from operation of motor vehicles on our highways.' The foregoing statements were quoted and relied upon in Jenkins v. Mayflower, supra, and the two cases, when read in conjunction, fully express the public policy of this state in regard to judicial implementation of the Financial Responsibility Act. The holding of Jenkins v. Mayflower that a restrictive endorsement negating coverage could not be relied on by the insurer where it conflicted with the coverage required by the omnibus clause read into Every automobile liability policy by the Financial Responsibility Act, was reiterated by this court in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Hamman Wholesale Lumber and Supply Co., Inc., 95 Ariz. 362, 390 P.2d 897.
'Financial contends, however, that the effect of this statute, when applied to the facts of the instant case, will result in a denial of due process violative of Art. II, § 4, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S., and of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. * * *
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...280, 380 P.2d, at 140. The Arizona court has consistently adhered to this construction of its legislation, see Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558, 456 P.2d 925, 928 (1969); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P.2d 914 (1969); Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 A......
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