Camacho. v. State
| Decision Date | 26 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 09-389,CR 09-389 |
| Parties | SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS MANUEL ENRIQUE CAMACHO Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
On July 11, 2008, appellant Manuel Enrique Camacho entered a guilty plea to capital murder, and the Benton County Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. Appellant filed a timely, verified petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2011) that was denied without a hearing. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court should have held a hearing on the petition and that it made a number of other errors regarding his claims for relief. Because it is clear that the petition was without merit, we affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief.
Where no hearing is held on a Rule 37.1 petition, the trial court has an obligation to provide written findings that conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Davenport v. State, 2011 Ark. 105 (per curiam); see also Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3. This court may affirm the denial of a Rule 37.1 petition regardless of the adequacy of the order if we can determine from the record that the petition was wholly without merit. Davenport, 2011 Ark.105.
Appellant's petition listed six claims for relief, not all of which were cognizable under the circumstances presented here. Appellant did not assert error in his sentencing, and, because he entered a guilty plea, cognizable claims were limited to those asserting that his plea was not entered intelligently and voluntarily upon advice of competent counsel. See Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, ___ S.W.3d ___. Appellant raised claims that his charges should have been dismissed for a speedy-trial violation, that he was denied counsel because the Mexican consulate was not informed upon his arrest, that he was not found competent to stand trial, that his guilty plea was coerced, that the prosecution withheld evidence, and that his counsel was ineffective. Direct challenges such as appellant's claims of a speedy-trial violation and prosecutorial misconduct are not cognizable in Rule 37.1 proceedings. See Travis v. State, 2010 Ark. 341 (per curiam); State v. Wilmoth, 369 Ark. 346, 255 S.W.3d 419 (2007).
Appellant's claim concerning denial of counsel, although couched in those terms, is rather an attack on the appropriateness of the consular notice that was given. Appellant was given the notice after he provided a statement, and a representative of the consulate and an attorney representing the Mexican government participated to some extent in the proceedings. Appellant asserted that he would not have given a confession if he had been properly notified upon his detention of his right to consular notification. That issue was vetted in hearings on appellant's motion to suppress the statement, which was denied. The validity of that ruling might have been contested on appeal if appellant had chosen not to enter a guilty plea and had continued to trial, but the issue does not have, under the circumstanceshere, any bearing on whether appellant's plea was voluntarily given or whether appellant was properly represented by counsel.
Appellant's next claim asserted that he was not found competent to stand trial. A defendant in a criminal case is ordinarily presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial, and the burden of proving incompetence is on the defendant. Whitham v. State, 2011 Ark. 28 (per curiam); Davis v. State, 375 Ark. 368, 291 S.W.3d 164 (2009) (citing Mask v. State, 314 Ark. 25, 32, 869 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1993)). Despite appellant's apparent contention that his competency to stand trial or to enter his plea was placed in issue, it was not.
The trial court initially ordered the defense to hire independent doctors to examine appellant and evaluate his mental condition and history. The court later ordered a mental evaluation of appellant at the state hospital, apparently in response to counsel's expressed concerns that the reports would not be received in time and that appellant intended to put on evidence during the guilt phase from one of the doctors hired by the defense. Counsel indicated in later proceedings that the defense had received a report on the mental evaluation from one of the independent doctors and had determined that it would not present any psychological evidence in the guilt phase, but did intend to use the evidence in the report during sentencing. If appellant was evaluated by the state hospital under the court's ruling, that evaluation was only to be used during any sentencing proceedings. No report was included in the record. The state hospital evaluation in this case, if completed, was not to determine whether appellant was impaired from assisting his attorneys or otherwise pursuing his defense by virtue of any mental disease or defect.
A petitioner who asserts incompetence for the first time in a petition for postconviction relief has the heavy burden of demonstrating with facts that he or she was not competent at the time of trial. Robertson v. State, 2010 Ark. 300, ___ S.W.3d ___ (per curiam). Even though a petitioner can document a history of mental illness or show that counsel could have argued incompetence, that showing without more is not sufficient to warrant postconviction relief. Id. Although appellant may have had a mental-health examination, that fact alone, particularly in light of the particular circumstances presented here, was not sufficient to demonstrate that he was not competent. That his attorneys elected not to raise a challenge to appellant's competency after receiving a report from retained professionals on the issue weighs heavily against any demonstration of incompetency.
Appellant's next claim in his petition was that he was coerced into entering a guilty plea. He alleged that his attorney told him that he had no chance and that he would get the death penalty if he went to trial. He alleged that the jury would have been biased against him, that motions for change of venue and severance had been denied, that information about his record had been made public, that the judge would not accept a plea to a term of years, that voir dire was performed in chambers, and that people involved with the prosecuting agency were related to the victim. None of the allegations in the petition rose to the level of coercion. See Pierce v. State, 2009 Ark. 606 (per...
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