Camacho v. State
| Decision Date | 29 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D13–3725.,2D13–3725. |
| Citation | 164 So.3d 45 |
| Parties | Felix CAMACHO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Clark E. Green, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Christina Zuccaro, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Felix Camacho appeals his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred by concluding that it had no legal basis to grant a downward departure. In Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065 (Fla.1999), the Supreme Court of Florida created a two-step process for deciding whether to impose a downward departure sentence. These two steps are analyzed with at least three different standards of review on appeal. As a result, to facilitate review, it is very helpful for the trial court to explain on the record the precise basis for a decision to depart or not to depart from the guidelines when sentencing. In this case, depending upon the trial court's view of the evidence, the challenged sentence may have been properly imposed. But on the face of the record, it appears that the trial court erred during the first step of the two-step process by concluding that it had no authority to depart. Accordingly, we reverse the sentences and remand for resentencing.
Mr. Camacho was charged in case number 12–CF–015538 with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and grand theft as a third-degree felony for events on January 24, 2012. In case number 12–CF–17055, he was charged with the same offenses for events on March 27, 2012, except that the grand theft was a second-degree felony. He pleaded nolo contendere to these charges with an open plea. At the sentencing hearing in June 2013, he presented testimony from several witnesses in an effort to obtain a downward departure sentence.
Mr. Camacho's theory for a downward departure was that his “capacity ... to appreciate the criminal nature of [his] conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.” See § 921.0026(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012). In support of this theory, Mr. Camacho presented evidence that he had been a professional boxer from a young age and into his early forties. As a result of the trauma that he had incurred to his head over this extended period, Mr. Camacho had sustained brain damage.
In addition to the testimony of lay witnesses, he supported his theory of impaired capacity with the testimony of an expert, a neuropsychologist. The expert testified that Mr. Camacho had some very significant neurocognitive deficits and that he suffered from “dementia pugilistica
,” a neurodegenerative disease caused by repeated blunt force trauma to the head. The expert performed tests on Mr. Camacho that indicated that he had significant frontal lobe damage that did not necessarily render him unable to differentiate between right and wrong but caused him to have poor judgment and difficulty controlling his impulses. The expert testified that Mr. Camacho also had other symptoms, including depression and severe headaches. He further testified that although dementia is a progressive disorder, Mr. Camacho's behavior could be managed with medication. The expert conceded on cross examination that Mr. Camacho was self-medicating for his symptoms with prescription drugs and that these drugs could also cause diminished inhibitions and impulse control. He did not know whether Mr. Camacho was under the influence of any drugs at the time of the offense.
The State argued that Mr. Camacho had failed to prove any legal ground for a downward departure in his case. First, it argued that in light of the evidence of self-medication, it was just as likely that Mr. Camacho's drug use was the cause of his impaired capacity as it was that his frontal lobe impairment was the cause and that section 921.0026(2)(c) therefore did not apply. It further argued that the case really involved a need for specialized treatment for a mental disorder that was related to substance abuse and, thus, was not a proper ground for departure under section 921.0026(2)(d). See § 921.0026(2)(d) ().
At the end of the hearing, the trial court announced that it did not “think, legally” that Mr. Camacho “me[t] the criteria laid out in the statutes” and that it did not “think” that Mr. Camacho was “mitigation eligible.” The minimum permissive sentence for which Mr. Camacho scored was 128.4 months' incarceration. If the court had imposed his sentences consecutively, it could have sentenced Mr. Camacho to up to fifty years in prison. Instead, the court imposed the maximum sentence for each offense to run concurrently—fifteen years' incarceration on the burglaries and the second-degree felony grand theft and five years' incarceration on the third-degree felony grand theft.
In Banks, the supreme court held that the decision of whether to depart from the guidelines is “a two-part process.” 732 So.2d at 1067. During the first step of this process, the trial court decides whether there is a legal basis to depart and whether the defendant has proven the factual support for that basis by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. If such a basis exists, the trial court then must make a discretionary decision under the totality of the circumstances of the case as to whether to depart. Id. at 1068 ; see also Fogarty v. State, 158 So.3d 669, 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
At least from the perspective of an appellate court, the “two-part process” transforms into three questions during the appellate review. First, is there a valid legal basis for a downward departure?
Legal grounds are provided by statute and in case law. Banks, 732 So.3d at 1067 & n. 2 (citing § 921.0016). This is a purely legal issue that is reviewed de novo. See id. at 1067. Second, is there competent, substantial evidence in the record to support a factual finding that the defendant's case fits within the legal basis? Id. This factual issue is reviewed under the competent, substantial evidence test that is generally applicable to all issues of fact. Third, and finally, if there is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Childers v. State, 1D14–3296.
...that it was unclear why the trial court ruled that it had no authority to grant a downward departure. See Camacho v. State, 164 So.3d 45, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (noting that the trial court announced that it did not “ ‘think, legally’ ” that the appellant “ ‘[m]et the criteria laid out in th......
-
State v. Milici, Case No. 5D16–2353
...capacity does not mean that, as a matter of law, section 921.0026(2)(c) is unavailable as a basis for departure." Camacho v. State , 164 So.3d 45, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Here, no competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings regarding section 921.0026(2)(c). Unlike man......
-
State v. Johnson
...analysis, a defendant is required to prove a legal basis to depart by a preponderance of the evidence. See e.g. Camacho v. State, 164 So. 3d 45, 46-47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (discussing defendant's theory of impaired capacity where defendant had been a professional boxer and sustained repeated ......
-
Warianek v. State
...that basis by a preponderance of the evidence.' " Williams v. State, 286 So. 3d 892, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (quoting Camacho v. State, 164 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ). In other words, the trial court must first assess "whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal groun......