Camacho v. Superior Court

• Docket Number: S273391
• Decision Date: 31 August 2023
• Parties: CIRO CAMACHO, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

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CIRO CAMACHO, Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, Respondent;

THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

S273391

Supreme Court of California

August 31, 2023

Fifth Appellate District F082798

Superior Court Merced County Superior Court 146207 Ronald W. Hansen Judge

Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo and Douglas C. Foster for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Julie A. Hokans, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Sally Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.

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OPINION

KRUGER, J.

The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) authorizes the involuntary commitment of certain convicted sex offenders - termed "sexually violent predators," or SVPs - who are found to have mental disorders that make them likely to reoffend after release from prison. This case concerns delays in holding trial on a petition for SVP commitment.

Petitioner Ciro Camacho was first determined to be an SVP at a 2005 trial and was committed to the state hospital for a two-year term under the version of the statute then in force. The next year, the statute was amended to provide for indefinite commitment instead of renewable two-year terms. In 2007, before Camacho's two-year term ended, the state filed a recommitment petition seeking indefinite commitment under the new version of the statute. Since then, the defense has repeatedly requested or agreed to continuances of the trial date, with the result that the trial on the recommitment petition has yet to occur. Camacho now argues that the extended pretrial delay violates his constitutional rights.

Although the Courts of Appeal have previously addressed similar claims, this case marks the first time this court has considered the constitutional framework for evaluating the timeliness of SVP trials. We now hold that persons facing SVP commitment have a due process right to a timely trial. But as

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is true in other contexts, whether pretrial delay violates that right depends in the first instance on the reasons for the delay. (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 531.) Here, while the decade-plus delay in holding Camacho's recommitment trial is extraordinarily lengthy, the available record shows that responsibility for the delay lies primarily with the defense, which either sought or agreed to the continuances that led to the delay. While many of the continuance requests were made by Camacho's counsel when Camacho was not personally present in court, the ordinary rule is that delays sought by counsel are attributable to their clients (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 85), and the record reveals no basis to depart from that rule in this case. Camacho therefore has not established that the pretrial delay in this case resulted in a violation of his due process rights.

Although we find no due process violation in the case before us, we underscore the vital role of trial courts in safeguarding the timely trial right of alleged SVPs. Involuntary commitment entails "a massive curtailment of liberty." (Humphrey v. Cady (1972) 405 U.S. 504, 509.) In the context of SVP proceedings, the deprivation of liberty begins when a court finds probable cause to hold an alleged SVP in state custody pending trial. In making determinations that will affect when trial is held, the trial court must take due account of the individual's interests in prompt adjudication and take decisive steps to guard against unjustified delay.

I.

A.

The Legislature first enacted the SVP Act in 1995, expressing concerns about "a select group of criminal offenders

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who are extremely dangerous as the result of mental impairment, and who are likely to continue committing acts of sexual violence even after they have been punished for such crimes." (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1144 (Hubbart).) In its findings and declarations for the SVP Act, the Legislature described its intent to "identify these individuals prior to the expiration of their terms of imprisonment" and, if they are "found to be likely to commit acts of sexually violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt," to ensure that they "be confined and treated until such time that it can be determined that they no longer present a threat to society." (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921.)

To be committed as an SVP, an individual must meet the SVP Act's definition of the term" '[s]exually violent predator' ": "[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1); see id., subd. (b) [defining" '[s]exually violent offense'" to include certain enumerated crimes "when committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, or threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person"].)^[1]

The statute sets forth extensive administrative and judicial procedures for determining whether an individual is properly classified as an SVP. The process typically begins

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while the individual is still serving a prison sentence for a sexually violent offense. At least six months before the individual's scheduled release date, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation conducts an initial screening of individuals who have committed a qualifying offense, using a standardized screening instrument to review the individual's "social, criminal, and institutional history." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (b).) If the initial screening indicates that the person is likely to be an SVP, the individual is referred to the California Department of State Hospitals (Department) for a full evaluation. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (2), (b).) The Department designates two mental health evaluators, who must be practicing psychiatrists or psychologists and must use the Department's standardized assessment protocol. (Id., subds. (c), (d).) If both mental health evaluators agree the person meets the statutory definition of an SVP, then the Director of State Hospitals asks the state to file a petition for commitment. (Id., subd. (d).) If the evaluators reach different conclusions, then two new evaluations are performed by independent mental health professionals. (Id., subd. (e).) A petition for commitment may be filed only if the two new evaluators concur that the person meets the criteria for commitment. (Id., subd. (f).)

Once the Director of State Hospitals has forwarded the evaluators' reports to the appropriate district attorney, the district attorney may file a petition for commitment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (h)(1).) The trial court then reviews the petition to determine whether it "contains sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute probable cause" that the person meets the definition of an SVP. (Id., § 6601.5.) If the court answers that question in the affirmative, the court then must hold a probable cause hearing within 10 days, absent good cause

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for extending the time period. (Id., §§ 6601.5, 6602, subd. (b).) In the meantime, the person must be detained in a secure facility. (Id., § 6601.5.) If, after a hearing, the court finds probable cause to believe the individual is an SVP, the person is detained at the state hospital pending trial. (Id., § 6602.5, subd. (a).)

The statute does not specify a fixed deadline by which trial must occur. It does, however, lay out a number of procedural protections for the conduct of trial, including the right to a jury and to the assistance of counsel and relevant experts. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (a).) At trial, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is an SVP. (Id., § 6604.) Specifically, the state must prove four conditions are met: "(1) the person has previously been convicted of at least one qualifying 'sexually violent offense' listed in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6600, subdivision (b) [citation]; (2) the person has 'a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others' [citation]; (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released from custody [citation]; and (4) those acts will be predatory in nature." (Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 190 (Walker).) The state must prove these conditions exist at the time of trial: A person is subject to SVP commitment only if the person is found to have a current diagnosed mental disorder and to pose a current risk to public safety. (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1162.)

If the individual is found at trial to be an SVP, the court then issues an order of commitment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604; id., § 6604.1, subd. (a).) As initially enacted, the SVP Act provided for renewable two-year commitment terms. (People v. McKee

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(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (McKee), citing former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.) In 2006, however, voters passed Proposition 83 (Gen. Elec., Nov. 7, 2006), which replaced these renewable two-year terms with an indefinite commitment from which the individual can be released if it is shown that the individual no longer qualifies as an SVP. (See McKee, at p. 1184; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.1, subd. (a).) Under this system, a person who is committed as an SVP must be reexamined annually by a qualified mental health professional to determine whether commitment is still appropriate. (Welf...