Camarillo v. Cabinets By Michael, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2018
• Docket Number: NO. 02-17-00154-CV,02-17-00154-CV
• Parties: JORGE CAMARILLO APPELLANT AND APPELLEE v. CABINETS BY MICHAEL, INC. AND MICHAEL WELLS APPELLEES AND APPELLANTS
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

JORGE CAMARILLO APPELLANT AND APPELLEE v. CABINETS BY MICHAEL, INC. ANDMICHAEL WELLS APPELLEES AND APPELLANTS

NO. 02-17-00154-CV

COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

June 28, 2018

FROM THE 342ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 342-266475-13

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

Appellant and Cross-Appellee Jorge Camarillo and Appellees and Cross-Appellants Cabinets by Michael, Inc. (CBM) and Michael Wells appeal from the trial court's final judgment in this Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case. Asrelevant to this appeal, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Camarillo for unpaid overtime and awarded him $1,585.50 in actual damages, $1,585.50 in liquidated damages, $38,640.50 in reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, and $1,738.25 in costs.

In four issues, Camarillo challenges the trial court's disposition of his overtime claim, and in three issues, CBM and Wells contest the trial court's fees and costs awards. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND²

On September 7, 2012, Camarillo sued CBM and Wells, alleging two causes of action under the FLSA: Camarillo claimed that (1) CBM and Wells failed to pay him his additional half-time wage for all of the overtime hours he worked from February 2006 to July 19, 2012 (Overtime Claim) and (2) CBM and Wells retaliated against him by constructively discharging him for pursuing his overtime claim (Retaliation Claim). See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1) (West 2016), § 215(a)(2)-(3) (West 1998). In answer, CBM and Wells filed a general denial. Eventually, CBM and Wells moved for traditional summary judgment on both of Camarillo's claims, which the trial court denied.

CBM and Wells subsequently filed a limited motion to reconsider the trial court's order denying their summary judgment motion. In that motion, CBM andWells asked the trial court to find, pursuant to rule of civil procedure 166a(e), that the summary judgment evidence established as a matter of law that Camarillo had worked a total of 317.1 hours of overtime from July 5, 2009, through July 5, 2012, and that his hourly rate during that period was $10.00 per hour. The trial court granted the limited motion to reconsider. CBM and Wells then filed a sworn petition to confess judgment pursuant to rule of civil procedure 314, by which they sought to confess judgment on Camarillo's overtime claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 314.

In their petition to confess judgment, CBM and Wells asserted that on July 5, 2012, Camarillo filed suit under the FLSA to recover damages for his unpaid overtime "for the prior three (3) years"—i.e., from July 5, 2009, through July 5, 2012.³ They claimed that the trial court's order granting their limited motion to reconsider conclusively established that Camarillo had worked 317.1 hours of overtime from July 5, 2009, through July 5, 2012, and that his hourly wage at alltimes during that period was $10.00 per hour. CBM and Wells alleged that these two facts established Camarillo was entitled to recover a total of $1,585.50 in unpaid overtime.⁴ See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1), § 216(b) (West 1998). CBM and Wells further alleged that under the FLSA, Camarillo was entitled to recover an additional $1,585.50 in liquidated damages. See id. § 216(b). Accordingly, they conceded Camarillo was entitled to $3,171.00 in damages on his overtime claim and confessed judgment for that amount. Additionally, CBM and Wells acknowledged that under the FLSA, Camarillo was entitled to recover his reasonable attorney's fees and costs. However, they alleged that Camarillo had not provided them with the amount of his reasonable attorney's fees and costs and that they therefore were unable to confess judgment on that portion of his overtime claim.

Upon considering CBM's and Wells's sworn petition to confess judgment, the live pleadings, and its previous orders—including its order granting CBM's and Wells's limited motion to reconsider—the trial court signed a partial judgment in which it found that Camarillo was entitled to recover from CBM and Wells "a total of $1,585.50 for unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount of $1,585.50 as liquidated damages, plus his reasonable and necessary attorneys'fees and costs" pursuant to section 216(b) of the FLSA.⁵ Accordingly, the partial judgment provided,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, the total sum of $3,171.00 in damages for Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff overtime wages as required by the FLSA.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, his reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA based on his overtime wage claim, which amounts shall be proven up by Plaintiff and determined by the Court at a later proceeding.

IT IS ORDERED that all other relief requested by Plaintiff for payment of his unpaid overtime wages is hereby denied.

Left pending were Camarillo's retaliation claim and a determination of the amount of his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs on his overtime claim.

Camarillo tried his retaliation claim to a jury, which found in favor of CBM and Wells.⁶ The trial court then conducted a bench trial on the issue of Camarillo's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In its final judgment, the trialcourt incorporated its partial judgment and, accordingly, rendered judgment in favor of Camarillo on his overtime claim and awarded him $1,585.50 in actual damages and $1,585.50 in liquidated damages. It also awarded Camarillo $38,640.50 in reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and $1,738.25 in costs.

In four issues, Camarillo argues the trial court erred by granting CBM's and Wells's limited motion to reconsider, by granting their sworn petition to confess judgment, by rendering its partial judgment, and by incorporating the partial judgment into the final judgment. And in three issues, CBM and Wells contend that the trial court erred in its fees and costs award.

As we explain below, we hold that the trial court erred by rendering a final judgment based upon its interlocutory partial judgment.

II. THE LIMITED MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The linchpin of Camarillo's argument is his contention that the trial court erred by granting CBM's and Wells's limited motion to reconsider. That is, Camarillo contends that the trial court erred by rendering final judgment on his overtime claim because that rendition was based upon the trial court's prior ruling granting CBM's and Well's limited motion to reconsider. And Camarillo argues the trial court's ruling on the limited motion to reconsider was erroneous because CBM and Wells failed to carry their burden to prove that he worked a total of 317.1 hours of overtime from July 5, 2009, through July 5, 2012.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Insofar as CBM's and Wells's limited motion to reconsider asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling on their motion for traditional summary judgment, the standards applicable to a motion for traditional summary judgment apply. To prevail on a motion for traditional summary judgment, the movant must prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists precluding summary judgment, we resolve every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and take all evidence favorable to it as true. Castillo v. Westwood Furniture, Inc., 25 S.W.3d 858, 860 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

B. CBM'S AND WELLS'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

After the trial court denied their motion for traditional summary judgment, CBM and Wells filed their limited motion to reconsider pursuant to rule of procedure 166a(e). That rule provides,

(e) Case not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If summary judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the judge may at the hearing examine the pleadings and the evidence on file, interrogate counsel, ascertain what material fact issues exist and make an order specifying the facts that are established as a matter of law, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(e). In their limited motion to reconsider, CBM and Wells moved the trial court to order that two facts were established as a matter of law: (1) that from July 5, 2009, to July 5, 2012, Camarillo's hourly rate was $10.00 per hour; and (2) that from July 5, 2009, to July 5, 2012, Camarillo worked exactly 317.1 hours of overtime. To establish these facts, CBM and Wells relied on two pieces of summary judgment evidence: an affidavit from Wells and a portion of Camarillo's deposition testimony. And in their brief, CBM and Wells assert that a letter offering tender they sent to Camarillo independently establishes those facts.

1. The Wells Affidavit

In pertinent part, Wells's affidavit stated,

2. "I am the president and owner of the defendant in this case, Cabinets by Micha[e]l, Inc. ("Cabinets by Michael"). I have personally read and reviewed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and all of the factual statements therein are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

. . . .

5. "I have personally reviewed the time records kept by Cabinets by Michael. Those records reflect that from Sunday, July 5, 2009, until Thursday, July 5, 2012, [Camarillo] worked exactly 317.1 hours of overtime (i.e., he worked 317.1 hours in excess of forty hours per week). During this time period, [Camarillo's] hourly rate was $10.00 per hour.

. . . .

9. "On January 29, 2014, I along with Cabinets by Michael, through counsel, tendered a cashier's check in the total amount of $3,171.00, which constituted full payment for theovertime hours worked by Plaintiff (or $1,585.50) plus 100%

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