Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vallee, 7892
Decision Date | 31 December 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 7892,Docket No. AND,7892 |
Citation | 687 A.2d 956 |
Parties | CAMBRIDGE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. Steven M. VALLEE, et al. DecisionLaw95 303. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
John C. Nivison, Pierce Atwood, Augusta, ME, for Plaintiff.
Paul F. Macri, Berman & Simmons, Lewiston, ME, Wendell G. Large, Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger, Portland, ME, for the Appellees.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.
Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Alexander, J.) in favor of Steven M. Vallee, State Mutual Insurance Company, and David and Renee Ouellette. Cambridge Mutual, in response to a personal injury action brought against Vallee by the Ouellettes, filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Vallee was not covered under a homeowners insurance policy issued by Cambridge Mutual to Vallee's father. Cambridge Mutual argues the trial court erred in deciding that Steven Vallee was a resident of his father's household at the time the Ouellettes' action arose. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.
Vallee was the defendant in a personal injury action brought by the Ouellettes on behalf of their son Bradley, who was injured on July 2, 1992. At that time, Vallee was living with his parents in Auburn. Vallee's father, Bertrand, had homeowners insurance with Cambridge Mutual. Section II(E)(1) of Bertrand's policy provides personal liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage "for which the insured is legally liable...." The policy defines "insured" as follows:
3. "insured" means you and residents of your household who are:
a. your relatives....
The definitions section does not define or otherwise explain the meaning of the term "resident" as contained in the definition of "insured."
On June 8, 1992, almost a month before Bradley Ouellette's injuries, Steven Vallee was arrested and charged with assaulting his wife. A condition of his bail prohibited him from returning to their home in Lisbon. A trial on the assault charge was scheduled for August 27, 1992. Between June 8 and his trial date (with the exception of a one- or two-week period in August), Vallee lived at his parents' house, kept his clothes there, and returned there after work each day. Vallee intended to live there until the assault charge against him was resolved. On the date set for trial, August 27, the charge was dropped and Vallee moved back into his Lisbon home.
On an appeal from a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered to determine whether the record supports the trial court's conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Simpson v. Central Maine Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Me.1996).
The term "resident," as used in the homeowners policy issued to Bertrand Vallee, is ambiguous. The language of a contract of insurance is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations. Brackett v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 486 A.2d 1188, 1189 (Me.1985) (citing Lidstone v. Green, 469 A.2d 843, 846 (Me.1983)). As many courts have observed, "residence" has different shades of meaning depending on the context in which it is used. See, e.g., Huffman v. Huffman, 232 Neb. 742, 441 N.W.2d 899, 904 (1989) ( ); Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1966) (...
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