Camden Cnty. v. Sweatt

• Docket Number: S22A0837
• Decision Date: 07 February 2023
• Citation: 315 Ga. 498,883 S.E.2d 827
• Parties: CAMDEN COUNTY v. SWEATT et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

315 Ga. 498

883 S.E.2d 827

CAMDEN COUNTY

v.SWEATT et al.

S22A0837

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 7, 2023

John S. Myers, John S. Myers PC, P.O. Box 99, Woodbine, Georgia 31569, William Bradley Carver, Sr., County Attorney, Russell A. Britt, Pearson Kern Cunningham, Hall Booth Smith, P.C, 191 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 2900, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Appellant.

G. Joseph Scheuer, Larry Wayne Ramsey, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Association County Commissioners of Georgia, 191 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 700, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Amicus Appellant.

Dana F. Braun, Kimberly Cofer Butler, Ellis Painter Ratterree & Adams LLP, PO Box 9946, Savannah, Georgia 31412, Philip Michael Thompson, Ellis Painter Ratterree & Adams LLP, 7 East Congress Street, 2nd Floor, Savannah, Georgia 31401, Kellye C. Moore, Walker Hulbert Gray & Moore, LLP, P.O. Box 1770, Perry, Georgia 31069, for Appellee.

Clare Rivka Norins, First Amendment Clinic, University of Georgia School of Law, PO Box 388, Athens, Georgia 30603, for Amicus Appellee.

McMillian, Justice.

Camden County (the "County") appeals the superior court's denial of its "Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief" concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge Robert C. Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on whether resolutions authorizing the County's purchase of land for a rocket launch facility should be repealed (the "Referendum"). The County asserts that the Referendum was not authorized under subparagraph (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties in this state (the "Home Rule Paragraph")¹ and that the results of the Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argues that the superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the Constitution. We disagree and affirm for the reasons set forth below.²

The facts are undisputed. Beginning in 2015, the Board of Commissioners for Camden County, Georgia (the "Board") began making plans to build a commercial rocket launch facility (the "spaceport") in Camden County. On June 3, 2015, the Board approved the County's entry into an option agreement with Union Carbide Corporation (the "Option Agreement") for the purchase of certain land on which to build the spaceport and later approved amendments to the Option Agreement that apparently extended the length of the option period.³ However, citizen opposition to the project arose over time, and on December 14, 2021,⁴ a number of registered electors in the County filed a petition under the Home Rule Paragraph in the Probate Court of Camden County (the "Electors’ Petition") seeking a special election for a referendum on the issue of whether the Board's resolutions authorizing the Option Agreement and its extensions (the "Resolutions") should be repealed.

The County filed a caveat to the Electors’ Petition alleging that the petitioners failed to meet the requirements of the Home Rule Paragraph because the filing contained a number of duplicate and inconsistent voter signatures, which brought the number of electors below the Home Rule Paragraph's requirement for obtaining a referendum. Judge Sweatt issued an order dismissing the caveat on February 8, 2022 (the "Caveat Order"), determining that there is no legal authority for filing an objection to a petition filed by electors under the Home Rule Paragraph, and even if such authority existed, the County's caveat was not verified as required under Georgia law. See OCGA § 15-9-88 (In probate court, "[a]ll objections or caveats to an order sought shall be in writing and verified, setting forth the grounds of such caveat.").

That same day, February 8, 2022, Judge Sweatt also issued an order granting the Electors’ Petition (the "Referendum Order"). The order determined that (1) the required number of verified electors had signed the petition; (2) the petition requested that the following question be put to the County's electors at a special election called pursuant to the Home Rule Paragraph:

Shall the resolutions of the Board of Commissioners of Camden County, Georgia authorizing the Option Contract with Union Carbide Corporation and Camden County's right and option to purchase the property described therein be repealed[;]

and (3) the petition satisfied the requirements of the Home Rule Paragraph. Based on these findings, the order directed that a special election on the question would be held on March 8, 2022. The County did not attempt to appeal either the Referendum Order or the Caveat Order.

However, prior to the special election, on February 24, 2022, the County filed a "Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief" in the Superior Court of Camden County against Judge Sweatt and also named James Goodman and Paul A. Harris, who had been among the electors to sign the Electors’ Petition, as interested parties who may wish to intervene in the proceeding. The petition sought writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt, asserting that he had exceeded the probate court's jurisdiction in setting the special election. The petition also sought a declaratory judgment that the Electors’ Petition was invalid, the Referendum Order was a nullity, and the Referendum was unauthorized, along with further declaratory relief to avoid consequences to the County arising from the Referendum. Goodman and Harris successfully moved to intervene in this action on February 25, 2022.⁵ An expedited hearing was held on March 3, 2022, and the next day, March 4, the superior court issued a written order⁶ summarily denying the County's petition.⁷ On March 8, 2022, the Referendum was held, resulting in a vote in favor of repealing the Resolutions.

In considering the County's appeal in this case, we will address separately each form of relief sought in the County's Petition: (1) writ of mandamus; (2) declaratory judgment; and (3) writ of prohibition.

1. Writ of Mandamus : The County petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to OCGA §§ 9-6-20⁸ and 9-6-21,⁹ asserting that it is entitled to such relief "because the constitutional provision at issue does not allow for a referendum in this circumstance." The County's petition for mandamus sought a writ commanding Judge Sweatt to "abandon his exercise of jurisdiction over the Petition;" "refrain from canvassing the returns and declaring and certifying the results of the March 8 election to the County"; "refrain from certifying the results of the March 8 election to the Secretary of State"; and "issue an order declaring the Petition invalid."

This Court has described a writ of mandamus as

an extraordinary remedy to compel a public officer to perform a required duty when there is no other adequate legal remedy. It is a discretionary remedy that courts may grant only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought or the public official has committed a gross abuse of discretion. In general, mandamus relief is not available to compel officials to follow a general course of conduct, perform a discretionary act, or undo a past act.

Gaddy v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue , 301 Ga. 552, 561-62 (3), 802 S.E.2d 225 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). See also R. A. F. v. Robinson , 286 Ga. 644, 646 (1), 690 S.E.2d 372 (2010) ("Mandamus can be used to compel an official to exercise his or her discretion, but not to direct the manner in which that discretion is exercised." (citation and punctuation omitted)). Rather, "mandamus relief applies prospectively only. It will not lie to compel the undoing of acts already done and this is so even though the action taken was clearly [in violation of the Georgia Constitution]." Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane , 266 Ga. 657, 660 (6), 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996) (affirming denial of mandamus relief seeking repayment of amounts paid by city to school district under an agreement that violated the Georgia Constitution).

Under the Home Rule Paragraph, the probate court judge's first responsibility upon receipt of a petition filed by electors for a special election is "[to] determine the validity of such petition." Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (2) (hereinafter "subparagraph (b) (2)"). If the judge determines that the petition is valid, "it shall be his duty to issue the call for an election for the purpose of submitting such amendment or repeal to the registered electors of the county for their approval or rejection" and to follow certain other procedures in conjunction with that election. Id.¹⁰ If the judge determines that the petition is invalid, "he shall cause to be published in explicit detail the reasons why such petition is not valid[.]" Id. Here, Judge Sweatt determined that the Electors’ Petition was valid and called the special election on February 8, 2022. The special election took place on March 8, 2022, and Judge Sweatt thereafter certified the results. On appeal, the County contends that the Superior Court should have issued a writ of mandamus to reverse the judge's determination that the Electors’ Petition was valid. In other words, the County asks for a writ of mandamus commanding the judge to undo his determination and the acts that followed. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the superior court properly denied the County's petition for a writ of mandamus because it sought only to compel Judge Sweatt to undo actions he had already taken.

2. Declaratory Judgment : The County contends that the superior court erred in denying the declaratory relief it sought¹¹ because the Electors’ Petition was not authorized under the Home Rule Paragraph.¹²

(a) Before we address the merits of the County's argument, however, we first consider the Intervenor-Appellees’ assertion

that the County is not authorized to pursue an action for...