Camden v. Camden Vill. Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1885
• Citation: 77 Me. 530,1 A. 689
• Parties: CAMDEN v. CAMDEN VILLAGE CORP.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

1 A. 689

77 Me. 530

CAMDEN

v. CAMDEN VILLAGE CORP.¹

SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.

Filed December 1, 1885.

This was an action to recover a tax assessed by the plaintiff town upon a building erected by the defendant corporation for public purposes.

A. P. Gould, for plaintiff.

T. R. Simonton, for defendant.

FOSTER, J. The defendant corporation, by special authority from the legislature, together with other powers and privileges particularly enumerated in the act of incorporation, was authorized to build a village hall at a cost of not more than $8,000. Thereafter a lot was purchased, and a building erected thereon by the defendants, known as "Megunti-cook Hall." This building is 60 feet long, 50 feet wide, and two stories high. The upper portion is finished into a hall, with galleries, platforms, and two small anterooms. The lower story contains a hall somewhat smaller than the one above, a lock-up, assessors' room, cook and furnace room. The upper hall is used for the annual and other meetings of the corporation, the lower one for a police court room; and when not in use by the corporation, both halls are let, as occasion requires, for lectures and other public entertainments, with an income from three to five hundred dollars a year, which is appropriated in defraying the annual expenses of the corporation. The plaintiff town, in which the defendant corporation is situated, claiming that the property is subject to taxation under the general statutes, like other real estate, has assessed a tax thereon, and this action is brought to recover the same. The plaintiff's claim is that this corporation is limited in its extent of territory,—is partly private and partly public,—in which the inhabitants of much the larger portion of the town have no pecuniary interest, and that this building, being adapted to and used in part for other than corporate purposes, is owned by the defendants in their social or commercial capacity and for pecuniary profit, and is therefore neither expressly nor impliedly exempt from taxation. As against this proposition the defense set up is that the corporation is of a public nature, and that the property upon which this tax is sought to be imposed is held by the defendants for public uses, necessarily incident to the objects of the corporation, and as such exempt from taxation.

For a correct determination of this question it becomes necessary to consider the nature and character of such corporations, the objects they are intended to accomplish, and their connection with the government of the state. It is laid down by the authorities that such corporations are public; and while they "are allowed to assume to themselves some of the duties of the state in a partial or detailed form, but having neither property nor power for personal aggrandizement, they can be considered in no other light than as auxiliaries of the government." U. S. v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 328. Being intended as agencies in the administration of civil government, they are regarded as public, and partaking the nature of municipal corporations in their incidents. Being purely creatures of legislative enactments, they owe their creation to the particular statute which gives them their existence. This statute, together with the general provisions of law applicable to them, confers upon them the powers they possess, and, like other municipal corporations, imposes upon them certain public duties which they owe to the state in the administration of the local government. Likewise towns are public corporations, created for similar public purposes in the due administration of the government of the state. As incident to their existence, and the objects of their creation, they are allowed to purchase or build town-houses, school-houses, poor-houses, and police stations; these being the "recognized functions of government," and as such exempted by implication from the general provisions of the statute in relation to taxation, as property appropriated to public uses. Worcester v. Western R. Corp., 4 Mete. 567; Wayland v. County Com'rs, 4 Gray, 501; Worcester Co. v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; Portland v. Water Co., 67 Me. 137; Boston & M. R. R. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. 239. This doctrine is thus laid down by a learned writer and jurist, (Dill. Mun. Corp. § 614:) "The general statutes of the state upon the subject of taxing property undoubtedly refer to private property, and not to that owned by the state; and, in view of the public nature of municipalities, and the purposes for which they are established, heretofore explained, the author is of opinion that such enactments do not, by implication, extend to any property owned by them,—certainly to none owned by them for public uses." In accordance with these views, the court of appeals in Kentucky, in the case of Louisville v. Com., 1 Duv. 295, held that whatever property was used and held by the city for carrying on its municipal government, or was necessary or useful for that purpose, was not taxable by the state, and this would include public buildings, prisons, and property dedicated to charity. The courts of other states furnish ample authority in support of exempting, by implication, from taxation property of the character above named. People v. Doe, 36 Cal. 222, was a case where a writ of assistance was asked by the plaintiff to put him in possession of land which he claimed to have acquired by tax title; being a portion of the city cemetery in the city of Sacramento. The court denied the writ as to that, on the ground that the land was public property, and therefore not taxable. Sanderson, J., said: "The constitution and laws upon the subject of taxing property are therefore to be understood as referring to private property and persons, and not including public property and the state, or any subordinate part of the state government, such as counties, towns, and municipal corporations." Speaking of the...