Camerena v. Department of Public Welfare

• Citation: 9 Ariz.App. 120,449 P.2d 957
• Decision Date: 28 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CIV,1
• Parties: Ascencion CAMERENA, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE and Maricopa County Department of Public Welfare of the State of Arizona, Appellees. 719.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Page 957

449 P.2d 957

9 Ariz.App. 120

Ascencion CAMERENA, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE and Maricopa County Department of Public Welfare of the State of Arizona, Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CIV 719.

Court of Appeals of Arizona.

Jan. 28, 1969.

Rehearing Denied March 6, 1969.

Gorey & Ely and Oscar C. Rauch, by Herbert L. Ely and Oscar C. Rauch, Phoenix, for appellant

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrell F. Smith, former Atty. Gen., by Peter Sownie, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

STEVENS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Maricopa County, denying appellant's petition for writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus, wherein she sought to have certain laws and regulations relating to 'Aid to Dependent Children' declared void.

The stipulated facts indicate that Ascencion Camerena and her 11 minor children were receiving Welfare Benefits entitled 'Aid to Dependent Children', commonly known as A.D.C., from appellees. Prior to being placed on the program the children were investigated, pursuat to applicable law, and found to be eligible for A.D.C. on the basis of the knowledge appellees then had.

Thereafter, by letter dated 21 January, 1966, appellant was advised as follows:

'This is to inform you that your Aid to Dependent Children grant of $220 is being suspended, effective February, 1966. This action is being taken due to the fact that Mr. Antonio Valenzuela was found to be living in your home.

'If you have any questions regarding this decision, please get in touch with me.

'If you are not in agreement with this decision, you have the right to a hearing. Forms for filing an appeal are furnished by this office.

'We will assist you in completing these forms if you desire such help.'

Valenzuela was the father of the two youngest children. Aside from this purported violation the minor children were qualified for and entitled to payments pursuant to A.D.C.

On 19 April, 1966, after the suspension went into effect, the appellant requested a hearing. A hearing was set for 2 May, 1966, and was continued until 9 May, 1966, at the request of her counsel. On 8 June, 1966, a decision was reached upholding the suspension from the welfare rolls.

From February 1966, until the date of the decision of the Welfare Department on 8 June, 1966, no A.D.C. payments were made to the petitioner for the minor children. The decision of 8 June, 1966, was final under A.R.S. § 46--205, subsec. C.

On 16 August, 1966, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, or in the alternative for a writ of mandamus, with the Superior Court. Issues were joined, a stipulation of facts was entered into, and the case was argued before the trial court on 15 December, 1966. The hearing involved no testimony, but the quesions of law revolved around the stipulated facts The issues which we must determine are as follows:

and the exhibits attached thereto were argued. The court entered its judgment denying the petition for extraordinary relief. The appellant appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not undertake jurisdiction and appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, the appellees argued several facts which go beyond the matters contained in the Stipulation of Facts. Although we find these additional facts colorful, we are unable to consider any matters outside the stipulated facts. Rule 52(c), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.

(1) Whether termination of A.D.C. benefits without a prior hearing constituted a violation of procedural due process under Article 2, Section 4, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S., or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(2) Whether subsection 3 of A.R.S. § 46--292 relating to the requirements for eligibility for assistance is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

(3) Whether the A.D.C. Act is unconstitutional for failing to provide for judicial review of decisions of the State Department of Welfare.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Appellant first contends that the suspension of A.D.C. benefits without affording appellant a prior hearing constituted a violation of due process. She urges, alternatively, that either A.R.S § 46--204, subsec. B, which relates to the opportunity for a hearing when A.D.C. benefits are modified or suspended, is unconstitutional because it does not require a prior hearing, or, if the statute can be interpreted as requiring a prior hearing, the application of the statute in this instance was an unconstitutional deprivation of due process because appellant was not afforded an opportunity for a prior hearing.

It is firmly established that when a person has been aggrieved by the action taken by a governmental agency, such person has the constitutional right to a hearing on issues of adjudicative facts. McGee v. Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 92 Ariz. 317, 376 P.2d 779 (1962); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); Bennett v. Arizona State Board of Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170, 388 P.2d 166 (1963); Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 28 S.Ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908).

It is clear in this instance that the suspension of welfare benefits involved adjudicative facts, as distinguished from legislative facts. It is also clear that appellant was afforded a hearing subsequent to the time the appellees suspended the welfare benefits. The narrow question which we are called upon to determine is whether the appellant was deprived of due process by reason of the suspension of benefits without affording her an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension becoming final.

Our research discloses numerous federal decisions which hold that a governmental agency must afford a person an opportunity for a hearing before the action taken by the agency becomes final. Cases enunciating this doctrine include Londoner v. City and County of Denver; Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5 Cir., 1961).

The Arizona case which seems most pertinent to the issue at hand is Schecter. That case involved that portion of Arizona's Financial Responsibility Act which provides for the suspension of a driver's license unless financial responsibility is shown. The statute contains two provisions for a hearing:

(1) upon request by a person aggrieved by action of the superintendent; and

(2) persons aggrieved by the superintendent action could within 10 days bring an action for a trial de novo in the Superior Court to determine the lawfulness of the action taken. Schecter challenged the constitutionality of the act on the grounds, in part, that it violated due process inasmuch 'While there is some ambiguity in the wording of the subject legislation, this Court believes that it is implied in this statute that, when requested, an aggrieved person shall have an administrative hearing before the suspension order becomes effective.'

as it failed to require the opportunity for a hearing prior to the action taken, that is, prior to the suspension of a driver's license. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act as against the due process argument. The Court first noted that several states had upheld the validity of the simlar statutes on grounds of a 'compelling public interest' requiring immediate action. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this ground after finding no compelling public interest present. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute by interpreting the statute to require a prior hearing. After rejecting the 'compelling public interest' exception the Court stated at page 282 of 93 Ariz., at page 142 of 380 P.2d:

The Court further stated:

'Accordingly, giving these various provisions the only meaning that would, in our view, render the statute constitutional, we hold that the administrative hearing provided by A.R.S. Section 28--1122, subd. A must, if requested, be conducted prior to the effective date of an order of suspension under the act.'

There are numerous decisions wherein the courts have departed from the due process requirement of a prior hearing. This exception has been recognized where the circumstances disclose a compelling public interest necessitating immediate action. A review of the decisions wherein the 'compelling public interest' doctrine was invoked reveals that the exception is sparingly applied, and only in those cases where the interest of the aggrieved individual is clearly subordinate to the interest of the public. For example, see North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 L.Ed. 195 (1908) involving summary seizure and destruction of contaminated foods; and Standard Airlines v. C.A.B., 85 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 177 F.2d 18 (1949), involving summary suspension of a pilot's license for safety reasons.

There is no compelling interest in the instant case which necessitates summary action by the State. One of the interests which the State has in terminating benefits is financial. A.R.S. § 46--294, 46--295 provides that the State may recover payments made to a person who is not eligible. In 76 Yale Law Journal 1234, (May 1967) there is a lengthy discussion, entitled Withdrawal of Public Welfare: Right to a Prior Hearing. At pages 1236 through 1243 there is a discussion of the 'compelling interest' doctrine and its application to welfare hearings. The author analyzes the interest of the government in relation to the interests of the welfare recipient. We paraphrase his conclusions as follows:

(1) The needy child has a great interest in a prior hearing because a subsequent hearing cannot undo the wrong resulting from a prior mistake. It the State was wrong in terminating benefits the child will have been denied the relief necessary for his basic subsistence.

(2) Once benefits are suspended the recipient will be all the less able to seek a subsequent hearing because once he is faced with need to live he can...