Cameron County v. Velasquez

• Decision Date: 16 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 13-83-172-CV,13-83-172-CV
• Parties: CAMERON COUNTY, Appellant, v. Joe A. VELASQUEZ and Maria Velasquez, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 776

668 S.W.2d 776

CAMERON COUNTY, Appellant, v. Joe A. VELASQUEZ and Maria Velasquez, Appellees.

No. 13-83-172-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Corpus Christi.

Feb. 16, 1984.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1984.

G. Thomas Coghlan, Lang, Cross, Ladon, Boldrick & Green, San Antonio, for appellant.

Tony Martinez, Horacio Barrera, Brownsville, for appellees.

Before GONZALEZ, UTTER and KENNEDY, JJ.

OPINION

GONZALEZ, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a suit for damages under the Texas Tort Claims Act. ¹ Appellee, Jose Velasquez, brought suit against appellant, Cameron County, for personal injuries sustained when he either slipped or dove off a shrimpboat that ran aground in the Gulf of Mexico, near the shores of a park owned by Cameron County. Appellant alleges that it owed no duty to appellee since it did not own or control the premises where the boat ran aground. We agree and reverse and render judgment that appellee take nothing.

* * * FACTS * * *

In the early morning hours of May 4, 1978, the shrimpboat Kerry Dancer ran aground in the Gulf of Mexico near the shores of Andy Bowie Park in South Padre Island. The Kerry Dancer was a wooden-hull boat approximately sixty feet long and eighteen feet wide with a pilot house about six to seven feet above the deck.

Bill Kenon, a salvor with twenty years of experience, arrived on the scene that same day. As part of his salvage operations, a line was attached to the Kerry Dancer and a winch truck on shore attempted to move the vessel closer to the beach.

Kenon's crew was able to move the boat only ten or fifteen feet as it had begun "sanding up." The witness explained that by this he meant to describe how planks on the bottom of the vessel had come loose allowing the hull to fill with sand.

Kenon stated that when he last saw the boat, it was sanded up and not capable of moving on its own. He fixed the location of the vessel at various distances ranging from "a couple of hundred feet out" to "approximately a hundred yards, maybe not quite that far." He stated the distance would depend on the tide. In any event, he testified that during all the time he was familiar with the boat, it never moved off the second sand bar from the beach and was at all times surrounded by water. Kenon was dismissed from the job.

Subsequently, on approximately May 11, 1978, Coastal Diving Company attempted to acquire ownership of the vessel in exchange for its salvage fee. David Landin of Coastal Diving said that when he saw the Kerry Dancer, it was wallowing in the surf on the second sand bar from the beach. He fixed the distance from the beach at about forty yards. Coastal removed the outriggers, booms and nets from the vessel. When Coastal discovered there were liens against the vessel, it abandoned its operation.

Jose Velasquez testified that on June 3, 1978, he drove to Andy Bowie Park and after drinking several cans of beer, got onto the boat. After spending approximately fifteen to twenty minutes on top of the pilot house, he either slipped or dove off and severely injured his spine. Thereafter, he filed suit against the County and alleged that the County operated the park in a negligent manner by allowing the partially sunken boat to remain on its premises, that the County violated a statutory duty to clean, maintain, and supervise its public beaches in that it failed to either eliminate the dangerous condition or warn of same. ² The County answered that Velasquez was injured because of his own negligence and that it was not liable because it did not own or control the premises.

At the conclusion of evidence, the County moved for an instructed verdict on the basis that the undisputed evidence showed that at the time of the accident, the boat was located in the Gulf of Mexico, and, as such, was on property belonging to the State of Texas and therefore the County did not owe a duty to Velasquez. The trial court denied the motion, and after the boiler plate definitions of preponderance of the evidence, ordinary care, proximate cause, and negligence were given to the jury, the trial court submitted the case to the jury as follows:

QUESTION 1

Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Mr. Velasquez on the occasion in question?

(a) Cameron County

(b) Mr. Velasquez

(c) Both Cameron County and Mr. Velasquez

(d) Neither Cameron County nor Mr. Velasquez

Answer: C

You are instructed that in answering the above question you must confine your deliberations on this question to the following acts or omissions, if any, on the part of Cameron County:

(1) Failure, if any, to warn the public of dangers, if any, created by the Kerry Dancer.

(2) Failure to remove, or cause to be removed, the Kerry Dancer prior to the occasion in question.

(3) Failure to close Andy Bowie Park to the public in the area on the Kerry Dancer prior to the occasion in question.

Your are instructed that in answering the above question you will confine your deliberations on this question to the following acts or omissions, if any, on the part of Mr. Velasquez:

1. His lookout.

2. Going aboard the Kerry Dancer.

3. Diving, if he did, from the Kerry Dancer.

4. Failure, if any, to hold on to the mast.

5. Going to the Kerry Dancer while intoxicated, if he was.

If in answer to Question 1 you have answered "Both" then answer Question 2; otherwise, do not answer Question 2, and skip to Question 3.

Question 2 was the comparative negligence issue and the jury found the County 70% negligent and Velasquez 30%. The third issue was the damages issue. The jury found that 1.88 million dollars would compensate appellee for damages that included mental anguish, pain and suffering, lost earnings and lost earning capacity. Judgment was entered in favor of Velasquez in the amount of one million eighty five thousand dollars ($1,085,000.00) plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum with the proviso that payment by the County of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) would fully discharge its liability.

The County perfected this appeal, and among other things, alleges that the trial court committed error in entering judgment for appellee because:

(1) there was no evidence that the County owned or controlled the property where the boat was located.

(2) appellee failed to request an issue establishing the County's ownership or control of the property where the boat was located.

(3) there was no evidence to support the jury finding that the County was negligent.

The instant suit was permissible under the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Vernon Supp.1982-83) which provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Section 3 of the act makes each unit of government liable for money damages for personal injuries proximately caused by its negligent acts or omissions in the use of tangible property, real or personal. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-19 § 3 (Vernon Supp.1982-83).

DUTY OF THE COUNTY

It is fundamental that the right of recovery for an injury sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the conduct of defendant must be founded upon a legal duty of some character owed to the plaintiff with respect to the injury and a violation of that duty by the defendant. Rassman, Of Torts and Defendants, 16 Sw.L.J. 244, 245 (1962) and authorities cited therein. The three elements of actionable negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately resulting from such breach. Each of the elements must coexist in order that there can be any recovery. (citations omitted) Whether or not a legal duty does exist under a given state of facts and circumstances is essentially a question of law to be determined by the court.

Rodriquez v. Carson, 519 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A plaintiff must prove the existence and violation of a legal duty owed to him by the defendant to establish tort liability. Coleman v. Hudson Gas and Oil Corp., 455 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.1970).

So, the threshold question is whether the County owed the plaintiff a duty. Put another way, was Cameron County owner or occupier of the premises where the boat went aground? If it was, as a matter of law it owed a duty to the plaintiff and the scope of that duty is delineated in the Texas Tort Claims Act. If it was not, it is self evident that there is no basis for plaintiff's cause of action against the County.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328E (1974) defines owner or occupier in terms of "possessor":

A possessor of land is

(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or

(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or

(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is in possession under clauses (a) and (b).

Another issue presented to this Court is if ownership is a contested issue, whether it is incumbent upon the plaintiff in a premises defect suit to prove ownership in the defendant before he may recover for his injuries.

In McLelland Stores Co. v. Lindsey, 157 S.W.2d 1013 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.) the court wrote:

Defendant, in effect, contends that there was no evidence to show that it owned or operated or was in any wise connected with, the store in which Mrs. Lindsey fell. Its [sic] general denial had the effect, of course, of joining issue upon such fact alleged by the Plaintiff; and cast the burden of establishing such fact upon the Plaintiff.

McLelland Stores, 157 S.W.2d at 1014; see also West v. Johnson, 129 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1939, writ ref'd) (where named defendants specifically alleged to be owners and operators of premises, general denial by defendants would put all material allegations in issue). We hold that it is...