Cameron v. Attorney Gen. United States, 15-2882
Decision Date | 17 February 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 15-2882,15-2882 |
Parties | CORNEL BONITO CAMERON, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 16, 2016
Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE and GREENBERG, CircuitJudges
Cornel Bonito Cameron, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board ofImmigration Appeals' final order of removal. For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
Cameron is a citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 1999 as a non-immigrant visitor. He later married a United States citizen and adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. On March 18, 2014, Cameron was convicted of two counts of Use of a Telephone to Facilitate the Commission of a Drug Trafficking Felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). In light of this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a controlled substance offense, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Cameron admitted the allegations in the Notice to Appear, but moved to terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that he was eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
On May 12, 2015, following a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Cameron removable as charged on account of his 2014 conviction. The IJ further found that he was not eligible for any form of relief from removal, and denied the motion to terminate. Cameron appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), but the BIA affirmed the IJ's findings and dismissed the appeal.
Cameron now petitions for review of the BIA's order.
We generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C.§ 1252(a)(1). In this case, however, because the agency found Cameron removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony and controlled substance offense, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Borrome v. Att'y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). We review such claims and questions de novo. See Mudric v. Att'y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2006). When, as in this case, the BIA agrees with the IJ's analysis and adds analysis of its own, we review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. See Sandie v. Att'y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).
Cameron first challenges the BIA's determination that his conviction for using a telephone to facilitate a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), constitutes an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).1 Upon review, we conclude that the BIA properly determined that Cameron's conviction for this federal drug offense is an aggravated felony. A conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony if it is for a crime that is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), see § 1101(a)(43)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and for which more than one year of imprisonment may be imposed, see Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 56 n.7 (2006). "The upshot is that a noncitizen's conviction of an offense that the [CSA] makes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment will be counted as an 'aggravatedfelony' for immigration purposes." Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013). Cameron's conviction clearly meets these requirements, as § 843 is part of the CSA, and prescribes a maximum penalty of four years.2 21 U.S.C. § 843(d); see also Khan v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 521, 522 (2d Cir. 2003) ( ). Thus, the IJ and BIA correctly concluded that Cameron's conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the INA.3
Cameron next challenges the agency's determination that he was ineligible for a discretionary grant of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). As the BIA correctly noted, however, in order to qualify for such relief, Cameron was required to show that he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); see also Garcia v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006) () (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As discussed above, Cameron's conviction was for an aggravated felony. Therefore, the IJ and BIA correctly determined that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Finally, Cameron challenges the BIA's determination that the IJ afforded him all the process he was due at his removal hearing. Specifically, Cameron contends that the IJ violated his due process rights by failing to advise him that he could seek relief from removal under INA § 212(h). Notably, however, that section provides the Attorney General with discretion to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility, not grounds of deportability.4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Thus, an alien like Cameron who is in removal proceedings may not obtain a § 212(h) waiver unless he is concurrently seeking to adjust his status. See In re Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 132-33 (BIA 2013) (); 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(f) (); see also Poveda v. Att'y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1177 (11th Cir. 2012) ( ). In this case, Cameron did not apply for adjustment of status and nothing in the record suggests that he had any basis to do so; as the Government correctly notes, Cameron testified at the hearing that he is not currently married, and he has never alleged that he has any family or employer-based means to adjust his status. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Under these circumstances, we do not fault the IJ for failing to advise him of this potential avenue for relief.5 Cf. Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005) ( ); see also Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att'y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010) ().
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
*. This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
1. Cameron does not challenge the agency's determination that he is also removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense.
2. Cameron contends that the IJ erred in relying on "conflicting" information contained in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report (PSR) to determine that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Contrary to Cameron's contention, however, the record reflects that the IJ relied exclusively on the Judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in making this determination, and that Judgment clearly reflects that Cameron pleaded guilty to two counts under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). (AR000128.)
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