Cameron v. Caldwell
| Decision Date | 03 September 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 28752,28752 |
| Citation | 232 Ga. 611,208 S.E.2d 441 |
| Parties | Willie L. CAMERON v. E. B. CALDWELL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Willie L. Cameron, pro se.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This appeal is from a habeas corpus judgment that remanded the appellant to custody. The sole question for decision is the issue of double jeopardy.
The appellant was tried twice for the same offense, and at the first trial he and another defendant were tried together. The jury convicted the other defendant, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict with respect to the appellant. The trial judge declared a mistrial in appellant's case, and the appellant was subsequently tried on the same charge and convicted by a jury at his second trial. The appellant raised the issue of double jeopardy at his second trial, but his plea was overruled. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus raising the double jeopardy issue, and his plea was again rejected by the habeas court. The appellant has come here seeking review.
The double jeopardy provision in Georgia's Constitution is: 'No person shall be put in jeopardy of life, or liberty, more than once for the same offense, save on his, or her own motion for a new trial after conviction, or in case of mistrial.' This court has consistently held that if a jury cannot agree upon a verdict in a criminal case, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, and the accused may then be tried a second time for the same offense. The declaration of a mistrial under such circumstances precludes an accused from successfully invoking the constitutional principle of double jeopardy at his second trial. See Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943).
The federal constitutional provision on this subject, in earlier days not applicable to Georgia but made applicable to the individual states by the Fourteenth Amendment, says: 'nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' Code § 1-805.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that this provision of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit a second trial of the accused when the jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict. See United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824), and Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur except GUNTER, J., who dissents.
I must dissent from the court's judgment of affirmance in this case. A reading of the record in this case convinces me that the declaration of a mistrial was not dictated by 'manifest necessity' or the 'ends of public justice.' After an accused has been fully tried before a jury for the crime charged, and the jury has received the case and deliberated on its verdict but cannot reach a decision of guilty or not guilty, the declaration of a mistrial so as to permit the retrial of the accused on the same charge violates the due process and double jeopardy constitutional rights of the accused. Such a procedure, in my opinion, makes the double jeopardy provision in the Fifth Amendment and the due process provision in the Fourteenth Amendment, in combination, meaningless.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is made applicable to Georgia through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).
In this case the jury had deliberated the cases of both defendants for merely a portion of a day. The jury reported that it had reached a verdict in one case but could not reach a verdict in the other. The jury returned a verdict in one defendant's case, but no verdict was returned in the appellant's case. The jury was discharged, and the trial judge declared a mistrial. This record is that bare with respect to there being a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial to meet the ends of public justice.
In a case showing far greater 'manifest necessity' for the declaration of a mistrial than the record in this case shows, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the...
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Williams v. State
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