Cameron v. City of Gilroy
| Citation | 104 Cal.App.2d 76,230 P.2d 838 |
| Parties | CAMERON v. CITY OF GILROY. Civ. 14371. |
| Decision Date | 08 May 1951 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
Campbell, Hayes & Custer and Robert E. Hayes, all of San Jose (Edward J. Niland, Santa Clara, of counsel), for appellant.
Harold Holden, Morgan Hill, R. G. Wilkins, San Jose, for respondent.
Respondent, Annie Cameron, received personal injuries when her foot slipped while she was entering a marked crosswalk leading across Monterey Street in the City of Gilroy. The City of Gilroy had constructed some years before an approach to the crosswalk leading from the theretofore existing sidewalk into the street. The sidewalk level at that point is ten inches above the street level and the approach, in the form of an arc-shaped ramp, was flush with the sidewalk at its higher end and, in a length of 33 inches, curved downward with an increasing pitch to meet the street level at its lower end. Aptly described by some witnesses as 'barrel-shaped', it was constructed of a surface of concrete poured over a curved iron frame. The plaintiff's fall was caused by her foot slipping from under her when she placed it upon the curved surface of the ramp. The court, sitting without a jury, gave plaintiff judgment for damages against the City of Gilroy and the city has appealed.
Photographs of the ramp are in evidence and from a side view it seems obvious that its curved surface as it sloped into the street was not well designed to secure a sure footing for pedestrians. This is supported by the testimony of witnesses that prior to respondent's mishap other persons, particularly women, seeking to use it had lost their footing on its curved surface.
Monterey Street is a state highway and appellant seeks to escape liability on the ground that this ramp being located upon, and a part of, a state highway, respondent city had no legal authority to repair or remove it. In support of this argument appellant relies heavily upon Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 225 P.2d 522. We have concluded that on its facts this case is not controlled by the Gillespie case.
The ramp in this case was admittedly constructed by the City of Gilroy under the direction of its superintendent of streets. By reason of its shape it was neither designed, nor could it be used, for vehicular travel. The sides of the ramp are vertical and, rising in a curve to a height of ten inches, it presents an obstacle to vehicular traffic, rather than being designed for its use. It was obviously designed and intended solely for pedestrian travel. A contract between the State Highway Department and appellant city, entered into long after the ramp was in place, was introduced into evidence. This contract is similar in form to the contract considered in the Gillespie case and contains the following provisions:
'There is hereby delegated to the city the maintenance of the areas between curb lines and right of way lines * * *.
'The Department of Public Works hereby delegates to the city such administrative powers, jurisdiction, and authority as are vested by law in the department to regulate and control the streets constituting the designated State highway routes within the city, in so far as the areas outside the curb lines are concerned.'
The crucial question lies in construing the language 'between curb lines and right of way lines' and 'outside the curb lines'. If the ramp upon which respondent fell lay within the area over which 'administrative powers, jurisdiction, and authority' and 'maintenance' were delegated by the contract to the City of Gilroy the legal authority of the city to remedy the defect is established.
In the Gillespie case a majority of the court found similar contract language inapplicable to a mountain highway without sidewalks, saying, 225 P.2d at page 527: 'Route 156 is a mountain road, lacking the sidewalk area whose maintenance could reasonably be separated from that of the roadway.' In this sentence the court recognizes that the purpose of these contracts is to reserve to the State Highway Department the control over and maintenance of the roadway, that portion of the highway designed for and used by vehicular traffic, and to delegate to the city like powers and duties over the sidewalk area, that portion of the highway not designed for or used by vehicular traffic but reserved exclusively for...
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...address of claimant's counsel substantially complies with the requirement that claimant's address be given. See Cameron v. City of Gilroy, 104 Cal.App.2d 76, 230 P.2d 838 (1951). (2) The letter requests any response be directed to the attorney's office. (3) The letter identifies several cir......
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...See Gay–Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1107 (E.D.Cal.2001); Cameron v. City of Gilroy, 104 Cal.App.2d 76, 80, 230 P.2d 838 (1951). Also, providing the dollar amount would give the County a starting point for assessing potential liability, as wel......
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