Cameron v. Fogarty
| Decision Date | 01 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2297,85-2297 |
| Parties | Kenneth S. CAMERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew FOGARTY and John Halbig, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Steven R. Popofsky, New York City (Diana Hassel, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York City, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Elizabeth Dvorkin, New York City (Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, June A. Witterschein, New York City, on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before NEWMAN, KEARSE and MINER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Kenneth S. Cameron, who was convicted in 1980 in New York State Supreme Court of possession of stolen property following his arrest by defendant police officers Matthew Fogarty and John Halbig, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward R. Neaher, Judge, dismissing his amended complaint ("complaint"), brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), seeking damages from defendants on the ground that they had arrested him without probable cause, in violation of his federal constitutional rights. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, ruling that New York law bars a civil action for arrest without probable cause if the claimant has been convicted of the crime for which he was arrested. On appeal, Cameron argues that New York law should not have been applied, since its application frustrates the purpose of Sec. 1983. Defendants urge that we affirm the dismissal, either on the ground adopted by the district court or on the ground that the claim was barred by principles of collateral estoppel. We conclude that although principles of collateral estoppel do not apply, the judgment should be affirmed because common-law principles incorporated in Sec. 1983 bar the present suit.
Insofar as it is pertinent to Cameron's claim of false arrest and the propriety of the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the trial record in state court reveals the following events and proceedings.
On February 13, 1980, New York City Police Officers Fogarty and Halbig observed Cameron, driving a car with Illinois license plates and a broken left rear vent window, make an illegal right turn through a red light on 111th Street in Manhattan and park illegally at a bus stop on Eighth Avenue. Cameron and his passenger, Anthony Wilson, left the car and began to walk away from it. Because of the illegal right turn and because the broken vent window caused them to suspect that the car might have been stolen, the officers pulled alongside the car and hailed Cameron, identifying themselves as police officers.
When asked for identification of himself and his vehicle, Cameron produced a Virginia driver's license bearing his photograph and the name Sammy Davis, Jr., and a carbon copy of a Hertz Corporation ("Hertz") car rental agreement made out to Jenne M. Currie, whom Cameron identified as his aunt. The agreement indicated that the car was to have been returned to Hertz on February 3. Cameron told the officers that the car window had been broken recently, that he had reported it to Hertz at Newark Airport, and that he had there been added to the rental agreement as a driver. The copy of the rental agreement bore handwritten notations in ink that Sammy Davis, Jr., was an authorized additional driver and that an accident report had been filed at Newark Airport.
In the minute or two between noticing Cameron's car and stopping alongside it, the officers had radioed police headquarters for information as to whether the car had been reported stolen, but had received no response. After questioning Cameron they remained suspicious because of the broken window, the notations inked in on the rental agreement, and the apparent overdue return of the car, and they decided to go to the police station to investigate further. Cameron and Wilson rode with Fogarty in the police car; Halbig drove the rental car.
At the station house, Cameron identified himself as Kenneth Cameron and showed Fogarty a passport in that name. He also produced an airline ticket to Barbados made out to K. Cameron, a social security card bearing the name Sammy Davis, Jr., and four state child support checks made out to Giovanni Stanislaus, who he said was his child.
Halbig telephoned Hertz to inquire about the car. Hertz employees informed both Halbig and Fogarty that the car was stolen, having been fraudulently rented at O'Hare Airport in Chicago. The employees also stated that Hertz did not authorize additional drivers in the manner indicated on Cameron's rental agreement and that no accident report had been filed.
Cameron was then placed under arrest and charged with several offenses including grand larceny, criminal impersonation, and criminal possession of stolen property.
At trial, the state's evidence included Fogarty's testimony describing the events as set forth above. When Fogarty was asked what statements Cameron had made about the license and the rental agreement when he produced those documents on the street, Cameron's counsel requested a sidebar conference, which included the following colloquy:
MR. DOCKRY [counsel for Cameron]: I would call to the Court's attention statements are now being proffered, statements allegedly made by the defendant.
It woud [sic ] seem I am going to run into the area of rights.
I would just ask the District Attorney to clarify the rights issue and the Miranda issue.
I am relatively certain it is all quite proper, but nonetheless.
MR. BARBER [the prosecutor]: That is entirely correct.
(Tr. 184-85.) The Sammy Davis, Jr. driver's license was then introduced into evidence without objection by Cameron. The rental agreement had been received in evidence earlier, also without objection by Cameron.
The social security card, the child-support checks, and the airline ticket were received in evidence subject to Cameron's counsel's "reserv[ation of an] objection" as to those documents. The reserved objections were overruled when, during Cameron's cross-examination of Fogarty, they were renewed in the following colloquy:
MR. DOCKRY: I hate to bother the Court with what may be a trifling matter.
You recall in a brief bench conference this mroning [sic ], in the course of the officer's testimony who is about to resume the stand, I asked to make very sure that the search which was to follow at the police station and the statements then taken, and all these things, that those would be probably [sic --properly?] structured.
The Court permitted me to wait until it became more timely.
Thereafter when these things were introduced into evidence I took objection and I also asked the Court to give me permission to renew an objection on a later date after cross examination.
But at this point it must be clear that the items that were introduced have not been properly foundationed with respect to the propriety of such a thing as admissible evidence in this case.
Under the circumstances they were properly admissible.
There were no pretrial motions to suppress. I don't know what the basis would have been in making one, under the circumstances of this case.
It is clear, after the defendant had been arrested, I assume he was searched, and those properties were the consequence of an arrest.
MR. DOCKRY: Thank you, sir. Now I am ready to proceed.
(Tr. 214-16.)
Cameron was convicted of first degree criminal possession of stolen property, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 165.50 (McKinney 1975). He appealed the conviction, but did not challenge the admissibility of any evidence against him. His conviction was affirmed without opinion. People v. Cameron, 86 A.D.2d 783, 448 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1st Dept), leave to appeal denied, 56 N.Y.2d 595, 450 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 435 N.E.2d 1102 (1982).
In February 1982, Cameron commenced the present action pro se, alleging that the defendants had arrested him in violation of his constitutional rights and seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The district court's early dismissal of the action was reversed by this Court as premature, Cameron v. Fogarty, 705 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.1983), and on remand, counsel was assigned and filed the complaint that is the focus of this appeal. Cameron alleged that his arrest took place on Eighth Avenue when he was required to accompany the officers to the police station, and that the arrest violated his constitutional rights because at that time the officers lacked probable cause to believe that a crime had occurred or that he had committed it and lacked any good faith belief that probable cause existed for his arrest.
Defendants answered and moved for summary judgment on the ground that the state court's ruling that the evidence was admissible at Cameron's criminal trial because it had been obtained in a search incident to a lawful arrest necessarily included a finding that there had been probable cause to make the arrest, and that Cameron's claim was therefore barred by principles of collateral estoppel.
In a Memorandum Order dated August 19, 1985 ("Decision"), the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that, even if the issue of probable cause to arrest had not been raised and rejected at the criminal trial, under New York common law Cameron's conviction barred his subsequent civil suit for arrest without probable cause. Reasoning that a claim under New York law for false arrest or false imprisonment would be...
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