Cameron v. Stack-Gibbs Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1912
• Citation: 68 Wash. 539,123 P. 1001
• Parties: CAMERON v. STACK-GIBBS LUMBER CO. et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

123 P. 1001

68 Wash. 539

CAMERON v. STACK-GIBBS LUMBER CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 25, 1912

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Wm. A. Huneke Judge.

Action by Donald R. Cameron against the Stack-Gibbs Lumber Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Reese H. Voorhees, for appellants.

Robertson & Miller, for respondent.

PARKER J.

The plaintiff, Donald R. Cameron, commenced this action in the superior court for Spokane county to recover from the defendants Stack-Gibbs Lumber Company, C. D. Gibbs, and R. B Stack the sum of $5,000 as compensation for certain information furnished by him to them relating to the standing timber in the neighborhood of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene river in northern Idaho, with the view to the acquisition of such timber by them. A trial before the court and a jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against all of the defendants for $5,000, from which they have appealed.

Respondent has been for some years engaged in the lumbering business in northern Idaho, and thereby acquired knowledge of the timber resources of the country in the vicinity of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene river and its tributaries. Appellant Stack-Gibbs Lumber Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Michigan. At the times here involved, its principal place of business was at Spokane in this state, and it was engaged in the lumber and sawmill business and in acquiring timber lands. Appellants C. D Gibbs and R. B. Stack were at the times here involved the vice president and assistant secretary, respectively, of the lumber company, with their residence at Spokane. They had the active management of the affairs of the company at its principal office and place of business at Spokane, and were the highest officers representing it residing in either Washington or Idaho.

The nature of the contract and the services upon which respondent rests his claim against appellants are alleged in his complaint as follows: 'That on or about the 1st day of February, 1906, the said defendant C. D. Gibbs, acting for himself and for R. B. Stack and for the Stack-Gibbs Lumber Company, a corporation, and as agent of the said corporation and of said Stack, procured this plaintiff to furnish the said defendants with such information as the plaintiff had concerning the timber resources of said region, and the value and the character of the land, and thereupon the said defendants agreed with the plaintiff that the plaintiff should procure a cruiser, one J. B. Graves, who, in the employ of the plaintiff and of the Cameron Lumber Company, had acquired knowledge of the said timber region, to go with the representative of the said defendants into the territory where the said timber then was, and did then and there agree with the plaintiff to pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation for the information so given, the plaintiff for such consideration agreeing with the said defendants, and each of them, to do such work in furnishing information, in assisting in employing cruisers, and in assisting in getting said timber in shape for location, and by aiding the defendants in so doing as the defendants might from time to time require, including the furnishing of such information as the plaintiff had in relation thereto; and thereupon this plaintiff performed all of the covenants and agreements on his part, and procured the said J. B. Graves and the son of this plaintiff to go with the agents and representatives of the said defendants into the vicinity where the said timber was, and did furnish all the information required by said defendants.' It is further alleged that thereafter they promised to pay him $5,000 for his services under this contract, and that he agreed to accept that sum in full payment thereof.

One of the contested questions upon the trial was whether or not the alleged contract was such a joint and several contract as would entitle respondent to recover from any or all of the appellants. While the jury rendered a general verdict in favor of respondent and against all of the appellants, the jury also made certain special findings in the form of answers to certain special interrogatories which it is contended by counsel for appellants are so inconsistent with the general verdict as to entitle them to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in any event to a new trial. The general verdict and special findings are as follows: 'Verdict for plaintiff. We, the jury in the case of Donald R. Cameron, plaintiff, v. Stack-Gibbs Lumber Co., a corporation, and C. D. Gibbs and R. B. Stack, defendants, find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at the sum of $5,000.00 five thousand and no/100 dollars, with interest at 6% from the date of demand by the plaintiff. Spokane, Washington, Oct. 14th, 1910. C. E. Smith, foreman.' 'Special interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 1. Did the plaintiff enter into a contract with the defendant, C. D. Gibbs, intending at the time to contract with him individually? Answer: No. Interrogatory No. 2. Did the plaintiff enter into a contract with the defendant, R. B. Stack, intending at the time to contract with him individually? Answer: No. C. E. Smith, foreman. Date Oct. 14th, 1910.'

At the time the jury returned the verdict and special findings into court, the following occurred, as shown by the statement of facts: 'By Mr. Robertson [counsel for respondent]: Is there any question in the mind of the court that the special verdicts are inconsistent, and that the jury should be sent back to the jury room? By the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, did you intend that the general verdict was your verdict? To which the jury responded, 'It is.' The foreman: The jury understood in answering the special findings that they had complied with the instructions of the court; that it was the intention of the jury in so answering the said special interrogatories to hold the said Stack and Gibbs individually responsible with the said company, and that if they had answered them otherwise the jury believed that they would not so hold them. The Court: Gentlemen, is the general verdict your verdict? Ten of said jury answered that it was, and thereupon counsel for the plaintiff requested that, if the special verdicts were inconsistent, the jury be permitted to return to the jury room. Thereupon the court said that the questions submitted were special interrogatories, and not special verdicts, and thereupon the jury was polled as to the special interrogatories, and 10 of the said jury said that the answers to the said special interrogatories were their answers, and two of said jury stated that, not having voted in favor of the general verdict, the said answers to the interrogatories were not agreed to by them, and thereupon the jury was discharged from further consideration of the case.'

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